7 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2020To that end, we employed the same two-level inquiry utilized in Williams II and first determined “the General Assembly’s intent in enacting SORNA apparently was twofold: to comply with federal law; and . . . ‘not to punish, but to promote public safety through a civil, regulatory scheme.’” Id. at 1209-10 , quoting Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972 . 2007The basis of his claim in this regard is that if deemed punitive, and thereby criminal, the Commonwealth would be held to a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard” in convincing the court that a juvenile should be subject to the dictates of Act 21. ¶ 12 In support of Appellant’s position, he points to the case of Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487 , 832 A.2d 962 (2003) (“Williams II”), in which the Supreme Court adopted the two-level inquiry enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). | 3 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Gaffneygreen2 sentences2006The legislature’s stated intent, noted above, was not retribution but, rather, provided “a system of registration and notification so that relevant information would be available to state and *1017 local law enforcement officials in order to provide the safety and general welfare of the public.” Id. at 972 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327 , 733 A.2d 616, 619 (1999)). 2006Accordingly, “the General Assembly’s intent in enacting Megan’s Law II was not to punish, but to promote public safety through a civil, regulatory scheme.” Id. ¶ 15 In conducting the second part of the two-level inquiry, the Williams II Court proceeded to examine the Mendoza-MaHinez factors, which, although not exhaustive or dispositive, see id. at 972, are helpful in determining “whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent[,]” id. at 971. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2003After applying the two-level inquiry set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), i.e., consideration of (1) the legislative intent of the statute, and (2) its purpose and effect, determined by considering the seven factors outlined in the Court's 1963 decision, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 *348 (1963), the Williams II Court held that the registration, notification and counseling provisions of the Act do not constitute criminal punishment; rather, they "constitute non-punitive, 2003After applying the two-level inquiry set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), i.e., consideration of (1) the legislative intent of the statute, and (2) its purpose and effect, determined by considering the seven factors outlined in the Court's 1963 decision, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 *348 (1963), the Williams II Court held that the registration, notification and counseling provisions of the Act do not constitute criminal punishment; rather, they "constitute non-punitive, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2020This Court analyzed the statute’s provisions under the same two-level inquiry used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith [v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)]. 2007The basis of his claim in this regard is that if deemed punitive, and thereby criminal, the Commonwealth would be held to a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard” in convincing the court that a juvenile should be subject to the dictates of Act 21. ¶ 12 In support of Appellant’s position, he points to the case of Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487 , 832 A.2d 962 (2003) (“Williams II”), in which the Supreme Court adopted the two-level inquiry enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). | 5 | 2003–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.
red
1 sentence2020To that end, we employed the same two-level inquiry utilized in Williams II and first determined “the General Assembly’s intent in enacting SORNA apparently was twofold: to comply with federal law; and . . . ‘not to punish, but to promote public safety through a civil, regulatory scheme.’” Id. at 1209-10 , quoting Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Rhoads
green
1 sentence2004Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Williams, this Court, in Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super.2003), discussed the constitutionality of the requirements in question as follows: In light of our Supreme Court’s holding [in Williams ], we find all of appellant’s constitutional challenges, which hinge on the underlying assumption that the registration, notification and counseling provisions of [Megan’s Law II] constitute criminal punishment and therefore, individually or collectively, violate one’s constitutional rights by imposing an additional punishment without providing d | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.