two-level test in California

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1984(Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 15, fn. 13 .) California follows the two-level test employed by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection clause.” (Reece v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., supra, 64 Cal.App.3d 675, 679 .) If anything, the California Supreme Court appears even more committed than the federal court to the two-tier model of scrutiny.

1976(Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 15, fn. 13 .) California follows the two-level test employed by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection clause.

1979It was explained in Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ], that “the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. ‘In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. . . .’ ” We perceive section 6922 as an example of economic regulatio

1979It was explained in Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ], that “the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. ‘In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. . . .’ ” We perceive section 6922 as an example of economic regulatio

1973Recently we said in Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597: “As recent decisions of this court have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. ‘In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] “ ‘On the other hand, in cases involving “su

1973Recently we said in Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597: "As recent decisions of this court have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. `In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] "`On the other hand, in cases involving "sus

1973Recently we said in Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597: “As recent decisions of this court have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. ‘In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] “ ‘On the other hand, in cases involving “su

1973Recently we said in Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597: "As recent decisions of this court have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. `In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] "`On the other hand, in cases involving "sus

1992In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 . . . , we explained that: ‘[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; “[on] the other hand, in cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or touching on ‘fundamental interests,’ ... the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations omitted.] Under the strict standard applied in such case

1992In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 ..., we explained that: `[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; "[on] the other hand, in cases involving `suspect classifications' or touching on `fundamental interests,' ... the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations omitted.] (5), (4b) Under the *473 strict standard applied

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

2014(See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 [“[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors [citation] or on an incorrect legal standard [citations].”]; see also Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 [“We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion and generally will not disturb it ‘“unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions.”’ [Citation.]”.) Thus, we will apply Taylor’s two-level standard.

2014(See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 [“[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors [citation] or on an incorrect legal standard [citations].”]; see also Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 [“We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion and generally will not disturb it ‘“unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions.”’ [Citation.]”.) Thus, we will apply Taylor’s two-level standard.

1992In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 ..., we explained that: `[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; "[on] the other hand, in cases involving `suspect classifications' or touching on `fundamental interests,' ... the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations omitted.] (5), (4b) Under the *473 strict standard applied

1992In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 ..., we explained that: `[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; "[on] the other hand, in cases involving `suspect classifications' or touching on `fundamental interests,' ... the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations omitted.] (5), (4b) Under the *473 strict standard applied

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1982The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review. [19] In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 501 P.2d 537 ], a voting rights case similar in many respects to the present case, we explained that: "[T]his court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. [Citation.] In the typical equal protection *799 case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; `[on] the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fu

1979Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ]; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), supra, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764 ; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (Kirchner II), 62 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 400 P.2d 321 , 20 A.L.R.3d 361 ]; see note, Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals (1977) 9 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1157.) *13 In evaluating legislative classifications under this state’s equal protection provisions, our Supreme Court has adopted the traditional two-level standard of review.

1979Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ]; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), supra, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764 ; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (Kirchner II), 62 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 400 P.2d 321 , 20 A.L.R.3d 361 ]; see note, Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals (1977) 9 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1157.) *13 In evaluating legislative classifications under this state’s equal protection provisions, our Supreme Court has adopted the traditional two-level standard of review.

1979Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ]; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), supra, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764 ; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (Kirchner II), 62 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 400 P.2d 321 , 20 A.L.R.3d 361 ]; see note, Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals (1977) 9 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1157.) *13 In evaluating legislative classifications under this state’s equal protection provisions, our Supreme Court has adopted the traditional two-level standard of review.

1979Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ]; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), supra, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764 ; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (Kirchner II), 62 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 400 P.2d 321 , 20 A.L.R.3d 361 ]; see note, Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals (1977) 9 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1157.) *13 In evaluating legislative classifications under this state’s equal protection provisions, our Supreme Court has adopted the traditional two-level standard of review.

1979“There is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment. [Citations.] Legislative classification is permissible when made for a lawful state purpose and when the classification bears a rational relationship to that purpose. [Citations.] ‘Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary. . . . [Citations.] A distinction in legislatio

1979“There is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment. [Citations.] Legislative classification is permissible when made for a lawful state purpose and when the classification bears a rational relationship to that purpose. [Citations.] ‘Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary. . . . [Citations.] A distinction in legislatio

1979(Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 592 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 586 P.2d 916 ]; Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 124 ]; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 , 46 A.L.R.3d 351 ]; see Arp v. Workers’ Comp.

1979(Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 592 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 586 P.2d 916 ]; Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 124 ]; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 , 46 A.L.R.3d 351 ]; see Arp v. Workers’ Comp.