hospitalization claim in Texas

2003Kimball v. Brothers , 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987).

2000See Kimball v. Brothers, M.D., 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex.1987).

2011Id. § 74.051(c) (West 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex.1992). 3 *705 We measure the limitations period from (1) the date that the breach or tort occurred, (2) the last date of a course of treatment for a particular condition, or (3) the last date of a hospitalization for which a claim is made.

1998See Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.1993); Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex.1992).

2000In this case, it is undisputed that the limitations period began to run from the date Simpson’s medical treatment of Mata was completed. “[Djetermining when treatment has concluded for purposes of section 10.01 simply amounts to deciding when a plaintiffs cause of action accrues, and the question of when a claim accrues is one of law and not fact.” See Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex.1993); Estate of Magness v. Hauser, 918 S.W.2d 5 , 7 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

1996Contrary to the Browns’ assertion, section 10.01 dictates that no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years of one of only three events: “(i) the date the breach or tort occurred; (ii) the date the treatment that is the. subject of the claim is completed; or (iii) the date the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed.” Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.1993); TexRev.Civ.

1992Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983). [4] The full text is: "`Health care' means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." [5] The trial court in this case seemed to recognize that this business was Dougherty's alter ego.

1989Our Supreme Court in Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.1983), held that in a medical malpractice case, article 4590i, § 10.01 did not abolish fraudulent concealment as a basis for extending limitations in health care liability actions.

2012CODE ANN. § 74.251(a) (West 2011) (providing that “no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed”); see also Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 841 (construing identical language in predecessor statute).

2012Code Ann. § 74.251 (a) (West 2011) (providing that “no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed”); see also Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 841 (construing identical language in predecessor statute).

1995The statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case provides, in relevant part, as follows: Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed[.] TexRev.Civ.StatAiín. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Pamph.1995); see Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985).

1993In the seminal case of Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.1985), we are reminded that the legislature enacted the Act to alleviate a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis in this State.

2022Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). 14Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). 10 Analysis In one issue, Devault argues the summary-judgment evidence reveals “a genuine issue of material fact exist[s] as to whether [Devault] exercised due diligence in effecting service [on Dr. Giannakis and Northwood Urology].” Although subject to exceptions that do not apply to Giannakis’s claims, health care liability claims must be commenced “within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort of from the date the medical or health care

2022Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). 14Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). 10 Analysis In one issue, Devault argues the summary-judgment evidence reveals “a genuine issue of material fact exist[s] as to whether [Devault] exercised due diligence in effecting service [on Dr. Giannakis and Northwood Urology].” Although subject to exceptions that do not apply to Giannakis’s claims, health care liability claims must be commenced “within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort of from the date the medical or health care

2011Id. § 74.051(c) (West 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex.1992). 3 *705 We measure the limitations period from (1) the date that the breach or tort occurred, (2) the last date of a course of treatment for a particular condition, or (3) the last date of a hospitalization for which a claim is made.

2002See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex.1999).

2002See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex.1999).

2001Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex.1997).

2000Voegtlin v. Perryman, 977 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, no writ).

1997State v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 933 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.1993); see Jennings, 917 S.W.2d at 793 .

1997State v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 933 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.1993); see Jennings, 917 S.W.2d at 793 .

1994As stated in Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.1992), the wrongful death statute allows an action by a decedent's beneficiaries "only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived." (citing Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.003 (Vernon 1986)).

1992Since appellants base their claim on health care liability under the Act, section 10.01 applies “notwithstanding any other law.” Shidaker v. Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1991, writ denied); Sanchez v. Memorial Medical Center Hosp., 769 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); But see Wilson v. Rudd, 814 S.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

1992Since appellants base their claim on health care liability under the Act, section 10.01 applies “notwithstanding any other law.” Shidaker v. Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1991, writ denied); Sanchez v. Memorial Medical Center Hosp., 769 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); But see Wilson v. Rudd, 814 S.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).