Legislature has not waived immunity in Texas

2015See id. at 622 (no waiver of immunity where plaintiff challenged state’s actions under statute and did not direct court to any provision of UDJA that expressly waived immunity for claim); Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (“[S]overeign immunity will bar an otherwise proper [U]DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the Legislature has not waived immunity.”); Montrose Mgmt.

2015However, and essential here is the well-settled legal proposition that “immunity will bar an otherwise proper UDJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the legislature has not waived immunity.” Mustang Special Utility District v. Providence Village, 392 S.W.3d 311, 315-16 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.), citing, Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011).

2025See id. at 622.

2015See id. at 622 (no waiver of immunity where plaintiff challenged state’s actions under statute and did not direct court to any provision of UDJA that expressly waived immunity for claim); Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (“[S]overeign immunity will bar an otherwise proper [U]DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the Legislature has not waived immunity.”); Montrose Mgmt.

2008See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 . 10 Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. 11 See Pastusek Indus., 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston, 164 S.W.3d 751, 757-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp., 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2008See IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856 . [10] Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. [11] See Patusek Indus. , 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston , 164 S.W.3d 751 , 757 B 58 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp. , 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2019Kirstein also argues that the City’s immunity was waived because it was negligent in not providing jailers any “jail detention training” at the time they were assigned as jailers and because the “jailers failed to follow the guidelines they were taught in their training courses paid for by the City of South Padre Island . . . .” “We have long held that information is not tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or palpable qualities.” Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 580 . “[S]imply reducing information to writing on paper does not make the information ‘ta

2019Kirstein also argues that the City’s immunity was waived because it was negligent in not providing jailers any “jail detention training” at the time they were assigned as jailers and because the “jailers failed to follow the guidelines they were taught in their training courses paid for by the City of South Padre Island . . . .” “We have long held that information is not tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or palpable qualities.” Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 580 . “[S]imply reducing information to writing on paper does not make the information ‘ta

2018Id.; City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007).

2017Id. (citing Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384 , 388–89 (Tex. 2011) (title as against State); City of Hous. v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827 , 828–29 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (retrospective monetary relief)).

2013See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating “the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud”); Harris Cnt.y v. Cypress Forest Pub.

2012See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 219 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud”); Sanders v. City of Grapevine, 218 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).

2011See Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 520 (“We have held that a governmental entity . . . does not, merely by entering into a contract, waive immunity from suit.”).

2011See Lawson , 87 S.W.3d at 520 ("We have held that a governmental entity . . . does not, merely by entering into a contract, waive immunity from suit.").

2008See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 . 10 Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. 11 See Pastusek Indus., 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston, 164 S.W.3d 751, 757-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp., 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2008See IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856 . [10] Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. [11] See Patusek Indus. , 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston , 164 S.W.3d 751 , 757 B 58 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp. , 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2008See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 . 10 Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. 11 See Pastusek Indus., 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston, 164 S.W.3d 751, 757-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp., 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2008See IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856 . [10] Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. [11] See Patusek Indus. , 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston , 164 S.W.3d 751 , 757 B 58 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp. , 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2004Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 696, 701 (Tex.2003).

2004Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 696, 701 (Tex. 2003).

2008See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 . 10 Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. 11 See Pastusek Indus., 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston, 164 S.W.3d 751, 757-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp., 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2008See IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856 . [10] Finally, the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud. [11] See Patusek Indus. , 48 S.W.3d at 372 ; Ethio Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston , 164 S.W.3d 751 , 757 B 58 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp. , 261 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted).

2020See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that redundant-remedies doctrine prohibits courts from entertaining UDJA action when same claim could be pursued through different channels) (citing Texas Mun.

2020Because the legislature has not waived immunity for Gonzalez’s third-party claims, he can proceed only if the third-party defendants’ actions in failing to produce the information he seeks were “ultra vires—without state authority.” See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 234, 238 (Tex. 2017) (holding no waiver of immunity for regent’s suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel chancellor to produce documents, and suit could proceed only if chancellor’s actions were ultra vires).

2015However, and essential here is the well-settled legal proposition that “immunity will bar an otherwise proper UDJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the legislature has not waived immunity.” Mustang Special Utility District v. Providence Village, 392 S.W.3d 311, 315-16 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.), citing, Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011).

2015See Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. 2013); Tex. A & M Univ.

2014City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011).

2012See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 219 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud”); Sanders v. City of Grapevine, 218 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).

2011In granting this additional “retroactive” relief on remand, HHSC adds, the district court: (1) erroneously purported to enjoin pre-injunction conduct not previously made unlawful; (2) awarded relief barred by sovereign immunity, as the recalculation the injunction contemplates would have no conceivable purpose or effect but to establish an entitlement to retrospective monetary relief from the State against which the Legislature has not waived immunity;17 and (3) awarded relief that was inconsistent with HHSC’s unchallenged appeal and 16 See In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1999) (per curi