inquiry defense in Tennessee

2015Some authorities classify inquiry notice as a type of constructive notice, but in Tennessee, it has come to be considered as a variant of actual notice. “‘The words “actual notice” do not always mean in law what in metaphysical strictness they import; they more often mean knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.’ ” Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn. 16, 27 , 227 S.W.2d 41, 46 (1950) (citation omitted). .Even a good faith failure to undertake the inquiry is no def

2015Some authorities classify inquiry notice as a type of constructive notice, but in Tennessee, it has come to be considered as a variant of actual notice. “‘The words “actual notice” do not always mean in law what in metaphysical strictness they import; they more often mean knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.’ ” Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn. 16, 27 , 227 S.W.2d 41, 46 (1950) (citation omitted). .Even a good faith failure to undertake the inquiry is no def

2024Id.[] Thus, “‘[w]hatever is sufficient to put a person upon inquiry, is notice of all the facts to which that inquiry will lead, when prosecuted with reasonable diligence and good faith.’” City Finance Co. v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 81, 84 , 257 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1953) (citation omitted).

2013“Even a good faith failure to undertake the inquiry is no defense.” Id. (citation omitted). “‘Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, [he] must decide whether to file suit or sit on [his] rights.

2019One such case, Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2010), cert denied Weis v. Georgia, 562 U.S. 850 (2010), discussed this issue in context of a three-and-one-half-year delay between the defendant’s arrest and placement of his case on a trial calendar.

2013So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; [he] cannot wait for the facts to find [him].’” Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)(quoting Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A., 67 Cal. App.4th 603 , 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 73 (1998)).

2007Initially, we note that it is unquestioned that “an accused is entitled to zealous representation by an attorney unfettered by a conflicting interest.” State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tenn. 1989).