7 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steven Steptoe and Patricia Carballo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.green2 sentences2020P. 736.11(d) (“If the automatic stay under [Rule 736.11] is in effect, any foreclosure sale of the property is void.”); Steptoe v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 464 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (explaining that a lender cannot bring a Rule 736 counterclaim in a borrower’s suit against the lender because a Rule 736 proceeding “is a special, expedited proceeding with a unique procedural mechanism that is not compatible with the administration of a suit brought by a borrower to challenge the propriety of a loan agreement”). 2020P. 736.11(d) (“If the automatic stay under [Rule 736.11] is in effect, any foreclosure sale of the property is void.”); Steptoe v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 464 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (explaining that a lender cannot bring a Rule 736 counterclaim in a borrower’s suit against the lender because a Rule 736 proceeding “is a special, expedited proceeding with a unique procedural mechanism that is not compatible with the administration of a suit brought by a borrower to challenge the propriety of a loan agreement”). 5 Gaber did not raise this argument in hi | 3 | 4 |
Ralph D. HUSTON and Christina Huston, Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appelleegreen1 sentence2015Cf. id. at 682-83 (holding that borrower could not assert a counterclaim in a Rule 736 proceeding). *434 ..Were we to hold that the Kaspar rule does not apply to a home-equity lien, which includes a bargained-for power-of-sale provision, we would necessarily.be requiring such a lender to. assert a counterclaim to preserve its foreclosure rights. • This would result in the impairment of the lender’s right to pursue one its remedies, namely a Rule • 736 proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldringgreen1 sentence1989Such a charge is not interest, and the demand for payment of it is not usurious Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1977, writ ref'd) (cited with approval in Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwestgreen1 sentence1989Such a charge is not interest, and the demand for payment of it is not usurious Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1977, writ ref'd) (cited with approval in Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance
green
1 sentence2018For example, while the ban applies to the borrower defense of fraud in the inducement, it does not necessarily bar a defense of fraud in the factum—that is, “the sort of fraud that procures a party’s signature to an instrument without knowledge of its true nature or contents.” Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.