contextual inquiry in Texas

2024App. 2014)); see also Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact.”); U.S. v. Sipe, 388 F. 3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas we typically analyze legal issues de novo, a Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.”); U.S. v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’”).

2020Moreover, it is intimately intertwined with the trial proceedings: because the court must judge the effect of the evidence on the jury’s verdict, the Brady decision can never be divorced from the narrative of the trial.”); United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’ While we examine the Brady question de novo, ‘we must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court’s dec

2024App. 2014)); see also Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact.”); U.S. v. Sipe, 388 F. 3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas we typically analyze legal issues de novo, a Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.”); U.S. v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’”).

2020See also Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact.”); United States v. Sipe, 388 F. 3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas we typically analyze legal issues de novo, a Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.

2024App. 2014)); see also Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact.”); U.S. v. Sipe, 388 F. 3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas we typically analyze legal issues de novo, a Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.”); U.S. v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’”).

2020See also Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact.”); United States v. Sipe, 388 F. 3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas we typically analyze legal issues de novo, a Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.

1999In Mesa Operating Co. v. California Union Insurance Co., 986 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet. h.), the Fifth Court of Appeals, relying on Mustang Tractor and SnyderGeneral, applied a contextual analysis to the same clause that we consider here, and found that “common usage of the term ‘sudden’ includes a temporal element.” Mesa Operating, at 755.

1999In Mesa Operating Co. v. California Union Insurance Co. , No. 05-96-986-CV, slip op. at 81 (Tex. App.--Dallas Feb. 2, 1999, no pet. h.) ( 1999 WL 42027 ), the Fifth Court of Appeals, relying on Mustang Tractor and SnyderGeneral , applied a contextual analysis to the same clause that we consider here, and found that "common usage of the term 'sudden' includes a temporal element." Mesa Operating , slip op. at 91 ( 1999 WL 42027 at *5 ).

2025See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 588 ; Contreras v. State, No. 03-02-00808-CR, 2004 WL 314881 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (noting basis of analyzing 803(4) is whether the declarant made the statement for the purpose of receiving medical treatment, and whether the content of the statement is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis).

2024Moreover, “[w]hile we examine the Brady 13 question de novo, ‘we must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court’s decision.’” Severns, 559 F.3d at 278 ; see also Horne v. State, 554 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. ref’d).

2023See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 10–12. 15 3 We now reaffirm Hysaw and clarify the import of our holding in that case.

2020DIAMOND — 18 record.29 But in other (non-death) habeas cases, the trial judge is the sole fact finder.30 The court of appeals and this Court are truly appellate courts.31 We have less leeway in these cases to disregard the habeas court’s findings.32 BRADY CLAIM An applicant for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus bears the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.33 To demonstrate that she is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of reversible error under Brady, a habeas applicant must show that (1) the State failed to disclose evidence, regardless of the pr

2020Moreover, it is intimately intertwined with the trial proceedings: because the court must judge the effect of the evidence on the jury’s verdict, the Brady decision can never be divorced from the narrative of the trial.”); United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’ While we examine the Brady question de novo, ‘we must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court’s dec

2020Moreover, it is intimately intertwined with the trial proceedings: because the court must judge the effect of the evidence on the jury’s verdict, the Brady decision can never be divorced from the narrative of the trial.”); United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the motion for a new trial is based on an alleged Brady violation, the Brady determination is ‘inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving questions of both law and fact.’ While we examine the Brady question de novo, ‘we must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court’s dec

2020DIAMOND — 18 record.29 But in other (non-death) habeas cases, the trial judge is the sole fact finder.30 The court of appeals and this Court are truly appellate courts.31 We have less leeway in these cases to disregard the habeas court’s findings.32 BRADY CLAIM An applicant for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus bears the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.33 To demonstrate that she is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of reversible error under Brady, a habeas applicant must show that (1) the State failed to disclose evidence, regardless of the pr

2016See Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 364 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 364 (Tex. Crim.