Rasmussen hearing in Minnesota

1976The first issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial court that the search at 3512 Lyndale Avenue South was instituted during the daytime. 2 When the evidence at a Rasmussen hearing is conflicting, the trial court “acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246 , 223 N. W. 2d 813, 814 (1974).

1976The first issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial court that the search at 3512 Lyndale Avenue South was instituted during the daytime. 2 When the evidence at a Rasmussen hearing is conflicting, the trial court “acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246 , 223 N. W. 2d 813, 814 (1974).

2024Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 14 (Minn. 1965) (adopting a pretrial proceeding, or Rasmussen hearing, to determine the admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained by infringement of a defendant’s constitutional rights).

2016Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539 , 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965), after which, the district court denied appellant’s suppression motion.

1975In State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974), we approved the action of the trial court in holding a Rasmussen hearing in the middle of a trial where the prosecutor failed to disclose his intention to introduce certain evidence prior to trial and where the evidence was properly subject to a Rasmussen hearing.

1975In State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974), we approved the action of the trial court in holding a Rasmussen hearing in the middle of a trial where the prosecutor failed to disclose his intention to introduce certain evidence prior to trial and where the evidence was properly subject to a Rasmussen hearing.

2015Typically, this court does not “consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008).

2015See In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn. 2003). (“All evidence obtained by illegal searches is inadmissible in court and the fruits . . . must be suppressed.”).

2014Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Minn. 2013) (holding that “submission of documentary evidence presenting contradictory versions of events cannot constitute a valid trial on stipulated facts”); see also Minn. R.

2014Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Minn. 2013) (holding that “submission of documentary evidence presenting contradictory versions of events cannot constitute a valid trial on stipulated facts”); see also Minn. R.

2011Thus, nothing prevented Williams from asserting, in the district court, a Second Amendment claim based on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 636 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees to individuals the right to possess pistols in the home, particularly for self-defense), which was decided on June 26, 2008-more than one month before Williams’s August 11, 2008, Rasmussen hearing.

2011Thus, nothing prevented Williams from asserting, in the district court, a Second Amendment claim based on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 636 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees to individuals the right to possess pistols in the home, particularly for self-defense), which was decided on June 26, 2008-more than one month before Williams’s August 11, 2008, Rasmussen hearing.

2006First, because Clark’s request was not made until after the Rasmussen hearing had been completed and jury selection had commenced, Clark’s right to defend himself was not “unqualified,” but was “ ‘subject to the trial court’s discretion which requires a balancing of the defendant’s legitimate interests in representing himself and the potential disruption and possible delay of proceedings already in progress.’ ” State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Minn. 2003) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986)).

2006First, because Clark’s request was not made until after the Rasmussen hearing had been completed and jury selection had commenced, Clark’s right to defend himself was not “unqualified,” but was “ ‘subject to the trial court’s discretion which requires a balancing of the defendant’s legitimate interests in representing himself and the potential disruption and possible delay of proceedings already in progress.’ ” State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Minn. 2003) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986)).

2006First, because Clark’s request was not made until after the Rasmussen hearing had been completed and jury selection had commenced, Clark’s right to defend himself was not “unqualified,” but was “ ‘subject to the trial court’s discretion which requires a balancing of the defendant’s legitimate interests in representing himself and the potential disruption and possible delay of proceedings already in progress.’ ” State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Minn. 2003) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986)).

2006First, because Clark’s request was not made until after the Rasmussen hearing had been completed and jury selection had commenced, Clark’s right to defend himself was not “unqualified,” but was “ ‘subject to the trial court’s discretion which requires a balancing of the defendant’s legitimate interests in representing himself and the potential disruption and possible delay of proceedings already in progress.’ ” State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Minn. 2003) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986)).

2005See State v. Rosenthal, 269 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn.1978).

2005See State v. Rosenthal, 269 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn.1978).

2003Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied by the district court at the conclusion of a Rasmussen hearing held immediately preceding appellant’s trial. “[W]hen reviewing a district court’s probable cause determination made in connection with the issuance of a search warrant [we] * * * afford the district court’s determination great deference.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn.2001).

2003Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied by the district court at the conclusion of a Rasmussen hearing held immediately preceding appellant’s trial. “[W]hen reviewing a district court’s probable cause determination made in connection with the issuance of a search warrant [we] * * * afford the district court’s determination great deference.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn.2001).

1999See State v. Wollan, 303 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Minn.1981) (noting general rule is if one files motion for rehearing or similar motion after time limit for filing notice of appeal has expired, then filing of motion does not extend time with which to appeal); see also State v. Reynolds, 578 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn.App.1998) (concluding standing issue properly presented to trial court in pretrial motion for reconsideration following Rasmussen hearing).

1999See State v. Wollan, 303 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Minn.1981) (noting general rule is if one files motion for rehearing or similar motion after time limit for filing notice of appeal has expired, then filing of motion does not extend time with which to appeal); see also State v. Reynolds, 578 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn.App.1998) (concluding standing issue properly presented to trial court in pretrial motion for reconsideration following Rasmussen hearing).

1999See State v. Wollan, 303 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Minn.1981) (noting general rule is if one files motion for rehearing or similar motion after time limit for filing notice of appeal has expired, then filing of motion does not extend time with which to appeal); see also State v. Reynolds, 578 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn.App.1998) (concluding standing issue properly presented to trial court in pretrial motion for reconsideration following Rasmussen hearing).

1999See State v. Wollan, 303 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Minn.1981) (noting general rule is if one files motion for rehearing or similar motion after time limit for filing notice of appeal has expired, then filing of motion does not extend time with which to appeal); see also State v. Reynolds, 578 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn.App.1998) (concluding standing issue properly presented to trial court in pretrial motion for reconsideration following Rasmussen hearing).

1997In State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn.1979), in discussing an omnibus court’s decision that a confession was voluntary, the supreme court described the inquiry as follows: Whether defendant’s confession was voluntary turns on a determination of defendant’s state of mind at the time of the confession.

1997In State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn.1979), in discussing an omnibus court’s decision that a confession was voluntary, the supreme court described the inquiry as follows: Whether defendant’s confession was voluntary turns on a determination of defendant’s state of mind at the time of the confession.

1997There is, however, case law suggesting that such evidence is admissible at trial. [I]f the trial court admits the confession, the trial court “must permit the jury to hear evidence on the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession * * * for a determination of weight and credibility * * State v. Schaeffer, 457 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn.1990) (quoting State v. Wajda, 296 Minn. 29, 31 , 206 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1973)).

1997There is, however, case law suggesting that such evidence is admissible at trial. [I]f the trial court admits the confession, the trial court “must permit the jury to hear evidence on the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession * * * for a determination of weight and credibility * * State v. Schaeffer, 457 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn.1990) (quoting State v. Wajda, 296 Minn. 29, 31 , 206 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1973)).

1997There is, however, case law suggesting that such evidence is admissible at trial. [I]f the trial court admits the confession, the trial court “must permit the jury to hear evidence on the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession * * * for a determination of weight and credibility * * State v. Schaeffer, 457 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn.1990) (quoting State v. Wajda, 296 Minn. 29, 31 , 206 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1973)).

1996State v. Favre, 428 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.App.1988) (reversing on appeal a plea to a lesser charge, entered during a pretrial Rasmussen hearing).

1991State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn. 1985); State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977). [3] The state's arguments at the Rasmussen hearing and in its brief focused on the inevitable discovery doctrine perhaps because of the trial court's statement that counsel direct their arguments at the Rasmussen hearing to whether the evidence was inevitably discovered.

1991State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn. 1985); State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977). [3] The state's arguments at the Rasmussen hearing and in its brief focused on the inevitable discovery doctrine perhaps because of the trial court's statement that counsel direct their arguments at the Rasmussen hearing to whether the evidence was inevitably discovered.