State v. LaRose, 174 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 1970). · Go Syfert
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State v. LaRose, 174 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …holding that the exclusionary rule adopted in the miranda case has no application with respect to statements made by a detainee to the citizen detainer during a citizen's arrest at p. 248 ⚠ not in text
21 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Richardson
N.C. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
holding that the exclusionary rule adopted in the miranda case has no application with respect to statements made by a detainee to the citizen detainer during a citizen's arrest
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Richardson
N.C. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
holding that the exclusionary rule adopted in the miranda case has no application with respect to statements made by a detainee to the citizen detainer during a citizen's arrest
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Spencer (2×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
State v. LaRose, 286, Minn. 517, 518, 174 N.W.2d 247, 248 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Red Paint
N.D. · 1981 · confidence medium
See, e. g., United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1364-1365 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2935 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1977); Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96 , 531 S.W.2d 474 , 477 — 478 (1976); State v. Van Alstine, 305 Minn. 276 , 232 N.W.2d 899, 904 (1975); State v. LaRose, 286 Minn. 517 , 174 N.W.2d 247, 248 (1970); State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283 , 294 A.2d 41, 43 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Van Alstine (2×)
Minn. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. LaRose, 286 Minn. 517 , 174 N. W. 2d 247 (1970); State v. King, 286 Minn. 392 , 176 N. W. 2d 279 (1970). *284 Consequently, it was not error to deny a Rasmussen hearing to challenge on constitutional grounds the admission of statements made by defendant to a private citizen.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE
v.
MILES LaROSE
41390.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan 30, 1970.
174 N.W.2d 247
John S. Connolly, for appellant., Douglas M. Head, Attorney General, Joseph P. Summers, Corporation Counsel, James W. Kenney, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Daniel A. Klas, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, for respondent.
Knutson, Otis, Rogosheske, Sheran, Gallagher.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
[*518] Per Curiam.

Defendant was convicted of tampering with an automobile in violation of Minn. St. 609.605(9). That statute provides as follows:

“Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $100:

í}í s}: s)c s{e

“(9) Without the permission of the owner, tampers with or gets into or upon a motor vehicle as defined in section 609.55, subdivision 1, or rides in or upon such motor vehicle knowing it was taken and is being driven by another without the permission of the owner.”

Defendant was tried without a jury in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul and found guilty. On appeal, he challenges the admissibility of his confession and attacks the constitutionality of the statute.

On February 9, 1968, one Donald Erskine parked his automobile in a shopping center and upon his return to the vehicle found defendant sitting in his car with a screwdriver in his hand. It was later determined that the lock on the glove compartment had been punched out. Defendant was detained by Erskine and a companion until the police arrived, after which Erskine perfected a formal citizen’s arrest. In the interim, defendant told Erskine that he was in the car to keep warm. Erskine testified that defendant stated “it was people like me [Erskine] that made it hard on people like him [defendant],” adding, “You know, my wife will kill me for this.” Thereupon, defendant offered Erskine $10 to release him.

1. Defendant objected to the introduction of testimony regarding his conversation with Erskine on the ground that he was denied a so-called Miranda warning. We find no merit in this contention. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. ed. (2d) 694, was directed at custodial police interrogation which in that decision was defined as “questioning initiated by law-enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.” 384 U. S. 444, 86 S. Ct. 1612, 16 L. ed. (2d) 706. We hold that the exclusionary rule adopted in the Miranda case has no application with respect to a citizen’s arrest under the circumstances here involved.

2. Defendant further contends that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague. Whether, as applied to other fact situations, the tampering statute is vulnerable, we do not decide. Under the circumstances in the instant case there was sufficient evidence from which the court could infer that defendant had broken the lock of the glove compartment. Consequently, we have no difficulty in[*519] holding the statute valid with respect to the matter here for review, and the conviction is affirmed.

Affirmed.