Menzies standard in Utah

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2014State v. Martinez, 2013 UT 23 , ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 .

2014State v. Martinez, 2013 UT 23 , ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 .

2014A significant portion of Mr. Menzies's brief is devoted to showing that the PCC's "de facto findings of fact from the record were erroneous." In reviewing a lower court's findings of fact, "[wle apply the clearly erroneous standard." State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 8 , 285 P.3d 1183 .

2014A significant portion of Mr. Menzies's brief is devoted to showing that the PCC's "de facto findings of fact from the record were erroneous." In reviewing a lower court's findings of fact, "[wle apply the clearly erroneous standard." State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 8 , 285 P.3d 1183 .

2006We therefore use Strickland to evaluate Menzies' claim. ¶ 87 The Strickland test for assessing whether an attorney's performance amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel is two-part: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether counsel's performance was prejudicial in that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 688-89, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2006We therefore use Strickland to evaluate Menzies' claim. ¶ 87 The Strickland test for assessing whether an attorney's performance amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel is two-part: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell *512 below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether counsel's performance was prejudicial in that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 688-89, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2006Id. "[ 105 In this case, the district court abused its discretion by denying Menzies rule 60(b)(6) motion because Brass' conduct was grossly negligent.

2006Id. ¶ 105 In this case, the district court abused its discretion by denying Menzies' rule 60(b)(6) motion because Brass' conduct was grossly negligent.

1999Id. ¶ 53 Defendant argues that the Menzies rule should not apply in this ease because Menzies was decided after the trial in this case.

1999Id. ¶ 53 Defendant argues that the Menzies rule should not apply in this ease because Menzies was decided after the trial in this case.

1994Under the new Menzies standard, “[t]o prevail ... a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.” Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 24, — P.2d at -. “ ‘So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean *152 the [Constitution] was violated.’ ” Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)).

1994Under the new Menzies standard, “[t]o prevail ... a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.” Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 24, — P.2d at -. “ ‘So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean *152 the [Constitution] was violated.’ ” Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)).

1994Defendant argues that the Menzies standard cannot apply to him retroactively, advancing the proposition that “[w]hen a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively.” State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (declining to apply State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) strict compliance standard retroactively); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260-61 (Utah 1988) (adding two requirements to penalty phases of capital trials, stating “[tjhese requirements shall apply prospectively only”); State v. Jonas, 725

1994Defendant argues that the Menzies standard cannot apply to him retroactively, advancing the proposition that “[w]hen a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively.” State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (declining to apply State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) strict compliance standard retroactively); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260-61 (Utah 1988) (adding two requirements to penalty phases of capital trials, stating “[tjhese requirements shall apply prospectively only”); State v. Jonas, 725

1994Menzies also points out that the trial judge did not make written findings that the prior bad acts evidenced by material found in his prison file had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by our decision in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.1992).

1994Menzies also points out that the trial judge did not make written findings that the prior bad acts evidenced by material found in his prison file had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by our decision in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.1992).

1994Defendant argues that the Menzies standard cannot apply to him retroactively, advancing the proposition that “[w]hen a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively.” State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (declining to apply State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) strict compliance standard retroactively); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260-61 (Utah 1988) (adding two requirements to penalty phases of capital trials, stating “[tjhese requirements shall apply prospectively only”); State v. Jonas, 725

1994Defendant argues that the Menzies standard cannot apply to him retroactively, advancing the proposition that “[w]hen a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively.” State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (declining to apply State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) strict compliance standard retroactively); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260-61 (Utah 1988) (adding two requirements to penalty phases of capital trials, stating “[tjhese requirements shall apply prospectively only”); State v. Jonas, 725

1994Under the new Menzies standard, “[t]o prevail ... a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.” Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 24, — P.2d at -. “ ‘So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean *152 the [Constitution] was violated.’ ” Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)).

1994Under the new Menzies standard, “[t]o prevail ... a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.” Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 24, — P.2d at -. “ ‘So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean *152 the [Constitution] was violated.’ ” Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)).