7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of Americagreen2 sentences1991The court did note, however, that the insurer had failed to inquire about the omitted information, despite being aware of a possible risk, and that the insurer could not be permitted to thus "blind itself from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful misrepresentation ... in order to avoid payment under a policy." Id. [23] We note that in its brief, Aetna characterizes Home as "lur[ing] a new bonding company" into insuring the anticipated possible loss. 1991The court did note, however, that the insurer had failed to inquire about the omitted information, despite being aware of a possible risk, and that the insurer could not be permitted to thus "blind itself from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful misrepresentation ... in order to avoid payment under a policy." Id. . | 1 | 2 |
Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.green1 sentence2015But the court relied on our decision in Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., which explicitly rejected the Restatement's truth defense in the context of improper-purpose claims. 885 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fieldinggreen1 sentence2007Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 126 Defendants argue alternatively that we should affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Sachs's express and implied-in-fact contract claims because Sachs cannot prove that he was responsible for procuring Jackson as a buyer of UPCM. | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Stategreen2 sentences1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented],] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies.”); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert’s opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq 1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented[,] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies."); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert's opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lindseygreen2 sentences1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented[,] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies."); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert's opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq 1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented[,] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies."); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert's opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rammelgreen2 sentences1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented],] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies.”); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert’s opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq 1989See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) ("Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented[,] ... courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies."); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75 , 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986) (expert's opinion as to credibility may not be indirectly adduced by allowing the expert to quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reporting of abuse despite subseq | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
RainFocus v. Cvent
green
1 sentence2023If Cvent’s approach were adopted, a party who claims the judicial proceeding privilege but then publishes excessively would be subject to liability, but another party could ignore the privilege and simply argue that the statements (while perhaps themselves untrue) accurately reflect what is alleged in a companion lawsuit and thus escape liability altogether. ¶18 Accordingly, we are hesitant to accept that accurate recitations of claims alleged in a lawsuit are inherently subject to the truth defense given the body of law in Utah restricting 20210611-CA 11 2023 UT App 32 RainFocus v. Cvent exce | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Verde
green
1 sentence2021He last argues that the other-acts evidence—even if admissible under the doctrine of chances—should have been excluded as impermissible statistical evidence that Daughter was telling the truth under rule 403. 13 Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 29 STATE v. RICHINS Opinion of the Court UT 60, ¶ 57, 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Thornton
green
2 sentences2021He last argues that the other-acts evidence—even if admissible under the doctrine of chances—should have been excluded as impermissible statistical evidence that Daughter was telling the truth under rule 403. 13 Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 29 STATE v. RICHINS Opinion of the Court UT 60, ¶ 57, 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated 2021He last argues that the other-acts evidence—even if admissible under the doctrine of chances—should have been excluded as impermissible statistical evidence that Daughter was telling the truth under rule 403. 13 Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 29 STATE v. RICHINS Opinion of the Court UT 60, ¶ 57, 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Major Oil Corporation, a Utah Corporation v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, a Corporation
green
1 sentence1988An insurance company is charged with facts which it ought to have known and cannot “blind itself from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful misrepresentation of the truth on which it relied in order to avoid payment under policy.” Id. at 603 ; see also Wootton, 16 Utah 2d at 56 , 395 P.2d at 726 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.