feha claim in California

2025(Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 105 .) “By making a cost award discretionary rather than mandatory, Government Code section 12965[(c)(6)] expressly excepts FEHA actions from Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b)’s mandate for a cost award to the prevailing party.” (Ibid.) Whether Hologic is entitled to costs incurred after Mallon’s dismissal of her FEHA claims thus depends on whether FEHA’s exception applies to the non-FEHA claims (whistleblower retaliation (§ 1102.5), slander, libel, and wrongful termination) 15 Statutes 2021, chapter 278, section 7. 50 litigated during that latter perio

2024(Pollock, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 949– 950; Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115 (Williams).) “Under [the Christiansburg] standard, ‘an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit.’ ” (Pollock, at pp. 949–950, quoting Williams, at pp. 99–100.) The purpose of limiting fee and cost awards to prevailing FEHA defendants is “to ‘reflect[ ] the public policy that society should incentivize e

2025(See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [“because [the plaintiff’s] FEHA claim fails, his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails”].) The trial court agreed with this argument.

2024(See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 (Hanson) [where employee’s FEHA claim for disability discrimination fails because he cannot demonstrate that employer discriminated on the basis of disability, “[employee’s] claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails”]; Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318 [failure to prevent discrimination claim fails where defendant employer prevails on underlying discrimination claim]; Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289 [same].) 19 D.

2025“Retaliation claims are inherently fact-specific, and the impact of an employer’s action in a particular case must be evaluated in context.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1052 .) Considering the particular facts of this case, we conclude that Guytan—a former employee found by the jury to have been retaliated against for engaging in FEHA-protected activity—could properly maintain a FEHA claim against the former employer, Swift, that engaged in the retaliatory conduct.

2025“Retaliation claims are inherently fact-specific, and the impact of an employer’s action in a particular case must be evaluated in context.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1052 .) Considering the particular facts of this case, we conclude that Guytan—a former employee found by the jury to have been retaliated against for engaging in FEHA-protected activity—could properly maintain a FEHA claim against the former employer, Swift, that engaged in the retaliatory conduct.

2025As numerous courts have held, “[g]iving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation.’ ” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 ; citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 488-489 ; see also Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 75 [“the value of ‘enf

2025As numerous courts have held, “[g]iving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation.’ ” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 ; citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 488-489 ; see also Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 75 [“the value of ‘enf

2020(Ibid.; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 156 (Wills).) “To exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a particular act made unlawful by [FEHA], the claim must specify that act in the administrative complaint.” (Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (Martin); accord, Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (Okoli).) Although the allegations of a FEHA lawsuit need not be identical to the claims previously identified in the DFEH charge, a FEHA claim cannot proceed in a 7 civil complaint unless it is “

2020(Ibid.; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 156 (Wills).) “To exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a particular act made unlawful by [FEHA], the claim must specify that act in the administrative complaint.” (Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (Martin); accord, Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (Okoli).) Although the allegations of a FEHA lawsuit need not be identical to the claims previously identified in the DFEH charge, a FEHA claim cannot proceed in a 7 civil complaint unless it is “

2024(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 .) “The phrase ‘because of’ means there 15 must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of [the] protected characteristic and the [adverse] action taken by the employer.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 215 .) An employee can prove a FEHA violation in one of two ways: by direct evidence of intentional discrimination or by circumstantial evidence.

2024(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 .) “The phrase ‘because of’ means there 15 must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of [the] protected characteristic and the [adverse] action taken by the employer.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 215 .) An employee can prove a FEHA violation in one of two ways: by direct evidence of intentional discrimination or by circumstantial evidence.

2026(Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists where “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 .) To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in an action brought under FEHA, a defendant employer initially has the burden to show “either that (1) plaintiff could not establish one of the elements of the FEHA claim, or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to [take some

2026(Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists where “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 .) To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in an action brought under FEHA, a defendant employer initially has the burden to show “either that (1) plaintiff could not establish one of the elements of the FEHA claim, or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to [take some

2025(Id. at p. 1045.) In reviewing the cost award, the appellate court rejected the proposition that the defendant was entitled to costs “regardless of the FEHA standard” because the plaintiffs had “unsuccessfully pursued causes of action . . . under several statutes other than FEHA (the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the DPA and the UCL) and for negligence.” (Id. at p. 1059.) The Roman court explained that while the defendant would be entitled under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) to recover allowable costs incurred in defending non- FEHA causes of action, there remained a question whether FEHA’

2025(Id. at p. 1045.) In reviewing the cost award, the appellate court rejected the proposition that the defendant was entitled to costs “regardless of the FEHA standard” because the plaintiffs had “unsuccessfully pursued causes of action . . . under several statutes other than FEHA (the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the DPA and the UCL) and for negligence.” (Id. at p. 1059.) The Roman court explained that while the defendant would be entitled under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) to recover allowable costs incurred in defending non- FEHA causes of action, there remained a question whether FEHA’

2023Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(6); Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 985 .) “An action is not frivolous simply because the plaintiff[s’] FEHA claim failed.” (Baker v. Mulholland Security & Patrol, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 776, 784 .) But an action may “rise to the level of frivolity required to support” an award of fees to an employer-defendant if, for example, the 28 plaintiff failed altogether to “present[] a colorable claim.” (Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 870, 873-874 (Rosenman).) We review a trial court’s a

2023In Holman, the appellate court held that neither Code of Civil Procedure section 998 nor the version of Government Code section 12965 in effect at the time required the trial court to find the plaintiff’s FEHA lawsuit was frivolous before awarding expert witness fees to a prevailing defendant. ( Holman, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281–283.) In Martinez, the appellate court held when determining whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party, if costs and attorney fees are included in the 72–73 [trial court must consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay before awarding attorney fees to a prevail

2021(Williams, at p. 99.) Although the language of section 12965(b) at the time did not “distinguish between awards to FEHA plaintiffs and to FEHA defendants,” we concluded on the basis of legislative history and public policy that “the Legislature intended trial courts to use the asymmetrical standard of [Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 ] as to both fees and costs.” (Williams, at p. 109.) Under that standard, “an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an o

2017Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit." ( Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at pp. 421-422, 98 S.Ct. 694 .) To assess attorney's fees against plaintiffs "simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII." ( Id. at p. 422, 98 S.Ct. 694 .) In 1992, the Court of Appeal in Cummings adopted the Christiansburg frivolousness stand

2015Although disagreeing with the plaintiff that Government Code section 12965(b) states an express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b), the Perez court, somewhat contradictorily, found it “clear that [Government Code] section 12965(b) governs the costs at issue here” and considered the “only question” to be “whether the court must find the action to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless before it may exercise that discretion to award costs to a prevailing FEHA defendant.” (Perez, at p. 679.) On that question, Perez found persuasive the federal case law on Title VII costs, in

2015Although disagreeing with the plaintiff that Government Code section 12965(b) states an express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b), the Perez court, somewhat contradictorily, found it “clear that [Government Code] section 12965(b) governs the costs at issue here” and considered the “only question” to be “whether the court must find the action to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless before it may exercise that discretion to award costs to a prevailing FEHA defendant.” (Perez, at p. 679.) On that question, Perez found persuasive the federal case law on Title VII costs, in

2017(Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 976 .) The court noted that the FEHA includes ― ‗the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof‘ ‖ in the definition of an employer that is subject to the FEHA, and assumed that the ―FEHA imposes individual tort liability on both public and private employees who cause or assist their covered ‗employers‘ to violate the statute.‖ (Id. at pp. 978–979, fn. 3.) The court nevertheless concluded that the FEHA claim could not proceed against the individual defendants because of the specific immunity provision in section 820.2, which applies to the exercise o

2017(Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 976 .) The court noted that the FEHA includes ― ‗the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof‘ ‖ in the definition of an employer that is subject to the FEHA, and assumed that the ―FEHA imposes individual tort liability on both public and private employees who cause or assist their covered ‗employers‘ to violate the statute.‖ (Id. at pp. 978–979, fn. 3.) The court nevertheless concluded that the FEHA claim could not proceed against the individual defendants because of the specific immunity provision in section 820.2, which applies to the exercise o

2025First, she complains she “was entitled to present all of her evidence showing the factual distinction between [her] causes of action prior to the [a]rbitrator dismissing” the complaint. employer.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 112 (Armendariz).) “The DFEH is obligated to investigate each complaint and decide whether to file an accusation. [Citations.] If it has not filed an accusation within 150 days, it must offer the employee a right-to-sue letter on request; if it has not filed an accusation within one year, it must issue the employee a righ

2025First, she complains she “was entitled to present all of her evidence showing the factual distinction between [her] causes of action prior to the [a]rbitrator dismissing” the complaint. employer.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 112 (Armendariz).) “The DFEH is obligated to investigate each complaint and decide whether to file an accusation. [Citations.] If it has not filed an accusation within 150 days, it must offer the employee a right-to-sue letter on request; if it has not filed an accusation within one year, it must issue the employee a righ

2023Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(6); Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 985 .) “An action is not frivolous simply because the plaintiff[s’] FEHA claim failed.” (Baker v. Mulholland Security & Patrol, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 776, 784 .) But an action may “rise to the level of frivolity required to support” an award of fees to an employer-defendant if, for example, the 28 plaintiff failed altogether to “present[] a colorable claim.” (Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 870, 873-874 (Rosenman).) We review a trial court’s a

2021(Ibid.) The California Supreme Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a) “gives a trial court discretion to deny attorney fees to a plaintiff who prevails on a FEHA claim but recovers an amount that could have been recovered in a limited civil case.” (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 976 .) Notably, the court provided guidance to assist trial courts in evaluating when they should exercise such discretion.

2022(Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1002 .) “Before pursuing a civil action asserting violation of the FEHA, an employee must file an administrative complaint with the [Department of Fair Employment and Housing] and obtain a right-to-sue letter from the agency. [Citations.] ‘Exhaustion of these procedures is mandatory; an employee may not proceed in court with a FEHA claim without first obtaining a right-to-sue letter.’ [Citations.] Moreover, claims in the employee’s civil complaint that fall outside the scope of the DFEH complaint are barred.” (Foroudi v. Aerops

2022(Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1002 .) “Before pursuing a civil action asserting violation of the FEHA, an employee must file an administrative complaint with the [Department of Fair Employment and Housing] and obtain a right-to-sue letter from the agency. [Citations.] ‘Exhaustion of these procedures is mandatory; an employee may not proceed in court with a FEHA claim without first obtaining a right-to-sue letter.’ [Citations.] Moreover, claims in the employee’s civil complaint that fall outside the scope of the DFEH complaint are barred.” (Foroudi v. Aerops

2024(Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492 .) Consequently, if a plaintiff fails to file a timely administrative complaint raising a FEHA claim, any civil action based on that claim must be dismissed.

2024(Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492 .) Consequently, if a plaintiff fails to file a timely administrative complaint raising a FEHA claim, any civil action based on that claim must be dismissed.

2023Such cases would include those in which granting finality to an arbitrator’s decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party’s statutory rights.’” (Sheppard, Mullin, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 77 [explaining and reaffirming the holding in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 ].) More generally, even outside the context of an illegal contract, in certain limited and exceptional circumstances, “[a]rbitrators may exceed their powers by issuing an award that violates a party’s unwaivable statutory rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (

2023Such cases would include those in which granting finality to an arbitrator’s decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party’s statutory rights.’” (Sheppard, Mullin, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 77 [explaining and reaffirming the holding in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 ].) More generally, even outside the context of an illegal contract, in certain limited and exceptional circumstances, “[a]rbitrators may exceed their powers by issuing an award that violates a party’s unwaivable statutory rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (

2015(Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs, at p. 1052.) Turning to FEHA case law, we begin with Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 ] (Cummings), which adopted the Christiansburg standard for awards of fees and costs to prevailing FEHA defendants.

2015(Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs, at p. 1052.) Turning to FEHA case law, we begin with Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 ] (Cummings), which adopted the Christiansburg standard for awards of fees and costs to prevailing FEHA defendants.

2026Code, § 12900 et seq.)3 “affords California employees broad protection against discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on any of a wide range of impermissible bases.” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College District (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 106 (McDonald).) A person who wishes to bring a civil lawsuit for a FEHA violation must first exhaust the administrative process.

2026Code, § 12900 et seq.)3 “affords California employees broad protection against discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on any of a wide range of impermissible bases.” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College District (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 106 (McDonald).) A person who wishes to bring a civil lawsuit for a FEHA violation must first exhaust the administrative process.

2023(Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 229-232, 241 (Harris).) “[D]iscrimination, though not a ‘but for’ cause of an adverse employment action (because the employer can show it would have taken the same action in any event), might nonetheless be found to be a substantial motivating factor . . . .” (Id. at 14 3 226.) Thus, “[i]f triable issues of material fact exist [as to] whether discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for the employer’s adverse employment action, even if the employer’s professed legitimate reason has not been disputed, the FEHA claim is not properl

2023(Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 229-232, 241 (Harris).) “[D]iscrimination, though not a ‘but for’ cause of an adverse employment action (because the employer can show it would have taken the same action in any event), might nonetheless be found to be a substantial motivating factor . . . .” (Id. at 14 3 226.) Thus, “[i]f triable issues of material fact exist [as to] whether discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for the employer’s adverse employment action, even if the employer’s professed legitimate reason has not been disputed, the FEHA claim is not properl

2021Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) FEHA authorizes courts to award prevailing 6 parties their reasonable attorney fees and costs. (§ 12965, subd. (b).) However, a prevailing defendant in a FEHA action may recover its fees and costs only if the trial court “finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” (Ibid.; Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115 [a prevailing FEHA defendant “should not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was object

2019(Compare Sviridov , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 521 , 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , with Arave , supra , 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 .) This court in Sviridov carefully and thoroughly examined the issue, reaching the reasonable conclusion that precluding " section 998 costs unless the FEHA claim was objectively groundless would erode the public policy of encouraging settlement in such cases." ( Sviridov , at p. 521, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Our opinion here should not be read as a critique of Sviridov , or the trial court's handling of the underlying case, but rather as a recognition tha

2025The court in Janken, however, merely stated in dicta that “A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.” (Id. at p. 80.) Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75 (Light), cited by Whithorn, understands Janken as finding only that the plaintiff had not alleged “ ‘outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.’ ” (Id. at p. 101, fn. 10.) The Light court recognized that “[a] number of California authorities have concluded claims for in

2025The court in Janken, however, merely stated in dicta that “A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.” (Id. at p. 80.) Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75 (Light), cited by Whithorn, understands Janken as finding only that the plaintiff had not alleged “ ‘outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.’ ” (Id. at p. 101, fn. 10.) The Light court recognized that “[a] number of California authorities have concluded claims for in

2024Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(C).) As in Pearson, the arbitrator committed a “clear error of law” when it found Li’s termination claims time-barred and the error deprived Li of the ability to obtain a hearing on the merits of her FEHA claim. ( Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 670, 680.) Thus, the arbitrator exceeded its powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), and the award was properly vacated.

2021(Cf. Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, 682 ; Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1473 .) That is precisely the course followed by the Supreme Court in Armendariz, which, after concluding it violated FEHA to require an employee to pay the costs associated with arbitration of a FEHA claim, held, “[A] mandatory employment arbitration agreement that contains within its scope the arbitration of FEHA claims impliedly obliges the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) As a re

2008Recently, in Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 1092, we held exhaustion of internal administrative remedies prior to filing a FEHA claim is not mandatory.

2008Recently, in Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 1092, we held exhaustion of internal administrative remedies prior to filing a FEHA claim is not mandatory.

2017"In order to meet the FEHA standard, an employer's adverse treatment must 'materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' [Citation.] '[T]he determination of whether a particular action or course of conduct rises to the level of actionable conduct should take into account the unique circumstances of the affected employee as well as the workplace context of the claim.' [Citation.] Such a determination 'is not, by its nature, susceptible to a mathematically precise test.' [Citation.] 'Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by employers or fellow employees

2017"In order to meet the FEHA standard, an employer's adverse treatment must 'materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' [Citation.] '[T]he determination of whether a particular action or course of conduct rises to the level of actionable conduct should take into account the unique circumstances of the affected employee as well as the workplace context of the claim.' [Citation.] Such a determination 'is not, by its nature, susceptible to a mathematically precise test.' [Citation.] 'Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by employers or fellow employees

2001(See, e.g., City of Moorpark, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1155, 1161, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 [FEHA claim]; Gantt, at p. 1100, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 [ Tameny claim]; Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 22-23, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 [whistleblower claim under Gov.Code, former § 19683].) We now apply these principles to plaintiffs' specific claims and allegations. 1.

2001(See, e.g., City of Moorpark, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1155, 1161, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 [FEHA claim]; Gantt, at p. 1100, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 [ Tameny claim]; Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 22-23, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 [whistleblower claim under Gov.Code, former § 19683].) We now apply these principles to plaintiffs' specific claims and allegations. 1.