de minimis violation (Ohio) · Go Syfert
← Ohio issues

de minimis violation in Ohio

52 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2026 13 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (19)

CaseFollowedCited
City of Dayton v. Ericksongreen
ohio · 1996 · cited in 17 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2008See, e.g., City of Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11-12 (holding "that where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation , the stop is constitutionally valid") (emphasis added); State v. Gross , Mahoning App. No. 01-CA-115, 2002-Ohio-3465 (rejecting the argument that a de minimis violation does not support probable cause); State v. Mehta (Sept. 4, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-11-232 (rejecting as "meritless" argument that a de minimis violation does not support probable ca

2007Ornelas v. U.S. (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1663 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . {¶ 66} This Court, relying on Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , and our analysis in State v. McCormick (Feb. 2, 2001), Stark App. No. 2000CA00204, unreported, has held that any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, would form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. {¶ 67} "The severity of the violation is not the determining factor as to whether probable cause existed for the stop." State v. Weimaster (Dec. 21, 1999), Richland App. No. 99CA36, unreported.

717
State v. Tidwell (Slip Opinion)green
ohio · 2021 · cited in 4 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2025
2 sentences

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”). {¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who observes a de mi

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”). {¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who observes a de mi

44
United States v. Sokolowgreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2025
2 sentences

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity ‘ “may be afoot.” ’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶22} A police officer who observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”). {¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who observes a de mi

35
United States v. Arvizugreen
scotus · 2002 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2025
2 sentences

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity ‘ “may be afoot.” ’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶22} A police officer who observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”). {¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who observes a de mi

35
Terry v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2025
2 sentences

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity ‘ “may be afoot.” ’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶22} A police officer who observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.

2025Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”). {¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who observes a de mi

35
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2012–2013
2 sentences

2013See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 108- 109, 98 S.Ct. 330 , (1997). {¶14} A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.

2013See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 108- 109, 98 S.Ct. 330 , (1997). {¶14} A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.

23
Whren v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 8 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2006No. 5- 99-41, 2000-Ohio-1663 ("While we recognize the existence of those cases holding essentially that a de minimis violation does not necessarily give a police officer reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, * * * we disagree with the general reasoning of those cases and note that such cases have effectively been overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.E.2d 89 , and the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 ."). {¶ 65} Nevertheless, while we stand behind our decisions which have held that

2006No. 5- 99-41, 2000-Ohio-1663 ("While we recognize the existence of those cases holding essentially that a de minimis violation does not necessarily give a police officer reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, * * * we disagree with the general reasoning of those cases and note that such cases have effectively been overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.E.2d 89 , and the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 ."). {¶ 65} Nevertheless, while we stand behind our decisions which have held that

18
State v. Koczwaragreen
ohioctapp · 2014 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026
2 sentences

2026See State v. Williams, 2014-Ohio-4897 , ¶ 9 (4th Dist.), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996), syllabus. “[A] traffic stop with the proper standard of evidence is valid regardless of the officer's underlying ulterior motives as the test is merely whether the officer ‘could’ have performed the act complained of; pretext is irrelevant if the action complained of was permissible.” See State v. Scioto App. No. 25CA4120 14 Koczwara, 2014-Ohio-1946, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.), citing Erickson at 7 and 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091 .

2021Mahoning No. 13MA149, 2014-Ohio-1946 , ¶ 22 * * *.

15
State v. Maylgreen
ohio · 2005 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2019
2 sentences

2019It states, “While not in transit or under examination, all blood and urine specimens shall be refrigerated.” {¶17} In State v. Baker, the Ohio Supreme Court held, Our decisions in Plummer [ 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 490 N.E. 2d 902 (1986] and Mayl [ 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 ] are instructive on the question of substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701–53–05(F) and establish that the state’s error in failing to refrigerate a specimen for four to five hours before placement of the specimen in transit to a laboratory for analysis is a de minimis error and does not rend

2019It states, “While not in transit or under examination, all blood and urine specimens shall be refrigerated.” {¶17} In State v. Baker, the Ohio Supreme Court held, Our decisions in Plummer [ 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 490 N.E. 2d 902 (1986] and Mayl [ 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 ] are instructive on the question of substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701–53–05(F) and establish that the state’s error in failing to refrigerate a specimen for four to five hours before placement of the specimen in transit to a laboratory for analysis is a de minimis error and does not rend

12
City of Columbus v. Gullick, 07ap-520 (6-26-2008)green
ohioctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Columbus v. Gullick, 2008-Ohio-3168, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). {¶25} In accordance with the above, “any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, may form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle.” Kay, ¶ 17.

11
State v. Woodsgreen
ohioctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025State v. Bangoura, 2009-Ohio- 3339 ¶14 (5th Dist.); State v. Woods, 2013-Ohio-1136, ¶60 (5th Dist.). {¶19} Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find Deputy Cline had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle.

11
State v. Alexander-Lindseygreen
ohioctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See State v. Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033 , 65 N.E.3d 129 , ¶ 11.

11
Miller v. Stategreen
ind · 1944 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Fairfield County, Case No. 18-CA-35 6 146 Ohio St.3d 456 , 2016-Ohio-451 , 58 N.E.2d 114, ¶26 (emphasis added).

11
State v. Andrewsgreen
ohioctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Compare State v. Andrews, 2017-Ohio-1383 , 89 N.E.3d 157, ¶ 53 (2d Dist.) (holding that even a de minimis violation of the marked- lane statute by driving into an adjacent lane by half a tire width provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop). {¶ 9} In opposition to our conclusion, Starks cites State v. Grenoble, 12th Dist.

2019Compare State v. Andrews, 2017-Ohio-1383 , 89 N.E.3d 157, ¶ 53 (2d Dist.) (holding that even a de minimis violation of the marked- lane statute by driving into an adjacent lane by half a tire width provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop). {¶ 9} In opposition to our conclusion, Starks cites State v. Grenoble, 12th Dist.

11
State v. Middleton, Unpublished Decision (2-22-2005)green
ohioctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See State v. Middleton, Preble App. No. CA2004-01-003, 2005-Ohio-681, ¶25 . {¶35} Appellant finally requests this Court to order the trial court to correct a de minimis error in the May 25, 2010 sentencing entry.

11
State v. Alemu, Unpublished Decision (10-31-2005)green
ohioctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See State v. Alemu, Licking App.No. 2005CA00039, 2005-Ohio-5955 , ¶ 46 - ¶ 47. {¶32} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress.

11
Berry v. Paisleygreen
ohioctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Environmental Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P.green
ohio · 2007 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Fitzpatrick v. Zimmerman, 21727 (7-27-2007)green
ohioctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007See State v. Mays , 114 Ohio St.3d 1506 , 2007-Ohio-4285 , 72 N.E.2d 949 (Table) (accepting a certified conflict and stating the question that was certified). {¶ 34} In Mays , the Fifth District followed existing authority, which held that "any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, would form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle." 2007-Ohio-3807 , at ¶ 12 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Baker (Slip Opinion) green
ohio · 2016
2 sentences

2023The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “failing to refrigerate a blood specimen for a period of four hours and ten minutes before placing it in transit for analysis is a de minimis error and does not render the test result inadmissible for failure to substantially comply with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-0[6(G)].” State v. Baker, 146 Ohio St.3d 456 , 2016-Ohio-451 , 58 N.E.3d 1114, ¶ 21 .

2023The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “failing to refrigerate a blood specimen for a period of four hours and ten minutes before placing it in transit for analysis is a de minimis error and does not render the test result inadmissible for failure to substantially comply with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-0[6(G)].” State v. Baker, 146 Ohio St.3d 456 , 2016-Ohio-451 , 58 N.E.3d 1114, ¶ 21 .

32019–2024
State v. Plummer green
ohio · 1986
2 sentences

2019It states, “While not in transit or under examination, all blood and urine specimens shall be refrigerated.” {¶17} In State v. Baker, the Ohio Supreme Court held, Our decisions in Plummer [ 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 490 N.E. 2d 902 (1986] and Mayl [ 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 ] are instructive on the question of substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701–53–05(F) and establish that the state’s error in failing to refrigerate a specimen for four to five hours before placement of the specimen in transit to a laboratory for analysis is a de minimis error and does not rend

2019It states, “While not in transit or under examination, all blood and urine specimens shall be refrigerated.” {¶17} In State v. Baker, the Ohio Supreme Court held, Our decisions in Plummer [ 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 490 N.E. 2d 902 (1986] and Mayl [ 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 ] are instructive on the question of substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701–53–05(F) and establish that the state’s error in failing to refrigerate a specimen for four to five hours before placement of the specimen in transit to a laboratory for analysis is a de minimis error and does not rend

32016–2019
State v. Wilhelm green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2005See Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , syllabus; State v. Wilhelm (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 444 , 692 N.E.2d 181 ; State v. McCormick (Feb. 5, 2001), 5th Dist.

2005See Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , syllabus; State v. Wilhelm (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 444 , 692 N.E.2d 181 ; State v. McCormick (Feb. 5, 2001), 5th Dist.

32001–2005
State v. Burnside green
ohio · 2003
2 sentences

2024(Citations omitted.) Id. {¶ 52} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “failing to refrigerate a blood specimen for a period of four hours and ten minutes before placing it in transit for analysis is a de minimis error and does not render the test result inadmissible for failure to substantially comply” with administrative regulations.

2016“Indeed, the General Assembly instructed the Director of Health — and not the judiciary — to ensure the reliability of alcohol-test results by promulgating regulations precisely because the former possesses the scientific expertise that the latter does not.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. {¶ 35} If the state’s burden to show substantial compliance under the Burnside test is to have any relevance, courts must have the information needed to assess what constitutes a de minimis error.

22016–2024
Ornelas v. United States green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

2007Ornelas v. U.S. (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1663 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . {¶ 66} This Court, relying on Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , and our analysis in State v. McCormick (Feb. 2, 2001), Stark App. No. 2000CA00204, unreported, has held that any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, would form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. {¶ 67} "The severity of the violation is not the determining factor as to whether probable cause existed for the stop." State v. Weimaster (Dec. 21, 1999), Richland App. No. 99CA36, unreported.

2007Ornelas v. U.S. (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1663 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . {¶ 66} This Court, relying on Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , and our analysis in State v. McCormick (Feb. 2, 2001), Stark App. No. 2000CA00204, unreported, has held that any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, would form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. {¶ 67} "The severity of the violation is not the determining factor as to whether probable cause existed for the stop." State v. Weimaster (Dec. 21, 1999), Richland App. No. 99CA36, unreported.

22006–2007
State v. Netter green
ohioctapp · 2024
1 sentence

2024Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they [Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 .] have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accord State v. Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57 , 2021-Ohio-2072 , 175 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the offi

12024–2024
Davis v. Flickinger green
ohio · 1997
2 sentences

2021The trier of fact "has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page." Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 , 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). {¶ 18} This court has consistently held any traffic violation could form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle, including a de minimis violation.

2021The trier of fact "has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page." Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 , 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). {¶ 18} This court has consistently held any traffic violation could form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle, including a de minimis violation.

12021–2021
State v. Alim green
ohioctapp · 2017
2 sentences

2020Nonetheless, upon stopping the vehicle an odor of marijuana was detected. “‘[U]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.’” Alim, 2017-Ohio-8868 , 100 N.E.3d 1119, at ¶ 27 , quoting State v. Battle, 10th Dist.

2020Nonetheless, upon stopping the vehicle an odor of marijuana was detected. “‘[U]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.’” Alim, 2017-Ohio-8868 , 100 N.E.3d 1119, at ¶ 27 , quoting State v. Battle, 10th Dist.

12020–2020
In re Adoption of Zschach green
ohio · 1996
1 sentence

2020Father chose to take no action to contest the petition, and as a consequence, his consent is not required pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(K). {¶ 15} As the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged, "strict adherence to the procedural mandates of [R.C. 3107.07(K)] might appear unfair," but "the state's interest in facilitating the adoption of children and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously justifies such a rigid application." In re Zschach, 75 Ohio St. 3d at 653 .

12020–2020
State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (1-3-2006) neutral
ohioctapp · 2006
1 sentence

2017Stark No. 2005 CA 00106, 2006-Ohio-14, ¶ 11 , citing State v. Lambert, 5th Dist.

12017–2017
Rodriguez v. United States green
scotus · 2015
1 sentence

2015Id. {¶21} The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether police, absent reasonable suspicion, could extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff.

12015–2015
State v. Dunfee, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2003) green
ohioctapp · 2003
1 sentence

2012No. 02CA37, 2003-Ohio-5970 , 2003 WL 2253819 , ¶ 25, citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 , 98 S.Ct. 330 , (1997). {¶20} A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.

12012–2012
Stutzman v. Madison County Board of Elections green
ohio · 2001
2 sentences

2009Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 511, 515 , 757 N.E.2d 297 , holding that a de minimis error in the acreage listed in the title of referendum petition relating to a village ordinance rezoning property did not *266 violate the R.C. 731.31 requirement that referendum petitions contain a “full and correct copy of the title of the ordinance” because there was no evidence or any reasonable argument that the error could have misled electors to sign a petition that they would not have signed had the correct acreage been listed. {¶ 31} For the Wolf parcel, Miller and McCarthy claim — as they did

2009Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 511, 515 , 757 N.E.2d 297 , holding that a de minimis error in the acreage listed in the title of referendum petition relating to a village ordinance rezoning property did not *266 violate the R.C. 731.31 requirement that referendum petitions contain a “full and correct copy of the title of the ordinance” because there was no evidence or any reasonable argument that the error could have misled electors to sign a petition that they would not have signed had the correct acreage been listed. {¶ 31} For the Wolf parcel, Miller and McCarthy claim — as they did

12009–2009
Ohio v. Freeman green
ohio · 1980
12005–2005
State v. Bobo green
ohio · 1988
12005–2005
United States v. Leroy Roberson, Jr., Lonnie Keeper, and Lawanda Whitlock green
ca5 · 1993
12001–2001
United States v. Edward Dane Jeffus green
ca4 · 1994
12001–2001
United States v. Gregory B. Bloomfield, Also Known as Earl Marcum Johnson green
ca8 · 1994
12001–2001
United States v. Paul N. Johnson Darryl Jonns Lamont Bell and Craig Richardson, Paul N. Johnson green
ca3 · 1995
12001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11 (15) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03 (11) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.33 (8) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.19 (7) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.14 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.11 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.01 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.14 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.12 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.13 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.08 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 61 (1959–2026) IL 53 (1968–2026) OH 52 (2000–2026) CA 24 (1949–2023) WA 23 (2000–2026) NY 21 (1953–2025) TX 15 (1952–2023) NJ 13 (1980–2022) HI 12 (2000–2023) VT 10 (1976–2026) MA 10 (1958–2016) NC 9 (1943–2020) IN 7 (1971–2025) CT 7 (1998–2026) MN 6 (2002–2023) AR 6 (1951–2008) NM 6 (1994–2026) MO 6 (1984–2024) MD 5 (1982–2026) WI 5 (2000–2025) ND 5 (2004–2015) IA 4 (1972–1994) FL 4 (2003–2024) MS 4 (2004–2013) UT 4 (1995–2013) MI 3 (1955–2023) DC 3 (1990–2009) ME 3 (2003–2023) RI 3 (2004–2011) DE 2 (2019–2021) OR 2 (2006–2024) TN 2 (1956–1988) ID 2 (2022–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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