defendant at the sentencing hearing in Ohio

2026State v. Qualls, 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶ 19 .

2019Adequate notification that complies with the statutory requirements directs that a trial court must notify the defendant "of the details of the postrelease control and the consequences of violating postrelease control." State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012- Ohio-1111, ¶ 18. {¶ 11} In addition to notifying a defendant at the sentencing hearing, the trial court must also incorporate post-release control into its sentencing entry.

2023Cuyahoga No. 102326, 2015-Ohio-3882, ¶ 16 . {¶4} Because the trial court correctly imposed the registration duty at the sentencing hearing, the failure to include the classification within the entry is clearly 2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS a mere clerical mistake.

2022Cuyahoga No. 102326, 2015-Ohio-3882, ¶ 16 ; see Crim.R. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time”).

2005State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2005Appellant based his motion on the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , which requires a trial court inform a defendant at the sentencing hearing of the specific prison term it will impose if the defendant violates community control.

2026State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085 , ¶ 17, overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913 .

2020Portage No. 2010-P-0090, 2011-Ohio-6001 , ¶49-53 (same). {¶45} Most recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio has revisited its prior void- sentence jurisprudence and held that “[a] sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” State v. Harper, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶42 . {¶46} Since Mr. Mitchell’s sentence is not void, his arguments are subject to res judicata.

2010No. 8-04-27, 2004-Ohio-6959, ¶ 16 . {¶ 8} This cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal and upon the certification of a conflict between the judgment of the appellate court in this case and the judgments rendered in State v. Peacock, 11th Dist.

2009However, the second and third districts have rejected the argument, instead reasoning that “a trial court is not required to orally address a defendant at the sentencing hearing to inform him that he is required by R.C. 2947.23 to pay for the costs of prosecution.” State v. Joseph, Allen App. No. 1-07-50, 2008-Ohio-1138 , 2008 WL 697377 , ¶ 9, citing State v. Ward, Logan App. No. 8-04-27, 2004-Ohio-6959 , 2004 WL 2940878 , ¶ 16, and State v. Powell, Montgomery App. No. 20857, 2006-Ohio-263 , 2006 WL 172347 , ¶ 11. {¶ 21} As such, the Supreme Court accepted a discretionary appeal in Joseph, wit

2010The appellate court sustained the judgment of the trial court, holding that “a trial court is not required to orally address a defendant at the sentencing hearing to inform him that he is required by R.C. 2947.23 to pay for the costs of prosecution.” State v. Joseph, 2008-Ohio-1138, ¶ 9 , citing State v. Ward, 3d Dist.

2010The appellate court sustained the judgment of the trial court, holding that “a trial court is not required to orally address a defendant at the sentencing hearing to inform him that he is required by R.C. 2947.23 to pay for the costs of prosecution.” State v. Joseph, 2008-Ohio-1138 , 2008 WL 697377 , at ¶ 9, citing State v. Ward, 3d Dist.

2010State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12 .

2010State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12 .

2024R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not impose any other notification requirements on trial courts.” State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-1975, ¶ 11 . {¶32} In State v. Riley, 2019-Ohio-3327 (11th Dist.), the trial court advised the defendant at the sentencing hearing that he would “be subject to post-release control for a mandatory term of three years pursuant to R.C. 2967.28, and that if he violates post- release control, he could receive an additional prison term, not to exceed fifty percent of his original term.

2024R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not impose any other notification requirements on trial courts.” State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-1975, ¶ 11 . {¶32} In State v. Riley, 2019-Ohio-3327 (11th Dist.), the trial court advised the defendant at the sentencing hearing that he would “be subject to post-release control for a mandatory term of three years pursuant to R.C. 2967.28, and that if he violates post- release control, he could receive an additional prison term, not to exceed fifty percent of his original term.

2023Id., 2016-Ohio-7990 at ¶ 32 .

2023Id., 2016-Ohio-7990 at ¶ 32 .

2022State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2022-Ohio-475 , 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 10-12 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St. 3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 , ¶ 23 and State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio-2927 , 85 N.E.3d 700 ; R.C. 2929.19(2)(d) and (f).

2022State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2022-Ohio-475 , 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 10-12 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St. 3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 , ¶ 23 and State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio-2927 , 85 N.E.3d 700 ; R.C. 2929.19(2)(d) and (f).

2021Cuyahoga No. 109599, 2021-Ohio-847, ¶ 45-46 . {¶23} Accordingly, Paul's sentence must be reversed, and this matter is remanded for the sole purpose of resentencing Paul in accordance with the requirements set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

2021Warren No. CA2020-08- 048, 2021-Ohio-1353 (reversed because R.C. 2929.19[B][2][c] notifications must be given by the trial court to the defendant at the sentencing hearing); State v. Whitehead, 8th Dist.

2020The court’s calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced. {¶36} Thus, the trial court must provide the information described in R.C. §2929.19(B)(2)(c) to a defendant at the sentencing hearing to fulfill the requirements of the statute. {¶37} In this case, the court gave no advisement of any of the requirements set forth in R.C. §2929.19(B) at the sentencing hearing held January 24, 2020 and, therefore, we fin

2020Mahoning No. 17MA0174, 2018-Ohio-4562 , the Seventh District recently considered another case in which the trial court advised the defendant at the sentencing hearing that he was subject to: “[m]andatory five years post-release control,” but the sentencing entry stated “[i]n addition, as part of this sentence, post release control must be imposed up to a maximum period of five (5) years.” Id. at ¶ 8.

2017The dissent acknowledged the trial court's error in failing to advise the defendant at the sentencing hearing that he had to pay court costs, but asserted the error was harmless because R.C. 2947.23(C)"makes reliance on [ Joseph ] improper." Id. {¶ 53} A week later, in Thomas , another divided panel of this court held that because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the defendant's court costs under R.C. 2947.23(C), "the protection established by the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph is no longer necessary" and that the trial court's error in failing to impose court costs at the sentenc

2017Portage No. 2008-P-0028, 2008-Ohio-6560 , FN. 2 (“not only must a court notify a defendant at the sentencing hearing and in its journal entry on sentence, but also, where applicable, prior to accepting his or her plea.”); see also State v. Delventhal, 8th Dist.

2016Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 (failure to include 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO mandatory driver’s license suspension makes that part of the sentence void); State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954 , 926 N.E.2d 278 (sentence imposing costs is not void when court fails to inform the defendant at the sentencing hearing that costs will be imposed); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 (failure to include mandatory fine when affidavit of indigency not filed renders that part of the sentence void). {¶ 62} The majority opinion, in m

2016Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 (failure to include 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO mandatory driver’s license suspension makes that part of the sentence void); State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954 , 926 N.E.2d 278 (sentence imposing costs is not void when court fails to inform the defendant at the sentencing hearing that costs will be imposed); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 (failure to include mandatory fine when affidavit of indigency not filed renders that part of the sentence void). {¶ 62} The majority opinion, in m

2016Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 (failure to include 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO mandatory driver’s license suspension makes that part of the sentence void); State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954 , 926 N.E.2d 278 (sentence imposing costs is not void when court fails to inform the defendant at the sentencing hearing that costs will be imposed); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 (failure to include mandatory fine when affidavit of indigency not filed renders that part of the sentence void). {¶ 62} The majority opinion, in m

2016Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 (failure to include 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO mandatory driver’s license suspension makes that part of the sentence void); State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954 , 926 N.E.2d 278 (sentence imposing costs is not void when court fails to inform the defendant at the sentencing hearing that costs will be imposed); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 (failure to include mandatory fine when affidavit of indigency not filed renders that part of the sentence void). {¶ 62} The majority opinion, in m

2016No. 13MA152, 2014-Ohio-4007 , the trial court failed to advise the defendant at the sentencing hearing that if he violated post- release control the parole board could impose a prison term up to half of his original sentence.