defendant at the sentencing hearing in Illinois

1998In response to the trial court’s inquiry, however, defense counsel stated he was willing to represent the defendant at the sentencing hearing, and the defendant stated he was willing to be represented by this attorney because “sentencing is sentencing.” Brown, 40 Ill.

1978App. 3d 562 , 352 N.E.2d 15 , where the defendant accused his counsel of suborning his perjury at his trial, and although his counsel moved to withdraw, he continued to represent the defendant at the sentencing hearing.

2020Id.

1986While that cross-examination only "gives * * * pause" to the majority ( 115 Ill.2d at 279 ), it convinces me that the defendant did not receive *289 a fair penalty hearing.

1984Ed. 2d 162 , 91 S. Ct. 160 .) We believe that an allegation of fear of a lengthy incarceration, which fear was admitted by this defendant at the sentencing hearing, offers even less reason to invalidate a knowing and intelligent plea than does a fear of death.

1983In a proceeding that will determine whether a defendant should live or die, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be precluded from no opportunity to present relevant evidence to show why he should live, notwithstanding the rules of evidence ordinarily applicable in criminal cases. ( Cf. Green v. Georgia (1979), 442 U.S. 95 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 (exclusion of reliable hearsay in death penalty proceeding under State's rules of evidence violates due process).) The polygraph evidence introduced by the defendant at the sentencing hearing was at least as reliable as some of th

1983Ed. 2d 738 , 99 S. Ct. 2150 (exclusion of reliable hearsay in death penalty proceeding under State’s rules of evidence violates due process).) The polygraph evidence introduced by the defendant at the sentencing hearing was at least as reliable as some of the evidence presented by the prosecution at the same hearing.