selection and implementation hearing in California

2024(In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 (Erik P.) [parent’s burden to raise any relevant exception at the selection and implementation hearing]; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 .) The failure to raise an exception forfeits the issue on appeal.

2022(In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 (Erik P.) [parent’s burden to raise any relevant exception at the selection and implementation hearing]; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 [“ ‘The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption’ ” (italics omitted)].) The failure to raise an exception forfeits the issue on appeal.

2022General Principles Regarding Adoptability When a parent fails to reunify with his or her dependent child and reunification services are terminated, “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) The juvenile court must set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to provide a stable, permanent home for the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to determine based on the Agency’s assessment “and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, tha

2016(Ibid.; Estate of Palmer (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 .) Despite the inadequacy of mother’s briefing, “[a] parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his [or her] children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 .) Accordingly, we will address the merits of mother’s contention. “ ‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child . . . .

2024Analysis “At the selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26, the trial court determines whether the child is adoptable on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732 .) “A prospective ‘family’s suitability to adopt is irrelevant to the issue whether the minor[] [is] likely to be adopted,’ which is the only issue at the selection and implementation hearing. [Citation.] ‘The sole issue at the selection and implementation hearing is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable. [Citations.] In resolving

2014(In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732 .) In order to terminate parental rights at the selection and implementation hearing, the court must find clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable. (§ 366.26(c); In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642 , 1649–1650.) “All that is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406 .) The court must focus on whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt

2026Mother timely appealed. 4 The minute order for the selection and implementation hearing states that Mother “has not maintained regular visitation with the child.” However, “[w]here there is a conflict between the juvenile court’s statements in the reporter’s transcript and the recitals in the clerk’s transcript, we presume the reporter’s transcript is the more accurate.” (In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799-800 ; accord, Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660 , 668.) 6 DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away

2023The Court Did Not Err in Terminating Parental Rights The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063 , 1076 [the selection and implementation hearing “‘is designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child’””].) The question at the hearing is not “‘whether the child should be returned to the parent, an issue already decided in the ne

2026Mother timely appealed. 4 The minute order for the selection and implementation hearing states that Mother “has not maintained regular visitation with the child.” However, “[w]here there is a conflict between the juvenile court’s statements in the reporter’s transcript and the recitals in the clerk’s transcript, we presume the reporter’s transcript is the more accurate.” (In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799-800 ; accord, Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660 , 668.) 6 DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away

2022Governing Law and Standard of Review The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Once the court has decided to end parent- child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 [“[i]f adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be detrimental to the child”].) Section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to conduct a two- part i

2024(Id. at pp. 246, 248–249.) The new process still resulted in “lengthy delays, especially when adoption was selected as the permanent plan.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 247 .) Thus, the Legislature, on the recommendations of a task force, revised the statutory scheme to eliminate the separate adoption proceeding “and brought termination of parental rights for dependent children within the dependency process through a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.” (Ibid.) This hearing required juvenile courts to “only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and conv

2003(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 253 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 ].) A prospective “family’s suitability to adopt is irrelevant to the issue whether the minor[] [is] likely to be adopted,” which is the only issue at the selection and implementation hearing.

2005(In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 862 P.2d *596 765].) 5 “Until permanency planning, reunification of parent and child is the law’s paramount concern.” (Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 546 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 ].) At the 12-month review hearing, the court may continue reunification services for another six months only if it believes there is a substantial probability the parent will reunify within that time. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) On the other hand, if the court finds there is no substantial probability of return within 18 months of the o

2005(In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 862 P.2d *596 765].) 5 “Until permanency planning, reunification of parent and child is the law’s paramount concern.” (Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 546 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 ].) At the 12-month review hearing, the court may continue reunification services for another six months only if it believes there is a substantial probability the parent will reunify within that time. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) On the other hand, if the court finds there is no substantial probability of return within 18 months of the o

2018(Ibid.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) If the court finds a child 14 cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the specified statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401 .) "The parent has the burden of establishing the exi

2016(Ibid.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the specified statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401 .) "The parent has the burden of establishing the existe

2021(Ibid.; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809 ; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) 18 Here, mother was present with counsel at the selection and implementation hearing.

2021(In re T.S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1031 , 1039; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 (C.F.).) Because a selection and implementation hearing occurs “after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) 12 The parent asserting the exception will not meet his or her burden by showing the existence of a “friendly and loving relationship,” an emotional

1996The purpose of the selection and implementation hearing is to "provide stable, permanent homes for [dependent children]." (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) A juvenile court at a section 366.26 hearing must select one of three plans for the child: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1)-(4); In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal. App.4th 1, 7 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 810 ].) The court may terminate parental rights and order adoption for the child only *1798 if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Findings made in pre

1996The purpose of the selection and implementation hearing is to "provide stable, permanent homes for [dependent children]." (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) A juvenile court at a section 366.26 hearing must select one of three plans for the child: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1)-(4); In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal. App.4th 1, 7 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 810 ].) The court may terminate parental rights and order adoption for the child only *1798 if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Findings made in pre

2023(In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1318 [appeal from most recent dependency order may not challenge prior orders for which statutory time for filing appeal has passed]; rule 8.406(a)(1) [a notice of appeal in a dependency proceeding must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed].) 10 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s June 9, 2022 order continuing the selection and implementation hearing is affirmed.

2022(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 , 630–631.) In preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court “is required to direct the Agency to prepare an assessment report of the child as part of its report to the court. [Citations.] The assessment report must 11 address the child’s medical, developmental, scholastic, mental and emotional status; analyze the likelihood the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated; describe the efforts made to identify a prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian for the child; and provide a preliminary assessment of the eligibility

2024(In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 (Erik P.) [parent’s burden to raise any relevant exception at the selection and implementation hearing]; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 .) The failure to raise an exception forfeits the issue on appeal.

2022(In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 (Erik P.) [parent’s burden to raise any relevant exception at the selection and implementation hearing]; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 [“ ‘The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption’ ” (italics omitted)].) The failure to raise an exception forfeits the issue on appeal.

2024It would be a perversion of the procedure to impose upon it a requirement that the child's testimony always be presented, regardless of the trauma resulting to the child therefrom, and regardless of the necessity of such testimony in the resolution of the issues before the court.’” (Jennifer J., at p. 1089, fn. omitted; accord, Daniela G., at p. 1092.) “In considering whether to exclude a child’s testimony” 13 the juvenile court “must engage in ‘a careful weighing of the interests involved,’ including a parent’s right to call and cross- examine witnesses.” (Daniela G., at p.1092, quoting Jenni

2018A juvenile court can, consistent with a parent's due process rights, refuse to compel the testimony of a child who is otherwise available when "the possible benefit derivable from [the] testimony would not warrant the [psychological] injury it would cause." ( In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080 , 1085-1086, 1088, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 813 ( Jennifer J. ).) Jennifer J. announced this principle in the context of excluding *1087 a child's testimony at a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, and no published decision has explicitly extended it to

2022“A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 259 [“the court’s dispositional and following orders are directly appealable, with the exception of an order scheduling a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26”].) “Generally, a parent who is aggrieved by an order after judgment in a juvenile dependency proceeding may take an appeal from that order. (§ 395.) ‘To be aggrieved,

2019Code, § 366.26, subd. ( l )(1)-(2) ; Cal Rules of Court, rules 8.450(e)(4)(a), 8.452 ; Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998 , 1018, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 , 116 P.3d 550 .) Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247 , 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 , cited by mother (and the Isaiah court), is distinguishable in that the appeal in that case was taken from an order terminating reunification services and scheduling a selection and implementation hearing. ( Id . at p. 251, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 .) The ICWA issue *897 was cognizable in the context of that order because the error under review w

1996(In re Alma B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 592 ].) The primary reason is that juvenile dependency cases are “ ‘civil in nature, designed not to prosecute a parent, but to protect the child.’ ” (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 795 P.2d 1244 ].) Because the focus at the selection and implementation hearing is on the fundamental interest of the child “in the opportunity to experience a stable parent-child relationship” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 ]), a trial attorney has no lega

1996(In re Alma B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 592 ].) The primary reason is that juvenile dependency cases are “ ‘civil in nature, designed not to prosecute a parent, but to protect the child.’ ” (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 795 P.2d 1244 ].) Because the focus at the selection and implementation hearing is on the fundamental interest of the child “in the opportunity to experience a stable parent-child relationship” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 ]), a trial attorney has no lega

2014First, the assessment report for the selection and implementation hearing must address the TCA option. (§§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(H), 366.24, subd. (b).) If the Tribe decides that TCA is the appropriate alternative, the Tribe or its designee conducts a home study prior to approval of the TCA placement, including a check of the Child Abuse Central Index and state and federal criminal background checks. (§ 366.24, subd. (c)(1), (2), & (3).) This assessment 10 and the TCA order from the Tribe should be completed prior to the selection and implementation hearing and the TCA order should be filed wit

2014(G.C., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399 .) In that case, the mother had Native American heritage, but the father did not, and the child had been placed in a “ ‘Designated Indian Home.’ ” (Id. at p. 1395.) By the time of the selection and implementation hearing, the mother intended to relinquish her parental rights.

2021(In re T.S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1031 , 1039; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 (C.F.).) Because a selection and implementation hearing occurs “after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) 12 The parent asserting the exception will not meet his or her burden by showing the existence of a “friendly and loving relationship,” an emotional

2018(Ibid.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) If the court finds a child 14 cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the specified statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401 .) "The parent has the burden of establishing the exi

2022(In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 .) “[S]ection 388 plays a vital role in preserving due process in dependency proceedings overall” because “it is only when read in conjunction with the escape mechanism section 388 procedures create that the limited options available at a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 comply with due process.

2015(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 ; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) Where, as here, the petition is brought when services have been bypassed or terminated and the selection and implementation hearing is pending, the best interests of the child are of paramount consideration.

2014Was Adoptable Parents contend there was insufficient evidence Jayden was adoptable because the Department’s assessment was not updated after Jayden was removed from placement with his paternal aunt and uncle, and because there was insufficient evidence he would be 8 adopted “in a reasonable time.” We conclude the initial assessment, in the absence of any evidence that Jayden’s health or behavior had deteriorated, was sufficient evidence of his adoptability, and that the presence of an identified prospective adoptive placement at the time of the selection and implementation hearing supported th

1997As the Tabatha G. court explained: “In enacting section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), the Legislature intended there be only four exceptions to selecting and implementing adoption as a permanent plan for an adoptable child. [Citations.] At the time of a selection and implementation hearing, \ . . there is no window of evidentiary opportunity for a parent to show that in some general way the “interests” of the child will be fostered by an order based on some consideration not set forth in section 366.26.’ [Citation.] Nor did the Legislature provide an opportunity for a parent to show in a specifi

2013(In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 .) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. [Citations.]” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 .) “ ‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . .

2003(In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 ].) We therefore “presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ].) The selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 takes place after the juvenile court finds that the parents are unfit and the child cannot be returned to them.

2001(Cf. In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, fn. 9 ["It is the nature of [drug] addiction that one must be `clean' for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform"].) Most important, mother's petition does not demonstrate how a change in the order would be in the best interest of these children. ( In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 .) At this point in the proceedings, on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children's interest in stability was the court's foremost concern, outweighing any inter

2001(Cf. In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, fn. 9 ["It is the nature of [drug] addiction that one must be `clean' for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform"].) Most important, mother's petition does not demonstrate how a change in the order would be in the best interest of these children. ( In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 .) At this point in the proceedings, on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children's interest in stability was the court's foremost concern, outweighing any inter

2026(J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527 .) Mother also acknowledges, with commendable candor, that she made little or no progress on her case plan until well after reunification services had ended and a selection and implementation hearing had been set under section 366.26.

2022(See In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061 , 1070 [substantial evidence supported juvenile court’s determination the father’s visits with the child were not consistent where visitation “throughout the years-long dependency proceeding was sporadic and also entailed significant gaps, and . . . even when he did visit his children he was frequently late”]; In re I.R., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 212 [juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply where it was undisputed “there were significant lapses” in mother’s visitation]; In r

2024(See In re Terrance B. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 965, 972 [“The remittitur defined the scope of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction by ordering the court to reinstate the judgment terminating parental rights, thereby foreclosing the right to a new selection and implementation hearing, if ICWA did not apply.”]; In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 707 [“Curing the ICWA error is distinct and separate from the section 366.26 protections”].) Thus, the cited cases are inapplicable.

2008Accordingly, the court reinstated the order terminating parental rights in the minors. [6] Both parents again timely appealed. *146 STANDARD OF REVIEW "When a judgment is reversed with directions, the appellate court's order is contained in its remittitur, which revests the jurisdiction of the subject matter in the lower court." ( In re Francisco W., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704-705, 43 Cal. Rptr.3d 171 .) Importantly, when an appellate court's reversal is issued with directions requiring specific proceedings on remand, those directions are binding on the trial court and must be followed.

2024(In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826 .) At the selection and implementation hearing, the court must terminate parental rights if the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).) One such exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from

2007(In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 739 ].) At the selection and implementation hearing, the court must terminate parental rights if the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) There are six statutorily recognized exceptions to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(l)(A)-(F).) These include an exception when the relative or foster parent caretaker is unable or unwilling to adopt because of exceptional circumstances (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D)).