admonition instruction in California

2022Rather, “the test for reversal is whether ‘the record affirmatively shows that [the guilty plea] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) In People v. Wrice (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 767 , 770–771, the court noted that “unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

2021(Cross, at p. 170.) In addition, a defendant “who admits a prior criminal conviction must first be advised of the increased sentence that might be imposed. [Citations.]” (People v. Wrice (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 767, 770 .) “If the advice and waivers do not appear on the record the finding must be set aside on appeal if prejudice appears. [Citation.]” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 650 , italics added.) “However, unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 650 .) However, unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

1995(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 650 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ].) However, unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

2026Realistically, some complainants are likely to choose not to go forward — even when they have legitimate complaints.” (Id. at pp. 513–514, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., italics omitted; accord Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094 [“There is a high likelihood that Section 148.6’s warning will cause individuals to refrain from filing a complaint against law enforcement officers”].) Similarly problematic, the admonition requirement may well deter reporting by persons who merely suspect, but cannot be certain, that they were a victim of more subtle forms of police misconduct such as racial p

2025Realistically, some complainants are likely to choose not to go forward — even when they have legitimate complaints.” (Id. at pp. 513–514, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., italics omitted; accord Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094 [“There is a high likelihood that Section 148.6’s warning will cause individuals to refrain from filing a complaint against law enforcement officers”].) Similarly problematic, the admonition requirement may well deter reporting by persons who merely suspect, but cannot be certain, that they were a victim of more subtle forms of police misconduct such as racial p

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2001As noted, the exclusionary rule employed to remedy Fourth Amendment violations is inapplicable in conservatorship proceedings. ( In re Susan T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1017-1020 .) Unless an answer would be inculpatory, neither does the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550 [proposed conservatee cannot refuse to testify]; Conservatorship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 , 610-612 [proposed conservatee cannot exclude statements obtained during a pre-commitment examination because of the absence of an admonition and waiver of his

2001(Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550 [proposed conservatee cannot refuse to testify]; Conservatorship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606, 610-612 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] [proposed conservatee cannot exclude statements obtained during a precommitment examination because of the absence of an admonition and waiver of his or her rights].) Nor does the double jeopardy doctrine preclude the state from seeking to establish a conservatorship subsequent to a prior adverse decision.

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2014Instead, since the admonition requirement is imposed as a function of the state Constitution rather than by federal law, error is tested by the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: it is reversible only if it is probable that the defendant would have achieved a better result but for the error.” (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 , citing Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697, fn. 5 .) In making this determination, “we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternat

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 650 .) However, unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

2021(Cross, at p. 170.) In addition, a defendant “who admits a prior criminal conviction must first be advised of the increased sentence that might be imposed. [Citations.]” (People v. Wrice (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 767, 770 .) “If the advice and waivers do not appear on the record the finding must be set aside on appeal if prejudice appears. [Citation.]” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 650 , italics added.) “However, unlike the admonition required for a waiver of constitutional rights, advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior conviction is not constitutionally mandated.

2023(People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 965 ; People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 368 [“Defendant may not argue that the court should have granted a mistrial he did not request”].) In his reply, defendant counters that the trial court was required to sua sponte grant a mistrial once the prosecutor made the argument; even if we assume a trial court may in some circumstances have a sua 20 sponte duty to declare a mistrial, it need not do so where an admonition or instruction can cure any prejudice (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 848 ), and that was most certainly the case here.

2017Because this is inherently a speculative matter, the trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a mistrial motion. ( People v. Harris , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 848, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 364 , 306 P.3d 1195 .) Here, the court acted well within its discretion.

2018(See **570 People v. Williams , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 211 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 [rejecting a claim of incurable prejudice where a witness testified she had received telephone calls " 'that if I testified I would be killed,' " the statement was stricken, and the jury admonished]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622 , 675, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 .) G.

2018(See **570 People v. Williams , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 211 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 [rejecting a claim of incurable prejudice where a witness testified she had received telephone calls " 'that if I testified I would be killed,' " the statement was stricken, and the jury admonished]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622 , 675, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 .) G.

2016(People v. Williams (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 446, 453 .) The trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that Magill’s statement was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial: “‘“A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted when “‘“a [defendant’s] ch

2016(Id. at p. 690.) “‘[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 985 ; accord, People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335 .) Similarly, while a mistrial should be granted if the trial court is apprised of prejudice an admonition or instruction would not cure, “‘[w]hether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.’ [Citati

2016(People v. Williams (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 446, 453 .) The trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that Magill’s statement was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial: “‘“A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted when “‘“a [defendant’s] ch

2016(Id. at p. 690.) “‘[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 985 ; accord, People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335 .) Similarly, while a mistrial should be granted if the trial court is apprised of prejudice an admonition or instruction would not cure, “‘[w]hether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.’ [Citati

2014If after an admonition and waiver a defendant subsequently requests counsel, “the interrogation generally must cease until an attorney is present.” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 26 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 264 P.3d 292 ] {Dement).) “Interrogation consists of words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ [Citation.] However, if the defendant thereafter initiates a statement to police, ‘nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . prohibits] the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteer

2014If after an admonition and waiver a defendant subsequently requests counsel, “the interrogation generally must cease until an attorney is present.” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 26 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 264 P.3d 292 ] {Dement).) “Interrogation consists of words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ [Citation.] However, if the defendant thereafter initiates a statement to police, ‘nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . prohibits] the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteer

2001(Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550 [proposed conservatee cannot refuse to testify]; Conservatorship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606, 610-612 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] [proposed conservatee cannot exclude statements obtained during a precommitment examination because of the absence of an admonition and waiver of his or her rights].) Nor does the double jeopardy doctrine preclude the state from seeking to establish a conservatorship subsequent to a prior adverse decision.

2001(Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550 [proposed conservatee cannot refuse to testify]; Conservatorship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606, 610-612 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] [proposed conservatee cannot exclude statements obtained during a precommitment examination because of the absence of an admonition and waiver of his or her rights].) Nor does the double jeopardy doctrine preclude the state from seeking to establish a conservatorship subsequent to a prior adverse decision.