Trombetta standard in California

2022We see no indication of “a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland [(1963) 373 U.S. 83 ] and its progeny,” nor any “allegation of official animus towards [the defendant] or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488 .) Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied the Trombetta motion.

2015Montes acknowledged that although "due process does not require the police to collect particular items of evidence," Trombetta recognized that due process does impose "a duty on the state to preserve 'evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.' " (Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 837 , italics added, quoting Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488 .) However, for the obligation to preserve evidence to arise, the "evidence 'must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant

2022(Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 , citing Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58 and Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 488–489.) And second, “if the evidence qualified as ‘potentially useful’ under Youngblood but did not meet the Trombetta standard, was the failure to retain it in bad faith?” (Alvarez, at p. 774, citing Youngblood, at p. 58.) Defendant cannot prevail under these standards.

2022(Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 , citing Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58 and Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 488–489.) And second, “if the evidence qualified as ‘potentially useful’ under Youngblood but did not meet the Trombetta standard, was the failure to retain it in bad faith?” (Alvarez, at p. 774, citing Youngblood, at p. 58.) Defendant cannot prevail under these standards.

2013(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court‟s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].)” (Peo

2011(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court’s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].) We ne

1990We also held in Johnson that our *513 adoption of the Trombetta rule is "compelled by the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8." ( Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1234.) (19b) Under the Trombetta test, we cannot characterize as "exculpatory" or "substantially material" the telephone calls (one of which originated from a telephone booth) of two people claiming they may have seen the victims after the alleged murders.

1990We also held in Johnson that our *513 adoption of the Trombetta rule is "compelled by the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8." ( Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1234.) (19b) Under the Trombetta test, we cannot characterize as "exculpatory" or "substantially material" the telephone calls (one of which originated from a telephone booth) of two people claiming they may have seen the victims after the alleged murders.

2015(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 856, fn. 25 ; People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 .) In any event, we conclude defendant’s argument is without merit.

2015(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 856, fn. 25 ; People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 .) In any event, we conclude defendant’s argument is without merit.

2013(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court‟s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].)” (Peo

2013(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court‟s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].)” (Peo

2013(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court‟s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].)” (Peo

2011(Compare State v. Leonard (2005) 217 W.Va. 603, 609-610 [ 619 S.E.2d 116, 122-123 ] [clearly erroneous standard of review applies to trial court’s factual findings after it conducts an evidentiary hearing on a Trombetta motion (see State v. Osakalumi (1995) 194 W.Va. 758 [ 461 S.E.2d 504 ])] with U.S. v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d 928, 930, 931 [applying de novo standard of review although a factual inquiry took place] and State v. Burden (2001) 104 Wn.App. 507, 512 [ 17 P.3d 1211, 1214 ] [applying de novo standard of review, but it is unclear whether a factual inquiry took place].) We ne

1990It suggested that trial courts “afford some leeway for the fact that the defendant necessarily proffers a description of the material evidence rather than the evidence itself.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 874 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1207 ].) Trombetta’s analysis of materiality focused on the problems presented by the destruction of physical evidence and the government’s duty “to take affirmative steps to preserve evidence . . . .” (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 486 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 420 ].) The court emphasized the defendant’s ability to obtain compa

1990It suggested that trial courts “afford some leeway for the fact that the defendant necessarily proffers a description of the material evidence rather than the evidence itself.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 874 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1207 ].) Trombetta’s analysis of materiality focused on the problems presented by the destruction of physical evidence and the government’s duty “to take affirmative steps to preserve evidence . . . .” (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 486 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 420 ].) The court emphasized the defendant’s ability to obtain compa

1985As noted in Tierce, 165 Cal.App.3d at page 262 , “The effect of that provision was, inter alia, to require the courts of this state to look to federal law in deciding issues concerning the exclusion of evidence.” As the California Supreme Court recently said in In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ]: “What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent the exclusion remains feder

1985As noted in Tierce, 165 Cal.App.3d at page 262 , “The effect of that provision was, inter alia, to require the courts of this state to look to federal law in deciding issues concerning the exclusion of evidence.” As the California Supreme Court recently said in In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ]: “What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent the exclusion remains feder

2014(See People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1349 ; see also Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 221 [rejecting Trombetta claim in part because there was “no indication” the fingerprint “would have exculpated defendant”].) The court properly denied the minor’s motion to dismiss for the additional reason the minor was able to “obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 ; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 (Carter).) As stated above, E.A.’s handwritten statement described the crime and inculpated the minor.

2011Defendant speculates that the swabs and photographs of the results might have contradicted what the analyst reported, but he has not shown failure to preserve the test results, to the extent possible, resulted in destruction of exculpatory evidence.” (Id. at pp. 878-879.) Likewise, in People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340 , 157 P.3d 950 ], the court rejected a Trombetta claim by noting that the defendant “speculates that he might have discovered items linking other persons to . . . bloodstained shoes” in a trash bag that the police failed to preserve, but “failed to show t

2025(People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 831 ; Montes, at p. 837; Duff, at p. 549.) In this case, it was undisputed that a SART exam was never conducted.

2025(People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 831 ; Montes, at p. 837; Duff, at p. 549.) In this case, it was undisputed that a SART exam was never conducted.

2024(Id. at pp. 918-919, 928.) In rejecting the defendant’s claim of a Trombetta violation, our Supreme Court explained: “[T]he absence of a tape recording of the entire interview did not deny defendant all opportunity ‘to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means’” because “[d]efendant was able to cross-examine [the interviewing detective] at trial, and defendant himself was available to testify regarding the interview if he chose to do so.” (People v. Thomas, supra, at p. 929 .) The same reasoning would apply here.

2024(Id. at pp. 918-919, 928.) In rejecting the defendant’s claim of a Trombetta violation, our Supreme Court explained: “[T]he absence of a tape recording of the entire interview did not deny defendant all opportunity ‘to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means’” because “[d]efendant was able to cross-examine [the interviewing detective] at trial, and defendant himself was available to testify regarding the interview if he chose to do so.” (People v. Thomas, supra, at p. 929 .) The same reasoning would apply here.

2024Law and Analysis “The federal constitutional guarantee of due process imposes a duty on the state to preserve ‘evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.’ [Citation.] In other words, that evidence ‘must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’ [Citation.] Generally, due process does not require the police to collect particular items of evidence. [Citation.] ‘The police cannot be exp

2015Montes acknowledged that although "due process does not require the police to collect particular items of evidence," Trombetta recognized that due process does impose "a duty on the state to preserve 'evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.' " (Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 837 , italics added, quoting Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488 .) However, for the obligation to preserve evidence to arise, the "evidence 'must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant

2025(See People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 , 394; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1348 ; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) 18 2.

2014(See People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1349 ; see also Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 221 [rejecting Trombetta claim in part because there was “no indication” the fingerprint “would have exculpated defendant”].) The court properly denied the minor’s motion to dismiss for the additional reason the minor was able to “obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 ; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 (Carter).) As stated above, E.A.’s handwritten statement described the crime and inculpated the minor.

2025(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 549 [“If . . . ‘no more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant’ . . . ; ‘unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ ”]; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 , 395 [same].) An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta claim for substantial evidence.

2025(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 549 [“If . . . ‘no more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant’ . . . ; ‘unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ ”]; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 , 395 [same].) An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta claim for substantial evidence.

2025“Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it possesses exculpatory value ‘apparent before [it] was destroyed,’ and not obtainable ‘by other reasonably available means.’ [Citations.] The state’s responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence ‘of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests’ that might have helped the defense. [Citation.] In such a case, unless the defendant can show ‘bad faith’ by the police, failure to preserve ‘potentially useful evidence’ does not violate his due process rights.” (P

2025“Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it possesses exculpatory value ‘apparent before [it] was destroyed,’ and not obtainable ‘by other reasonably available means.’ [Citations.] The state’s responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence ‘of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests’ that might have helped the defense. [Citation.] In such a case, unless the defendant can show ‘bad faith’ by the police, failure to preserve ‘potentially useful evidence’ does not violate his due process rights.” (P

2022(See People v. Pastor Cruz (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 322, 325 [finding no Youngblood/Trombetta violation where police lost the knife in case of assault with a deadly weapons because “a discrepancy in size [between seized knife and the victim’s description] might eventually prove useful to a defendant in impeaching a witness but is not the type of evidence that a reasonable police officer should be expected to recognize as having apparent exculpatory value”].) Finally, assuming the recording was “potentially useful” to the defense, the trial court’s finding that the police did not act in bad faith

2016(People v. Pastor Cruz (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 322 .) Defendant argues that a motion based on Pacheco’s ineffective assistance of counsel would have had merit, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in not bringing such a motion.

1986Under the circumstances we must, of course, follow the Trombetta rule.” (People v. Gonzales (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 566, 572 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) Although not squarely addressed by the parties in this litigation, the trial court was not asked to exclude evidence as a remedy and therefore Proposition 8 may not apply to this case at all.

1986Under the circumstances we must, of course, follow the Trombetta rule.” (People v. Gonzales (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 566, 572 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) Although not squarely addressed by the parties in this litigation, the trial court was not asked to exclude evidence as a remedy and therefore Proposition 8 may not apply to this case at all.

2014(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 943 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “The police cannot be expected to ‘gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ].) A trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling.

2014(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 943 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “The police cannot be expected to ‘gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ].) A trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling.

2014(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 943 .) “The police cannot be expected to ‘gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 .) A trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling.

2014(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 943 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “The police cannot be expected to ‘gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ].) A trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling.

1986(People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 256, 265, fn. 3 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) Moreover, there is a second prong to the Trombetta standard: The evidence must “be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ].) This case also fails that test, at least as Trombetta describes it.

1986(People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 256, 265, fn. 3 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) Moreover, there is a second prong to the Trombetta standard: The evidence must “be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ].) This case also fails that test, at least as Trombetta describes it.

2022(See People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 591-592 [no Trombetta error when photographs of occupants of house where crime occurred were lost because police made a list of the occupants].) Moreover, defendant does not dispute Detective Brewton’s testimony that evidence that Rex threatened Lorenzo was not known to Brewton at the time of his interview of Rex, so the interview recording had no apparent exculpatory value at the time it was made.