6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rutledgegreen2 sentences2016Thus, while Foshay did request that the trial court exclude the report and CD, he did so on different grounds. ¶ 22 Foshay’s objection did not “give[ ] the [trial] court an opportunity to correct any error and allow[ ] opposing counsel a chance to ‘obviate the objection.’” Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 175 P.3d at 683 , quoting State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 30 , 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003). 2016Thus, while Foshay did request that the trial court exclude the report and CD, he did so on different grounds. ¶ 22 Foshay’s objection did not “give[ ] the [trial] court an opportunity to correct any error and allow[ ] opposing counsel a chance to ‘obviate the objection.’” Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 175 P.3d at 683 , quoting State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 30 , 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2020Defense counsel did not object once the prosecutor actually made these statements, e.g., that Lewis did not cooperate with the DUI investigation because “he knew his level of impairment,” cooperation “would not exonerate him” but “it would convict him,” and sobriety testing “wouldn’t work in his favor.” See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 179 (2004) (finding a failure to make a contemporaneous objection to prosecutor’s comments limited court’s review “to one for fundamental error only”); see also State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, 434-35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (explaining to preserve an issue for 2016Thus, while Foshay did request that the trial court exclude the report and CD, he did so on different grounds. ¶ 22 Foshay’s objection did not “give[ ] the [trial] court an opportunity to correct any error and allow[ ] opposing counsel a chance to ‘obviate the objection.’” Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 175 P.3d at 683 , quoting State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 30 , 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hoffmangreen2 sentences2008This gives the court an opportunity to correct any error and allows opposing counsel a chance to “ ‘obviate the objection.’” State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 30 , 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003), quoting State v. Hoffman, 78 Ariz. 319, 325 , 279 P.2d 898, 901 (1955). 2008This gives the court an opportunity to correct any error and allows opposing counsel a chance to “ ‘obviate the objection.’” State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 30 , 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003), quoting State v. Hoffman, 78 Ariz. 319, 325 , 279 P.2d 898, 901 (1955). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Moodygreen1 sentence2020Defense counsel did not object once the prosecutor actually made these statements, e.g., that Lewis did not cooperate with the DUI investigation because “he knew his level of impairment,” cooperation “would not exonerate him” but “it would convict him,” and sobriety testing “wouldn’t work in his favor.” See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 179 (2004) (finding a failure to make a contemporaneous objection to prosecutor’s comments limited court’s review “to one for fundamental error only”); see also State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, 434-35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (explaining to preserve an issue for | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adamsongreen2 sentences2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration 2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lindseygreen2 sentences2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration 2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danngreen2 sentences2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration 2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration | 1 | 1 |
Fuenning v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR CTY. OF MARICOPAgreen2 sentences2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration 2004Ultimately, however, Moody’s claim fails to withstand even an abuse of discretion analysis. ¶ 125 The State concedes that Detective Wright’s statement was improper, citing Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 605 , 680 P.2d 121, 136 (1983) (supp.op.) (stating that it is “neither necessary nor advisable to ask for a witness’ opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged”); cf. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 , 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (noting that we generally do “not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case”). ¶ 126 “A declaration | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn
green
2 sentences1992This motion “gave the superior court an opportunity to correct any error and ... preserved as an issue for appeal the sufficiency of the ... evidence to justify summary judgment.” Id., 167 Ariz. at 197 , 805 P.2d at 1018 . 1992This motion “gave the superior court an opportunity to correct any error and ... preserved as an issue for appeal the sufficiency of the ... evidence to justify summary judgment.” Id., 167 Ariz. at 197 , 805 P.2d at 1018 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.