Lanigan hearing in Massachusetts

2018To be admissible, field tests must be shown reliable in accordance with the "inherently fact-intensive and flexible Lanigan analysis. [ 3 ] " Commonwealth v. Fernandez , 458 Mass. 137 , 149 (2010), quoting from Canavan's Case , 432 Mass. 304 , 312 (2000).

2018Daubert - Lanigan analysis must be flexible, and "[d]iffering types of methodology may require judges to apply differing evaluative criteria to determine whether scientific methodology is reliable." Canavan's Case , 432 Mass. 304 , 314 n.5, 733 N.E.2d 1042 (2000).

2021In Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26 , we noted that in many cases general 12 acceptance will "be the significant, and often the only, issue." Lanigan's progeny make clear that reliability can still be established by general acceptance alone, without regard to the other Daubert-Lanigan factors.

2013While Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 149-150 , speaks of instances in which the defense may seek to invoke the protocol of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), and request a hearing to challenge the manner in which certain field tests were conducted, or the particular test kit used, that issue is not present in this appeal, there having been no Lanigan challenge raised below.

2010In arguing that the judge should have subjected the field tests to a Lanigan analysis, the defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 188 (1997), and State v. Morales, 132 N.M. 146,149 (Ct. App. 2002).

2010In arguing that the judge should have subjected the field tests to a Lanigan analysis, the defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 188 (1997), and State v. Morales, 132 N.M. 146,149 (Ct. App. 2002).

2008To the extent the mother also asserts that the statements and opinions of Dr. Cavallero and Dr. Grey are inadmissible (and thus not sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding her conduct toward Tom) as they have not been shown to be reliable under the “Daubert/Lanigan standard,” see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994), we disagree.

2005The judge serves as a gatekeeper on the admission of expert opinion testimony; a ruling on the admissibility of challenged testimony “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26 , quoting from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-593 (1993). 4 Recognizing the “inherently fact-intensive” nature of these determinations and the flexibility of the Lanigan analysi

2010In considering the defendant’s motion, the judge was initially of the view that a Lanigan hearing might not be required because this court, in Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527 (2001), had both permitted expert testimony “concerning dissociation and recovered memory; what these conditions or symptoms are; and the fact that victims of trauma may experience them,” id. at 535 , and suggested that no Lanigan hearing was necessary as to expert testimony which concerned “memory problems associated with dissociative memory loss, and related mental disorders . . . such as those referred to in

2010In considering the defendant’s motion, the judge was initially of the view that a Lanigan hearing might not be required because this court, in Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527 (2001), had both permitted expert testimony “concerning dissociation and recovered memory; what these conditions or symptoms are; and the fact that victims of trauma may experience them,” id. at 535 , and suggested that no Lanigan hearing was necessary as to expert testimony which concerned “memory problems associated with dissociative memory loss, and related mental disorders . . . such as those referred to in

2021See Patterson, 445 Mass. at 640 - 641 (citing cases).

2007“Lanigan’s progeny make clear that general acceptance in the relevant community of the theory and process on which an expert’s testimony is based, on its own, continues to be sufficient to establish the requisite reliability for admission in Massachusetts courts regardless of other Daubert factors.” Id. at 640 , and cases cited.

2000We cannot conclude that the expert’s mere assertion that a methodology is reliable is sufficient to pass the Lanigan test absent any other evidence showing its reliability. 8 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, supra at 157 , quoting General Elec.

2000We cannot conclude that the expert’s mere assertion that a methodology is reliable is sufficient to pass the Lanigan test absent any other evidence showing its reliability. 8 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, supra at 157 , quoting General Elec.

2019See Commonwealth v. Sparks , 433 Mass. 654 , 660, 746 N.E.2d 133 (2001).

2019See Commonwealth v. Sparks , 433 Mass. 654 , 660, 746 N.E.2d 133 (2001).

2015See Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558 , 570 n.11 (2006) (“To the extent that the defendant’s claim rests on the judge’s failure to assume the role of gatekeeper to preclude the introduction of ‘junk science’ evidence, it is too late for the defendant to request a Lanigan hearing”).

2015See Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558 , 570 n.11 (2006) (“To the extent that the defendant’s claim rests on the judge’s failure to assume the role of gatekeeper to preclude the introduction of ‘junk science’ evidence, it is too late for the defendant to request a Lanigan hearing”).

2001“That a person qualifies as an expert does not endow his testimony with magic qualities.” Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 579 (1956).

2001“That a person qualifies as an expert does not endow his testimony with magic qualities.” Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 579 (1956).

2023Cf. Molly A. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 267 , 284 n.24 (2007) (noting that, if made, Lanigan challenge to expert evidence at summary judgment "might have succeeded . . . because [the expert evidence] largely failed to satisfy the requirements of" rule 56 [e]).

2008See Molly A. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Retardation, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 267 , 284-285 n.24 (2007); Driscoll v. Providence Mut.

2018A trial judge has "broad discretion to determine how to assess the reliability of expert testimony." Palandjian v. Foster , 446 Mass. 100 , 111, 842 N.E.2d 916 (2006). "[I]f the process or theory underlying an expert's opinion lacks sufficient reliability or an expert cannot provide a reliable factual basis for his conclusions, the trial judge must exclude the opinion from reaching the trier of fact." Commonwealth v. DiCicco , 470 Mass 720 , 729, 25 N.E.3d 859 (2015), citing Lanigan , 419 Mass. at 25 -26 , 641 N.E.2d 1342 .

2014Where the expert’s opinion lacks a foothold in “scientific theory or research” but rather relies on a honed awareness of how a group practices its craft or enterprise such testimony “need not be subject to a Daubert/Lanigan analysis.” Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 106-09 (2006); Commonwealth v. Goodman, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 385, 386-91 (2002).

2001At the Lanigan hearing (held prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, supra), the defendant challenged the reliability of PCR methodology, and also contended that the results of this particular test were unreliable because the sample size was too small.

2001At the Lanigan hearing (held prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, supra), the defendant challenged the reliability of PCR methodology, and also contended that the results of this particular test were unreliable because the sample size was too small.

2023See, e.g., Grassi Design Group, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 462-463 (2009); Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 126 (1993).

2023See, e.g., Grassi Design Group, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 462-463 (2009); Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 126 (1993).

2023See, e.g., Grassi Design Group, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 462-463 (2009); Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 126 (1993).

2023See, e.g., Grassi Design Group, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 462-463 (2009); Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 126 (1993).

2018See id . at 334-335, 58 N.E.3d 1100 (determination as to *796 admissibility at trial of actuarial tool used to estimate probability of reoffense required Daubert - Lanigan hearing). 3.

2014Where the expert’s opinion lacks a foothold in “scientific theory or research” but rather relies on a honed awareness of how a group practices its craft or enterprise such testimony “need not be subject to a Daubert/Lanigan analysis.” Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 106-09 (2006); Commonwealth v. Goodman, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 385, 386-91 (2002).

2014See Commonwealth v. Riley, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 274 (2013).

2014See Commonwealth v. Riley, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 274 (2013).

2012See Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 237-240 (2007).

2012See Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 237-240 (2007).

2011See Cetrulo et al., Daubert: The Fundamentals of an Expert Challenge, §6.2.4 (Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc., 2009) (“Under the Daubert/Lanigan standard, an expert opinion is admissible only if the proponent proves that: (i) the methodology used is scientifically valid; and (ii) it can be properly applied to the facts at issue”); see generally Van Brode Group, Inc., 36 Mass.App.Ct. at 520 .

2010See Commonwealth v. Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. 510, 520-521 (2006).

2010See Commonwealth v. Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. 510, 520-521 (2006).