conviction obtained violation in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Coffeygreen cal · 1967 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1991 2 sentences 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	2	2
Burgett v. Texasgreen scotus · 1967 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1995 2 sentences 1995We find no conflict of interest, nor do we find any prejudice resulting to defendant from Mr. Nixon’s representation.” (Id. at pp. 1048-1049.) Following Burgett v. Texas, supra, 389 U.S. 109 , and United States v. Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. 443 , the federal circuit courts adopted divergent conclusions as to whether these decisions should be extended to preclude the enhancement of punishment by reliance upon a prior conviction obtained in violation of constitutional rights other than the right to counsel. 1995We find no conflict of interest, nor do we find any prejudice resulting to defendant from Mr. Nixon's representation." ( Id. at pp. 1048-1049.) [13] Following Burgett v. Texas, supra, 389 U.S. 109 , and United States v. Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. 443 , the federal circuit courts adopted divergent conclusions as to whether these decisions should be extended to preclude the enhancement of punishment by reliance upon a prior conviction obtained in violation of constitutional rights other than the right to counsel.	1	2
In Re Terrygreen cal · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026 1 sentence 2026(Id. at pp. 113, 115; cf. In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 916 [finding that informing the jury of a conviction obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was error but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) In Aldrich, the defendant was convicted of one count of violating 26 United States Code section 5861 (possession of a sawed-off shotgun) and two counts of 18 United States Code section 922 (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition).	1	1
People v. Sumstinegreen cal · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991(People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 914, 916 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ]; see People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 [ 430 P.2d 15 ].) Coffey, supra, established the procedure for holding an evidentiary hearing, prior to trial, on the constitutionality of a prior conviction. (67 Cal.2d at pp. 215-218.) The issues for such a hearing are completely distinct from the issue for the trier of fact on the enhancement charge itself, as to whether the accused in fact suffered the prior. 1991(People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 914, 916 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ]; see People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 [ 430 P.2d 15 ].) Coffey, supra, established the procedure for holding an evidentiary hearing, prior to trial, on the constitutionality of a prior conviction. (67 Cal.2d at pp. 215-218.) The issues for such a hearing are completely distinct from the issue for the trier of fact on the enhancement charge itself, as to whether the accused in fact suffered the prior.	1	1
De La Vigne v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen calctapp · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	1	1
Hasson v. Cozensgreen cal · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	1	1
In Re Johnsongreen cal · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970(In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 329 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) Because the right to counsel is so fundamental to our notions of due process, the United States Supreme Court has held that collateral attacks on prior convictions obtained in violation of Gideon are permissible in a wide range of situations: “To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to erode the principle of that case. 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	1	1
Mitchell v. Orrgreen calctapp · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	1	1
In re Woodsgreen cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P 1970Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." ( Burgett v. Texas (1967) 389 U.S. 109, 115 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], italics added.) The settled rule of this court has been that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may be attacked collaterally when any "statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, ..." ( People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 214-215 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 430 P	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
United States v. Kim Eugene Aldrich, United States of America v. Kim Eugene Aldrich green ca8 · 1999 1 sentence 2026(Aldrich, supra, 169 F.3d at p. 527 .) To show the defendant was a felon, the prosecutor introduced evidence that the defendant had been convicted in 1976 of a felony in Iowa.	1	2026–2026
Gideon v. Wainwright green scotus · 1963 2 sentences 2010The defendant claimed that under the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 ], a violation of the federal possession statute could not be predicated on an earlier conviction obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. ( Lewis, supra, 445 U.S. at pp. 57-58.) The Supreme Court disagreed. 2010The defendant claimed that under the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 ], a violation of the federal possession statute could not be predicated on an earlier conviction obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. ( Lewis, supra, 445 U.S. at pp. 57-58.) The Supreme Court disagreed.	1	2010–2010
Richard Duane Brown v. United States green ca9 · 1980 2 sentences 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir. 1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his	1	1995–1995
United States v. Lawrence Johnson green ca7 · 1980 2 sentences 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir. 1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his	1	1995–1995
United States v. Jesus Vea-Gonzales green ca9 · 1993 2 sentences 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir. 1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his	1	1995–1995
People v. Wharton green cal · 1991 2 sentences 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his	1	1995–1995
United States v. Tucker green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 1995We find no conflict of interest, nor do we find any prejudice resulting to defendant from Mr. Nixon’s representation.” (Id. at pp. 1048-1049.) Following Burgett v. Texas, supra, 389 U.S. 109 , and United States v. Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. 443 , the federal circuit courts adopted divergent conclusions as to whether these decisions should be extended to preclude the enhancement of punishment by reliance upon a prior conviction obtained in violation of constitutional rights other than the right to counsel. 1995We find no conflict of interest, nor do we find any prejudice resulting to defendant from Mr. Nixon's representation." ( Id. at pp. 1048-1049.) [13] Following Burgett v. Texas, supra, 389 U.S. 109 , and United States v. Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. 443 , the federal circuit courts adopted divergent conclusions as to whether these decisions should be extended to preclude the enhancement of punishment by reliance upon a prior conviction obtained in violation of constitutional rights other than the right to counsel.	1	1995–1995
Melvin Leroy Tyler v. Harold R. Swenson, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary green ca8 · 1976 2 sentences 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir. 1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) 1995(See, e.g., U.S. v. Vea-Gonzalez (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 1326 ; United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 305 ; Brown v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 610 F.2d 672 ; Tyler v. Swenson (8th Cir.1976) 527 F.2d 877 .) [1] In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [ 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ], we rejected, on the merits, defendant's claim that his prior murder conviction, alleged as a special circumstance in a capital case, was invalid because the trial court in the prior case had failed, sua sponte, to order a hearing on his competency to plead guilty, or to allow withdrawal of his	1	1995–1995
Greer v. Beto green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1969To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright tobe used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense (see Greer v. Beto, 384 U.S. 269 , [ 86 S.Ct. 1477 , 16 L.Ed.2d 526 ]) is to erode the principle of that case. 1969To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright tobe used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense (see Greer v. Beto, 384 U.S. 269 , [ 86 S.Ct. 1477 , 16 L.Ed.2d 526 ]) is to erode the principle of that case.	1	1969–1969

Where else courts name it

NY 22 (1966–2016) CO 22 (1977–2025) IL 12 (1976–2021) TX 11 (1968–2018) WA 10 (1973–2016) MD 9 (1968–1986) PA 8 (1968–2022) MI 8 (1974–2025) FL 7 (1969–2007) OR 6 (1956–2023) CA 6 (1969–2026) NE 5 (1983–2020) GA 5 (1972–2013) AZ 5 (1976–2007) HI 5 (1976–2003) OK 5 (1968–1982) IA 5 (1969–2017) KS 4 (1970–1997) WI 4 (1968–2010) AR 4 (1972–2000) TN 4 (1993–2014) UT 4 (1989–2008) MO 3 (1968–2018) CT 3 (1996–2017) ME 3 (1968–1986) MT 3 (1969–2005) MN 2 (2007–2016) NM 2 (1991–1997) WY 2 (1981–1992) NC 2 (1979–1983) NJ 2 (1983–2018) LA 2 (1976–2017) AL 2 (1970–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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