6 California opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jimenez v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive 2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive | 3 | 3 |
Washington v. Glucksberggreen2 sentences2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive 2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive | 2 | 3 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to 2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to | 2 | 2 |
The People v. Piraligreen2 sentences2015The specific condition that prohibits minor from “possess[ing] . . . sexually explicit materials” is unconstitutionally vague because it sets “an inherently subjective standard” that “does not sufficiently provide [the] defendant with advance knowledge of what is required of him.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1352-1353 (Pirali); see also People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 .) Relying on the Pirali decision, the People support modifying this condition. 2015In Pirali, a panel of this court considered a probation condition ordering Pirali “ ‘not to purchase or possess any pornographic or sexually explicit material as defined by the probation officer.’ ” (Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 .) The court held: “Materials deemed explicit or pornographic, as defined by the probation officer, is an inherently subjective standard that would not provide defendant with sufficient notice of what items are prohibited.” (Id. at p. 1353.) Accordingly, the court modified the 17 condition to order Pirali “not to purchase or possess any pornographic or sex | 1 | 3 |
Rise v. State of Oregongreen2 sentences2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to 2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. “ ‘Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” but to have “a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates “to a proper legislative goal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 ].) Due to 2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. “ ‘Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” but to have “a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates “to a proper legislative goal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 ].) Due to | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to 2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to | 1 | 2 |
People v. Turnergreen1 sentence2015The specific condition that prohibits minor from “possess[ing] . . . sexually explicit materials” is unconstitutionally vague because it sets “an inherently subjective standard” that “does not sufficiently provide [the] defendant with advance knowledge of what is required of him.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1352-1353 (Pirali); see also People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 .) Relying on the Pirali decision, the People support modifying this condition. | 1 | 1 |
Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive 2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castellanosgreen2 sentences2010These concerns are legitimate, as the Hofsheier court recognized: “Although sex offender registration is not considered a form of punishment under the state or federal Constitution (In re Alva [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [254,] 268 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 ]; People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 796 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ] (lead opn. of George, C. 2010These concerns are legitimate, as the Hofsheier court recognized: “Although sex offender registration is not considered a form of punishment under the state or federal Constitution (In re Alva [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [254,] 268 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 ]; People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 796 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ] (lead opn. of George, C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive 2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive | 1 | 1 |
People v. Travisgreen1 sentence2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boling v. Romer
green
2 sentences2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to 2006We conclude that section 296 does not offend substantive due process principles. "`Generally, the constitutional guaranty of substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislative action; it requires legislation not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" but to have "a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." [Citation.] Thus, legislation does not violate substantive due process so long as it reasonably relates "to a proper legislative goal." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 798 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 150 .) Due to | 2 | 2006–2006 |
In Re HC
green
1 sentence2014(Leon, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 ; In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 .) Thus, we will modify the condition that defendant “not frequent, be employed by, or engage in, any business where pornographic materials are openly exhibited” (condition No. 20) to provide: “The defendant shall not knowingly visit or remain in, be employed by, or engage in, any business where pornographic materials are openly exhibited.” IV. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Leon
green
1 sentence2014(Leon, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 ; In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 .) Thus, we will modify the condition that defendant “not frequent, be employed by, or engage in, any business where pornographic materials are openly exhibited” (condition No. 20) to provide: “The defendant shall not knowingly visit or remain in, be employed by, or engage in, any business where pornographic materials are openly exhibited.” IV. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Alva
green
2 sentences2010These concerns are legitimate, as the Hofsheier court recognized: “Although sex offender registration is not considered a form of punishment under the state or federal Constitution (In re Alva [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [254,] 268 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 ]; People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 796 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ] (lead opn. of George, C. 2010These concerns are legitimate, as the Hofsheier court recognized: “Although sex offender registration is not considered a form of punishment under the state or federal Constitution (In re Alva [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [254,] 268 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 ]; People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 796 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ] (lead opn. of George, C. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.