6 California opinions name it 1 courts 2008–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2024(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414 [“We presume that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions”].) Accordingly, we conclude Vanatti was not prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancements, gang offense, and gang-murder special circumstance allegations. 2024(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414 [“We presume that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions”].) Accordingly, we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement and gang special circumstance allegations. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Arandagreen1 sentence2014He argues that the jury "did not know that it had to find '[s]ome evidence other than the statement itself' of a conspiracy before it could use Happy's statement as evidence of appellant's guilt." He also asserts that "no evidence supported a finding that Happy and appellant were members of a conspiracy at the time that Happy spoke to Clements on February 8, 2011, to support element 1 of the instruction." Assuming that the defendants are correct in their assertion that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to Happy's statements and the uncharged conspiracy, they cannot est | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Garrett
green
1 sentence2026Analysis To prove the charge of criminal threats, the People were required to establish that defendant specifically intended for his statement to be taken as a threat, and that Sharon was in a state of “sustained fear for [her] own safety or for [her] immediate family’s 4 We address post defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with a limiting instruction. 8 safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) “The prosecution must additionally show that the nature of the threat, both on ‘its face and under the circumstances in which it is made,’ was such as to convey to the victim | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2026Analysis To prove the charge of criminal threats, the People were required to establish that defendant specifically intended for his statement to be taken as a threat, and that Sharon was in a state of “sustained fear for [her] own safety or for [her] immediate family’s 4 We address post defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with a limiting instruction. 8 safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) “The prosecution must additionally show that the nature of the threat, both on ‘its face and under the circumstances in which it is made,’ was such as to convey to the victim | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Franz
green
1 sentence2026Analysis To prove the charge of criminal threats, the People were required to establish that defendant specifically intended for his statement to be taken as a threat, and that Sharon was in a state of “sustained fear for [her] own safety or for [her] immediate family’s 4 We address post defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with a limiting instruction. 8 safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) “The prosecution must additionally show that the nature of the threat, both on ‘its face and under the circumstances in which it is made,’ was such as to convey to the victim | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2014He argues that the jury "did not know that it had to find '[s]ome evidence other than the statement itself' of a conspiracy before it could use Happy's statement as evidence of appellant's guilt." He also asserts that "no evidence supported a finding that Happy and appellant were members of a conspiracy at the time that Happy spoke to Clements on February 8, 2011, to support element 1 of the instruction." Assuming that the defendants are correct in their assertion that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to Happy's statements and the uncharged conspiracy, they cannot est 2014He argues that the jury "did not know that it had to find '[s]ome evidence other than the statement itself' of a conspiracy before it could use Happy's statement as evidence of appellant's guilt." He also asserts that "no evidence supported a finding that Happy and appellant were members of a conspiracy at the time that Happy spoke to Clements on February 8, 2011, to support element 1 of the instruction." Assuming that the defendants are correct in their assertion that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to Happy's statements and the uncharged conspiracy, they cannot est | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Neal
green
1 sentence2014He argues that the jury "did not know that it had to find '[s]ome evidence other than the statement itself' of a conspiracy before it could use Happy's statement as evidence of appellant's guilt." He also asserts that "no evidence supported a finding that Happy and appellant were members of a conspiracy at the time that Happy spoke to Clements on February 8, 2011, to support element 1 of the instruction." Assuming that the defendants are correct in their assertion that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to Happy's statements and the uncharged conspiracy, they cannot est | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2014He argues that the jury "did not know that it had to find '[s]ome evidence other than the statement itself' of a conspiracy before it could use Happy's statement as evidence of appellant's guilt." He also asserts that "no evidence supported a finding that Happy and appellant were members of a conspiracy at the time that Happy spoke to Clements on February 8, 2011, to support element 1 of the instruction." Assuming that the defendants are correct in their assertion that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to Happy's statements and the uncharged conspiracy, they cannot est | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2008(Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 854 .) In addition, while the evidence was prejudicial, it was not unduly so, and the evidence in question was clearly more than “ ‘minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.’ ” (Ibid.) We therefore reject New’s contention that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with a limiting instruction concerning its use of the cross-admissible evidence. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.