6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Whitfieldred2 sentences2001The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that "although knowledge `may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator's criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.' [Citations.]" ( Mendoza, at p. 1131, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P. 2001The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that "although knowledge `may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator's criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.' [Citations.]" ( Mendoza, at p. 1131, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reyesgreen1 sentence2001The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that "although knowledge `may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator's criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.' [Citations.]" ( Mendoza, at p. 1131, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mendozagreen2 sentences2001The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that "although knowledge `may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator's criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.' [Citations.]" ( Mendoza, at p. 1131, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P. 2001The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that "although knowledge `may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator's criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.' [Citations.]" ( Mendoza, at p. 1131, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lanegreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chapmangreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ellisgreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sowersgreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Haeusslergreen2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Trujillo
green
2 sentences1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis 1966I, § 13.) Eeviewing the scope and purpose of that provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [ 194 P.2d 681 ]: ‘Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection “is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own Ups an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. . . . “ ‘ “In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel | 3 | 1953–1976 |
In Re Sassounian
green
2 sentences2016The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6, and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3. 2015The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ], overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 , 887 P.2d 527 ], and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ]. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2016The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6, and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3. 2015The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ], overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 , 887 P.2d 527 ], and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ]. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People v. Cromer
green
2 sentences2016The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6, and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3. 2015The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ], overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 , 887 P.2d 527 ], and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ]. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Holt v. United States
green
2 sentences1966I, § 13.) Eeviewing the scope and purpose of that provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [ 194 P.2d 681 ]: ‘Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection “is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own Ups an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. . . . “ ‘ “In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel 1966I, § 13.) Eeviewing the scope and purpose of that provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [ 194 P.2d 681 ]: ‘Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection “is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own Ups an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. . . . “ ‘ “In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel | 2 | 1953–1966 |
Biggs v. State
green
2 sentences1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. | 2 | 1953–1966 |
United States v. White
green
2 sentences1966I, § 13.) Eeviewing the scope and purpose of that provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [ 194 P.2d 681 ]: ‘Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection “is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own Ups an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. . . . “ ‘ “In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel 1966I, § 13.) Eeviewing the scope and purpose of that provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [ 194 P.2d 681 ]: ‘Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection “is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own Ups an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. . . . “ ‘ “In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel | 2 | 1953–1966 |
State v. Aspara
green
2 sentences1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. | 2 | 1953–1966 |
State v. McLaughlin
green
2 sentences1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. | 2 | 1953–1966 |
State v. Green
neutral
2 sentences1966(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing-defendant’s foot in footprint found at scene of crime] ; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused’s fingernails] ; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant’s shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant’s clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 1953(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing defendant's foot in footprint found at scene of crime]; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused's fingernails]; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant's shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant's clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex.Crim.Rep. 420 [ 141 S.W.2d 341 ] [giving accused an enema to recover swallowed jewelry]; United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 [taking fingerprints of | 2 | 1953–1966 |
People v. Braeseke
green
2 sentences2015The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ], overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 , 887 P.2d 527 ], and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ]. 2015The “predictable conduct” principle apparently arises from People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ], overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545 , footnote 6 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 , 887 P.2d 527 ], and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 , footnote 3 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ]. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
green
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Schader
green
2 sentences1976Furthermore, it will be observed that Prudhomme's denial of discovery by the People, where the disclosure "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief," appears to be unsupported by People v. Schader, 71 Cal.2d 761 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 457 P.2d 841 ], the authority relied upon. 1976Furthermore, it will be observed that Prudhomme's denial of discovery by the People, where the disclosure "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief," appears to be unsupported by People v. Schader, 71 Cal.2d 761 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 457 P.2d 841 ], the authority relied upon. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Williams v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Reed v. Cranor
green
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Nishida v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
green
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Chapman v. California
neutral
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis | 1 | 1976–1976 |
McAllister v. Pinto
neutral
2 sentences1976“Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection ‘is the employment of legal process to extract from the person’s own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence .... “ ‘In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in histoiy and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. ’ ” To the same effect see People v. E 1976"Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as the California mandate, concludes that the object of the protection `is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.... "`In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.'" To the same effect see People v. Ellis | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Kelly
green
1 sentence1953(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing defendant's foot in footprint found at scene of crime]; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused's fingernails]; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant's shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant's clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex.Crim.Rep. 420 [ 141 S.W.2d 341 ] [giving accused an enema to recover swallowed jewelry]; United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 [taking fingerprints of | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Ash v. State
green
2 sentences1953(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing defendant's foot in footprint found at scene of crime]; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused's fingernails]; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant's shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant's clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex.Crim.Rep. 420 [ 141 S.W.2d 341 ] [giving accused an enema to recover swallowed jewelry]; United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 [taking fingerprints of 1953(State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [ 114 S.E. 317 ] [placing defendant's foot in footprint found at scene of crime]; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [ 70 So. 925 ] [scrapings taken from beneath accused's fingernails]; Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [ 167 N.E. 129 , 64 A.L.R. 1085 ] [removing defendant's shoes to match footprints]; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940 [ 37 So. 883 ] [removing defendant's clothing for comparisons and tests]; Ash v. State, 139 Tex.Crim.Rep. 420 [ 141 S.W.2d 341 ] [giving accused an enema to recover swallowed jewelry]; United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 [taking fingerprints of | 1 | 1953–1953 |