purpose of rebutting presumption in California

2015Subsequent to See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778 , in Beam, supra, 6 Cal.3d 12 , the court expressly discussed the meaning of See and clarified that evidence of the balance of the community estate could be determined on a monthly or yearly basis for the purpose of rebutting the presumption that property acquired during marriage was community.

2015Subsequent to See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778 , in Beam, supra, 6 Cal.3d 12 , the court expressly discussed the meaning of See and clarified that evidence of the balance of the community estate could be determined on a monthly or yearly basis for the purpose of rebutting the presumption that property acquired during marriage was community.

2015Subsequent to See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778 , in Beam, supra, 6 Cal.3d 12 , the court expressly discussed the meaning of See and clarified that evidence of the balance of the community estate could be determined on a monthly or yearly basis for the purpose of rebutting the presumption that property acquired during marriage was community.

2012In In re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 556 ], the issue presented implicated the rights of a presumed father and a biological father, and whether the court could use evidence (as opposed to a “judgment”) of biological paternity in order to enter “ ‘a judgment establishing paternity’ under section 7612, subdivision (c), for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of paternity under section 7611, subdivision (d), without weighing the competing interests of a statutorily presumed father.” (In re P.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 .) The In re PA. court held that because t

2012In In re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 556 ], the issue presented implicated the rights of a presumed father and a biological father, and whether the court could use evidence (as opposed to a “judgment”) of biological paternity in order to enter “ ‘a judgment establishing paternity’ under section 7612, subdivision (c), for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of paternity under section 7611, subdivision (d), without weighing the competing interests of a statutorily presumed father.” (In re P.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 .) The In re PA. court held that because t

2006(Samuels, supra, 965 S.W.2d at p. 919 ; see also Waldrip v. Head (2000) 272 Ga. 572 [ 532 S.E.2d 380 ] [the defendant waived attorney-client privilege as to documents relevant to claims of ineffective assistance, but disclosure of such documents should be limited to the purpose of rebutting claim of ineffectiveness].) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly has held, in an en banc decision, that in federal habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege arising from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel extends only to litiga

2006(Bittaker v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 715 .) Bittaker upheld a district court’s order precluding the disclosure of privileged attorney-client materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas corpus petition.

1925(Barg v. Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355 [ 68 N. W. 45 ].) As going to the question of the credibility or the weight of his testimony, it would seem that it ought to be proper for plaintiff to show by cross-examination of a physician called by defendant to testify and who does testify that he had examined plaintiff’s injuries and found that they were less serious in nature and effect than as claimed by plaintiff, that such physician had been specially employed by a surety company by which defendant was indemnified against the payment of any damages awarded against him to make such examination and stat

1925(Barg v. Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355 [ 68 N. W. 45 ].) As going to the question of the credibility or the weight of his testimony, it would seem that it ought to be proper for plaintiff to show by cross-examination of a physician called by defendant to testify and who does testify that he had examined plaintiff’s injuries and found that they were less serious in nature and effect than as claimed by plaintiff, that such physician had been specially employed by a surety company by which defendant was indemnified against the payment of any damages awarded against him to make such examination and stat

1892For the purpose of rebutting the presumption thus arising from the attestation clause, oral evidence is admissible: Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120 , 105 Am.