jury trial is harmless error in Texas

2025P. 44.1 (regarding reversible error in civil cases); In re J.N., 670 S.W.3d 614 , 621 (Tex. 2023) (“[W]hen a trial court’s error causes a party to lose her right to present her case to a jury, that error is harmful if there were material fact issues for a jury to resolve.”); Halsell, 810 S.W.2d at 372 (“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”).

2025“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.” Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991); Wheeler v. Wheeler, No. 01-16-00642-CV, 2017 WL 3140027 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

2019See id.; Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”); Olson v. Texas Commerce Bank, 715 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2015Stated another way, a trial court’s “refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.” Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (citing Olson v. Tex. Comm. Bank, 715 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

2020“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.” Halsell, 810 S.W.2d at 372 ; J.N.F., 116 S.W.3d at 437 .

2020Having so concluded, we now must address harm. 5 “A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.” Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991); In re J.N.F., 116 S.W.3d 426, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

2004Cf. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex.1996) ("The wrongful denial of a jury trial is harmful when the case contains material fact questions.”); Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) (“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”); William.

2004Cf. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex.1996) ("The wrongful denial of a jury trial is harmful when the case contains material fact questions."); Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) ("A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified."); William.

2014Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 535 (Tex. 1995) (Spector, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The right of trial by jury dictates that a jury must be allowed to decide all matters of fact.”); Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (stating that a refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified). 7 sold at a foreclosure sale, whether the foreclosure had been conducted under a deed of trust with a tenancy at sufferance provision, whether Bank of America had purchased the prop

2011Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 535 (Tex. 1995) (Spector, J., concurring and dissenting) (―The right of trial by jury dictates that a jury must be allowed to decide all matters of fact.‖); Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (stating that a refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified). 19 NAFC and the traditional summary judgment grounds established by NAFC.

2019See Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”); In re K.C.R.T., No. 02-10-00425-CV, 2011 WL 3426258 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 4, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with a bench trial, as [appellant] cursorily contends, she does not assert any argument, analysis, or reference that the abuse of discretion constituted reversible error,

2011See Halsell v. Dehoyos , 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified”); In re Marriage of Scott , 117 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (reasoning that showing harm is “of import since the burden lay with [appellant] to establish on appeal that the purported error caused the rendition of an improper judgment” and declining to conduct harm analysis because “[appellant] neither argues nor attempts to illustrate the effect, if

1990Id. at 767 (citing County of Caldwell v. Crocket, 68 Tex. 321 , 4 S.W. 607 (1887); Kegans v. Williams, 214 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

1986Kegans v. Williams, 214 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); County of Caldwell v. Crocket, 68 Tex. 321 , 4 S.W. 607 (1887).

2019Walter v. Walter, 127 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Tex.App.-- Dallas 2004, no pet.); Olson v. Texas Commerce Bank, 715 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2009“A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.” Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991); see also In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138 .

2004Grossnickle v. Gross-nickle, 865 S.W.2d 211, 212 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ); see In re Marriage of Richards, 991 S.W.2d 32, 36-38 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).

2004Grossnickle v. Gross-nickle, 865 S.W.2d 211, 212 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ); see In re Marriage of Richards, 991 S.W.2d 32, 36-38 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).