supermajority voter approval requirement (California) · Go Syfert
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supermajority voter approval requirement in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2010 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Rider v. County of San Diegogreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–2010
2 sentences

2010Rider I involved the validity of a taxation scheme “enacted for the apparent purpose of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement” imposed by Proposition 13 “with respect to any ‘special taxes’ sought to be imposed by ‘cities, counties and special districts’ [citation].” (Rider I, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 5 .) The Legislature had created an agency charged with imposing a supplemental sales tax to finance the construction of justice facilities, subject to a simple majority vote.

1994(See Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 8, citing Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) The Rider court turned its attention to the question left open in Richmond regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose *1272 of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by article XIII A, section 4.

34
Knox v. City of Orlandgreen
cal · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern

1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern

22
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmondgreen
cal · 1982 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1994
2 sentences

1994(See Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 8, citing Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) The Rider court turned its attention to the question left open in Richmond regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose *1272 of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by article XIII A, section 4.

1991OPINION LUCAS, C.J. — INTRODUCTION In this case we consider, among other issues, a question previously left open (see Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 208 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ] [hereafter Richmond ]) regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by a 1978 initiative measure (Prop. 13) with respect to any "special taxes" sought to be imposed by "cities, counties and special districts" (see Cal. Const., art.

12
Westbrook v. Mihalygreen
cal · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11
Newport Beach Fire & Police Protective League v. City Councilgreen
calctapp · 1961 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11
City of Dublin v. County of Alamedagreen
calctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993Overview “Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and counties may impose ‘special taxes by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors.’ Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. [Citation.] A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific governmental project or program. [Citation.] As with any tax, a special tax may be imposed upon individuals

1993Overview “Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and counties may impose ‘special taxes by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors.’ Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. [Citation.] A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific governmental project or program. [Citation.] As with any tax, a special tax may be imposed upon individuals

11
Pennell v. City of San Josegreen
cal · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern

1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Gunderson v. Adams neutral
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11995–1995
Matthews v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11995–1995
Strader v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11995–1995
Adams v. Board of Regents green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11995–1995
Bogert v. Kinzer green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as

1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same — approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio

11995–1995

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