6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rider v. County of San Diegogreen2 sentences2010Rider I involved the validity of a taxation scheme “enacted for the apparent purpose of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement” imposed by Proposition 13 “with respect to any ‘special taxes’ sought to be imposed by ‘cities, counties and special districts’ [citation].” (Rider I, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 5 .) The Legislature had created an agency charged with imposing a supplemental sales tax to finance the construction of justice facilities, subject to a simple majority vote. 1994(See Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 8, citing Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) The Rider court turned its attention to the question left open in Richmond regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose *1272 of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by article XIII A, section 4. | 3 | 4 |
Knox v. City of Orlandgreen2 sentences1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern 1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern | 2 | 2 |
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmondgreen2 sentences1994(See Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 8, citing Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) The Rider court turned its attention to the question left open in Richmond regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose *1272 of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by article XIII A, section 4. 1991OPINION LUCAS, C.J. INTRODUCTION In this case we consider, among other issues, a question previously left open (see Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 208 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ] [hereafter Richmond ]) regarding the validity of a taxation scheme enacted for the apparent purpose of avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by a 1978 initiative measure (Prop. 13) with respect to any "special taxes" sought to be imposed by "cities, counties and special districts" (see Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 2 |
Westbrook v. Mihalygreen2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1 |
Newport Beach Fire & Police Protective League v. City Councilgreen2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1 |
City of Dublin v. County of Alamedagreen2 sentences1993Overview “Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and counties may impose ‘special taxes by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors.’ Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. [Citation.] A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific governmental project or program. [Citation.] As with any tax, a special tax may be imposed upon individuals 1993Overview “Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and counties may impose ‘special taxes by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors.’ Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. [Citation.] A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific governmental project or program. [Citation.] As with any tax, a special tax may be imposed upon individuals | 1 | 1 |
Pennell v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern 1993Special Tax (11) Article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution, enacted in June 1978 as part of Proposition 13, provides in relevant part that cities and *281 counties may impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of their qualified electors. [12] Although the section uses permissive language, the supermajority voter approval requirement was intended to restrict the taxing power of local government. ( Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [ 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ].) A special tax, for purposes of that provision, is a tax levied to fund a specific govern | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gunderson v. Adams
neutral
2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Matthews v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Strader v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System
green
2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Adams v. Board of Regents
green
2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bogert v. Kinzer
green
2 sentences1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. ‘Nonetheless, the result is the same—approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.’ (230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitution as 1995II, § 10, subds. (d) and (e).) Moreover, the Woodlake court observed that Proposition 62 eliminates the need for a petition by requiring automatic referenda on tax measures. `Nonetheless, the result is the same approval or rejection by the voters of a legislative enactment which would otherwise become law.' (230 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1065-1066; see id. at p. 1068; cf. Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 777, fn. 16, 790, fn. 48, 793-794, fn. 53 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ] [referring to the supermajority voter approval requirement in different articles of the California Constitutio | 1 | 1995–1995 |