6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1958–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen1 sentence2025As noted, the Government Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the claim presentation requirement and “substantive liability.” (See ante, at pp. 11–12.) The phrase “substantive liability” is not expressly defined, but we find instructive the language of Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a), under which a claim cannot be presented until “after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Italics added; see V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 508 [“The date of accrual of a 10 District suggests “[a] public entity retain[s] its sovereign immunity at all | 1 | 1 |
Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd.green1 sentence2024The order alone is not appealable: “[A]ppeal must be taken from the ensuing order (judgment) of dismissal.” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, LTD. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 418, fn. 1 .) The appellate record does not contain any of the subsequent judgments against the plaintiffs, if entered. | 1 | 1 |
Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.green1 sentence2023(See § 910.8 [public entity may notify claimant of defects in claim that does not substantially comply with §§ 910 and 910.2]; City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 455-457 [discussing doctrine of substantial compliance with content requirements]; Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060 [“ ‘The doctrine of substantial compliance is normally raised where a timely but deficient claim has been presented to the public entity.’ ”].)2 Strict 2 Most of the cases plaintiffs cite as part of their substantial compliance argument concerned the content requiremen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of San Jose v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2023(See § 910.8 [public entity may notify claimant of defects in claim that does not substantially comply with §§ 910 and 910.2]; City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 455-457 [discussing doctrine of substantial compliance with content requirements]; Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060 [“ ‘The doctrine of substantial compliance is normally raised where a timely but deficient claim has been presented to the public entity.’ ”].)2 Strict 2 Most of the cases plaintiffs cite as part of their substantial compliance argument concerned the content requiremen | 1 | 2023–2023 |
City of Stockton v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021(City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 .) When a claim is not timely presented, a claimant may make a written application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) If the public entity denies that application, the claimant may then petition the superior court under section 946.6 for relief from the claim presentation requirements. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) The court may grant relief only if the requirements of section 946.6 are met. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lentz v. McMahon
green
1 sentence2013(See Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 401-402 [holding application of estoppel would not seriously undermine the interests represented by the statute of limitations to encourage the timely presentation of claim and prevent windfall benefits; "Estoppel against a county's assertion of purely procedural preconditions and limitations on benefits, when the county itself is responsible for the procedural default, will not defeat the underlying statutory policy of safeguarding accurate and orderly administration of the welfare system"]; McKnight, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992-993.) V. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
J. H. McKnight Ranch, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board
green
1 sentence2013(See Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 401-402 [holding application of estoppel would not seriously undermine the interests represented by the statute of limitations to encourage the timely presentation of claim and prevent windfall benefits; "Estoppel against a county's assertion of purely procedural preconditions and limitations on benefits, when the county itself is responsible for the procedural default, will not defeat the underlying statutory policy of safeguarding accurate and orderly administration of the welfare system"]; McKnight, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992-993.) V. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Casey v. Katz
green
2 sentences1958There should be no distinction between injuries to property in cases of fraud and deceit, which are tortious acts, and injuries to property rights in other eases of tortious acts such as wrongful death.” (See *841 also Western Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191 [ 8 P.2d 1016 , 80 A.L.R. 866 ].) In Casey v. Katz, 114 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 250 P.2d 291 ], an action for malicious prosecution of a battery action was held to be an “injury to property” under the terms of Probate Code, section 707. 1958There should be no distinction between injuries to property in cases of fraud and deceit, which are tortious acts, and injuries to property rights in other eases of tortious acts such as wrongful death.” (See *841 also Western Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191 [ 8 P.2d 1016 , 80 A.L.R. 866 ].) In Casey v. Katz, 114 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 250 P.2d 291 ], an action for malicious prosecution of a battery action was held to be an “injury to property” under the terms of Probate Code, section 707. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Hunt v. Authier
green
2 sentences1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ 1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Leavitt v. Gibson
green
2 sentences1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ 1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co.
green
2 sentences1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ 1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Evans v. Gibson
green
2 sentences1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ 1958Counsel have presented no authority squarely deciding whether such a claim as that before us constitutes an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 707, and accordingly has been forever barred by reason of appellant’s failure to make a timely presentation of her claim. *840 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288 [ 169 P.2d 913 , 171 A.L.R. 1379 ], an action for wrongful death was declared to constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of Probate Code, section 574, the court stating (at p. 296), “It follows that wherever a plaintiff has sustained an injury to his ‘ | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Western Mortgage & Guaranty Co. v. Gray
green
2 sentences1958There should be no distinction between injuries to property in cases of fraud and deceit, which are tortious acts, and injuries to property rights in other eases of tortious acts such as wrongful death.” (See *841 also Western Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191 [ 8 P.2d 1016 , 80 A.L.R. 866 ].) In Casey v. Katz, 114 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 250 P.2d 291 ], an action for malicious prosecution of a battery action was held to be an “injury to property” under the terms of Probate Code, section 707. 1958There should be no distinction between injuries to property in cases of fraud and deceit, which are tortious acts, and injuries to property rights in other eases of tortious acts such as wrongful death.” (See *841 also Western Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191 [ 8 P.2d 1016 , 80 A.L.R. 866 ].) In Casey v. Katz, 114 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 250 P.2d 291 ], an action for malicious prosecution of a battery action was held to be an “injury to property” under the terms of Probate Code, section 707. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.