inmate hearing in Colorado

2007Fisher v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., supra. However, the DOC need not provide an inmate an additional hearing where the inmate was previously convicted of a sex offense because such an inmate, whether convicted "as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required by due process." Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir.1997).

2002See Chambers v. Colorado Department of Corrections, supra; Neal v. Shimoda, supra. Here, in basing its classification on a crime that is not a sex offense and not affording the inmate a hearing, the DOC failed to provide him with the required procedural due process.

2025“Under these circumstances, the [C]DOC must afford an inmate a hearing so that the inmate may contest the sexual basis of the [classification].” Id.; see also Fisher v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 56 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[D]ue process require[s] that an inmate be afforded a hearing when the basis for 14 such classification is not a listed sex offense of which he stands convicted.”).

2019Colorado case law clearly establishes that the right to collect damages in a wrongful death case is “dependent upon the right of action which the decedent would have had, had []he survived [the] injuries.” Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97, 102 (Colo. 1995); see also Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2007) (The right “does not arise from a separate tort, but instead is wholly derivative of the injury to the decedent.”). ¶ 25 When a decedent could not have maintained an action due to a different section of the Colorado Revised Statutes, the tortfeasor is not liable to the d

2019Colorado case law clearly establishes that the right to collect damages in a wrongful death case is “dependent upon the right of action which the decedent would have had, had []he survived [the] injuries.” Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97, 102 (Colo. 1995); see also Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2007) (The right “does not arise from a separate tort, but instead is wholly derivative of the injury to the decedent.”). ¶ 25 When a decedent could not have maintained an action due to a different section of the Colorado Revised Statutes, the tortfeasor is not liable to the d

2007See Negron v. Gillespie, 111 P.3d 556, 558-59 (Colo.App.2005) (addressing merits of mandamus action brought by inmate in state custody against state prison officials).

2007Chambers v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., supra. That hearing must include "notice of the charges, an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in defense of those charges, and a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)).

2007Gwinn v. Awmiller, supra. Similarly, the DOC must afford an inmate a hearing where the DOC's asserted basis for a sex offender classification is a preconfinement conviction for a crime not listed as a sex offense under § 16-11.7-102.

2002The failure to provide due process is an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Tepley v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 955 P.2d 573, 578 (Colo.App.1997), and therefore we conclude that the DOC abused its discretion in its classification of the inmate as a sex offender.