6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TYRONE BRYANT v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIAgreen1 sentence2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
Monica M. Garcia v. Woman's Hospital of Texasgreen1 sentence2014Having determined that Mr. Bryant produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim if the Muhammad deposition is included, we next determine whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Bryant’s motion to reopen *270 the case to submit the deposition. 4 “[A] party who has rested may move to reopen [one’s] case in order to cure an evi-dentiary deficiency identified in a Rule 50(a) motion.” Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1149 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (citing Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp., 97 F.3d 810, 813-14 (5th Cir.1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Teneyck, Lillie v. Omni Shoreham Hotelgreen1 sentence2014Having determined that Mr. Bryant produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim if the Muhammad deposition is included, we next determine whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Bryant’s motion to reopen *270 the case to submit the deposition. 4 “[A] party who has rested may move to reopen [one’s] case in order to cure an evi-dentiary deficiency identified in a Rule 50(a) motion.” Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1149 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (citing Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp., 97 F.3d 810, 813-14 (5th Cir.1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993Fundá-mentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant’s request for reversal of a criminal conviction. 16 When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction “on confession of error alone”; the “public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official.” Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , 1993Fundá-mentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant’s request for reversal of a criminal conviction. 16 When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction “on confession of error alone”; the “public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official.” Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , | 1 | 1 |
cluster 564941green2 sentences1993If, for example, the government had contested the Harris/Bryant issue and had a winning argument (as the dissent says it does), we might well have reached that issue and ruled for the government by assuming, solely for the sake of argument and not deciding as we do here that appellant had standing. [22] Third, as already noted, the Harris/Bryant issue as applied to the facts here is complex; this is not a matter we could easily resolve because the answer is "beyond serious debate." Pryce, supra note 20 , 291 U.S.App.D.C. at 89 , 938 F.2d at 1348 (per Williams, J.). 1993If, for example, the government had contested the Harris/Bryant issue and had a winning argument (as the dissent says it does), we might well have reached that issue and ruled for the government by assuming, solely for the sake of argument — and not deciding as we do here — that appellant had standing. 22 Third, as already noted, the Harris/Bryant issue as applied to the facts here is complex; this is not a matter we could easily resolve because the answer is “beyond serious debate.” Pryce, supra note 20 , 291 U.S.App.D.C. at 89 , 938 F.2d at 1348 (per Williams, J.). | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993Fundamentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant's request for reversal of a criminal conviction. [16] When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction "on confession of error alone"; the "public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official." Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , 1993Fundá-mentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant’s request for reversal of a criminal conviction. 16 When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction “on confession of error alone”; the “public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official.” Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carlton E. Bryant, United States of America v. William E. Turnergreen2 sentences1982In United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 141 , 439 F.2d 642, 651 (1971), the U. S. Court of Appeals held that “before a request for discovery has been made, the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation.” See Hardy v. United States, supra at 870 (adopting the Bryant rule). 1982In United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 141 , 439 F.2d 642, 651 (1971), the U. S. Court of Appeals held that “before a request for discovery has been made, the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation.” See Hardy v. United States, supra at 870 (adopting the Bryant rule). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Bryant
green
2 sentences2016The Court instead took pains to distinguish Hammon on the grounds that the case involved “a neutralized threat,” “a known and identified perpetrator” who was unarmed and had not caused serious injury, and a domestic-violence situation, which. often meant “a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety.” 562 U.S. at 363-64 , 131 S.Ct. 1143 . 2016The Court instead took pains to distinguish Hammon on the grounds that the case involved “a neutralized threat,” “a known and identified perpetrator” who was unarmed and had not caused serious injury, and a domestic-violence situation, which. often meant “a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety.” 562 U.S. at 363-64 , 131 S.Ct. 1143 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Staub v. Proctor Hospital
green
2 sentences2014Moreover, Mr. Bryant argues that the trial court’s reliance on McFarland and its failure to address the "cat's paw theory,” see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186 , 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011), when considering his motion to reopen the case to admit the deposition caused the court to erroneously dismiss his claim. 2014Moreover, Mr. Bryant argues that the trial court’s reliance on McFarland and its failure to address the "cat's paw theory,” see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186 , 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011), when considering his motion to reopen the case to admit the deposition caused the court to erroneously dismiss his claim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Doreus v. United States
green
1 sentence2009The Doreus court, in rejecting the conclusion "that based on the circumstantial evidence alone, [i.e., without consideration of the DEA-7 report], reasonable jurors would have found the requisite intent for entry of judgment on the lesser-included attempt offense,” stressed, inter alia, the ambiguous nature of the "hand-to-hand” transaction the officer had observed (but was not a party to), noting his "limited" or equivocal testimony that " ‘he couldn't see exactly what [Mr. Doreus] had in his hand’ " and that he "didn’t see the green money ... per se,‘ ” but only " ‘believed’ the female gave | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Williams v. United States
green
1 sentence2009Bryant’s defense, however, was also misidentification, and the government all but concedes that it is surmising (“[c]oun-sel may have reasoned”) that Williams was thinking tactically, and was not just asleep at the switches, when Bryant forcefully challenged the admission of the chemist’s report without accompanying testimony. 6 Because the judge was given full opportunity to weigh the constitutional objection, and the prosecution a full chance to argue *848 for admissibility, Williams, supra, justice would not be served by holding Williams to near-forfeiture of the claim in circumstances wher | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Pryce
green
2 sentences1993If, for example, the government had contested the Harris/Bryant issue and had a winning argument (as the dissent says it does), we might well have reached that issue and ruled for the government by assuming, solely for the sake of argument and not deciding as we do here that appellant had standing. [22] Third, as already noted, the Harris/Bryant issue as applied to the facts here is complex; this is not a matter we could easily resolve because the answer is "beyond serious debate." Pryce, supra note 20 , 291 U.S.App.D.C. at 89 , 938 F.2d at 1348 (per Williams, J.). 1993If, for example, the government had contested the Harris/Bryant issue and had a winning argument (as the dissent says it does), we might well have reached that issue and ruled for the government by assuming, solely for the sake of argument — and not deciding as we do here — that appellant had standing. 22 Third, as already noted, the Harris/Bryant issue as applied to the facts here is complex; this is not a matter we could easily resolve because the answer is “beyond serious debate.” Pryce, supra note 20 , 291 U.S.App.D.C. at 89 , 938 F.2d at 1348 (per Williams, J.). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Parlton v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Fundá-mentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant’s request for reversal of a criminal conviction. 16 When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction “on confession of error alone”; the “public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official.” Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , 1993Fundá-mentally, Judge WAGNER relies on a line of cases in which the government confesses error and joins in an appellant’s request for reversal of a criminal conviction. 16 When that happens, as this court put it long ago, we cannot set aside the conviction “on confession of error alone”; the “public interest prevents shifting the responsibility for reversal from the appellate court to the prosecuting official.” Fletcher v. United States, 49 A.2d 88, 88 (D.C.1946) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 62 S.Ct. 510 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), and Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.