6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 2008–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND RAND SIMBERG v. MICHAEL E. MANN, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. v. MICHAEL E. MANNgreen2 sentences2026See Mann, 150 A.3d at 1236 (The constitutional avoidance canon “leads us to interpret the phrase ‘likely to succeed on the merits,’ undefined in the D.C. 2025See Mann, 150 A.3d at 1236 (The constitutional avoidance canon “leads us to interpret the phrase ‘likely to succeed on the merits,’ undefined in the D.C. | 2 | 2 |
J.P. v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2025Supra at 23 (quoting J.P. v. District of Columbia, 189 A.3d 212, 222 (D.C. 2018)). 2024Cf. J.P. v. District of Columbia, 189 A.3d 212, 222 (D.C. 2018) (doctrine of constitutional avoidance did not apply, because claimed constitutional concern would persist even under proposed narrowing interpretation). | 2 | 2 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.green1 sentence2025When these interpretive tools fail us, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance “counsel[s] that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.” Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233 (D.C. 2010) (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Mack v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025When these interpretive tools fail us, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance “counsel[s] that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.” Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233 (D.C. 2010) (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)). 2025Although the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is “intended as ‘a means of giving effect to [legislative] intent, not of subverting it,’” Mack, 6 A.3d at 1234 (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 382 ), that is not its only purpose; it also serves to support courts’ “general obligation to interpret statutes so as to support their constitutionality.” Smith, 68 A.3d at 737 . 85 There is little risk of “subverting” the Council’s intent here, where interpreting “conviction” to mean “judgment of conviction” is one of two entirely plausible readings of FCRA. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See Thompson v. United States, 59 A.3d 961 , 966 n. 12 (D.C.2013) (declining to apply doctrine of constitutional avoidance “[g]iven the clarity of the Council’s purpose”). 2 Finally, appellants suggest that the Subcommittee Report inaccurately described the law in this jurisdiction when it said, “The courts have ruled that a real or threatened breach of the peace is not necessary in order to criminalize this type of disorderly conduct.” The sentence in the Subcommittee Report is ambiguous at worst. | 1 | 1 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2008See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (Fourth Amendment precluded conviction for denying housing code inspector entry into home without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 , 70 S.Ct. 468 , 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (Fourth Amendment concerns, coupled with doctrine of constitutional avoidance, precluded conviction for violation of local regulation after respondent refused to unlock door for health inspector’s warrantless entry); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-1351 (9th Cir.1978) (consistent with Fourth Amendmen 2008See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (Fourth Amendment precluded conviction for denying housing code inspector entry into home without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 , 70 S.Ct. 468 , 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (Fourth Amendment concerns, coupled with doctrine of constitutional avoidance, precluded conviction for violation of local regulation after respondent refused to unlock door for health inspector’s warrantless entry); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-1351 (9th Cir.1978) (consistent with Fourth Amendmen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Saundra Prescottgreen1 sentence2008See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (Fourth Amendment precluded conviction for denying housing code inspector entry into home without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 , 70 S.Ct. 468 , 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (Fourth Amendment concerns, coupled with doctrine of constitutional avoidance, precluded conviction for violation of local regulation after respondent refused to unlock door for health inspector’s warrantless entry); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-1351 (9th Cir.1978) (consistent with Fourth Amendmen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2025Although the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is “intended as ‘a means of giving effect to [legislative] intent, not of subverting it,’” Mack, 6 A.3d at 1234 (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 382 ), that is not its only purpose; it also serves to support courts’ “general obligation to interpret statutes so as to support their constitutionality.” Smith, 68 A.3d at 737 . 85 There is little risk of “subverting” the Council’s intent here, where interpreting “conviction” to mean “judgment of conviction” is one of two entirely plausible readings of FCRA. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. United States
green
1 sentence2025Although the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is “intended as ‘a means of giving effect to [legislative] intent, not of subverting it,’” Mack, 6 A.3d at 1234 (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 382 ), that is not its only purpose; it also serves to support courts’ “general obligation to interpret statutes so as to support their constitutionality.” Smith, 68 A.3d at 737 . 85 There is little risk of “subverting” the Council’s intent here, where interpreting “conviction” to mean “judgment of conviction” is one of two entirely plausible readings of FCRA. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
District of Columbia v. Little
green
2 sentences2008See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (Fourth Amendment precluded conviction for denying housing code inspector entry into home without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 , 70 S.Ct. 468 , 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (Fourth Amendment concerns, coupled with doctrine of constitutional avoidance, precluded conviction for violation of local regulation after respondent refused to unlock door for health inspector’s warrantless entry); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-1351 (9th Cir.1978) (consistent with Fourth Amendmen 2008See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (Fourth Amendment precluded conviction for denying housing code inspector entry into home without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 , 70 S.Ct. 468 , 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (Fourth Amendment concerns, coupled with doctrine of constitutional avoidance, precluded conviction for violation of local regulation after respondent refused to unlock door for health inspector’s warrantless entry); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-1351 (9th Cir.1978) (consistent with Fourth Amendmen | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.