constitutional avoidance doctrine in California

2026(Gonzalez, at pp. 329-330.) In reaching this conclusion, Gonzalez noted, among other things, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lynch, which held that “ ‘a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 330, citing Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which compels that a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other construction is viable (P

2025(Id. at p. 330; see Lynch, at p. 768 [“a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established”].) “Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other construction is viable.” (Gonzalez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 330, citing People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 804 .) In supplemental briefing, defendant asks us to follow Gonzalez and the Attorney General urges us to follo

2023(California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 253 [courts avoid “constitutional conflicts whenever possible by construing legislative enactments strictly against the impairment of [courts’] constitutional jurisdiction”]; Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 857– 859 [construing plainly mandatory provision in initiative as directive, in part to avoid separation of powers concerns].) But this does not allow us to simply pretend that Proposition 22 regulates collective bargaining, as the state suggests, when the text does not reasonably admit of such a construction.

2023(California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 253 [courts avoid “constitutional conflicts whenever possible by construing legislative enactments strictly against the impairment of [courts’] constitutional jurisdiction”]; Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 857– 859 [construing plainly mandatory provision in initiative as directive, in part to avoid separation of powers concerns].) But this does not allow us to simply pretend that Proposition 22 regulates collective bargaining, as the state suggests, when the text does not reasonably admit of such a construction.

2018(People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 805 .) We also consider the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, under which "a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution ' " 'if any other possible construction remains available.' " ' " (People v. Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804 .) "The theory underlying the canon rests not only on a preference for avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions, but also on the presumption that the Legislature (whose members have sworn to uphold the Constitution) did not 'intend[ ] to infringe constitutionally protected liberties

2018(People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 805 .) We also consider the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, under which "a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution ' " 'if any other possible construction remains available.' " ' " (People v. Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804 .) "The theory underlying the canon rests not only on a preference for avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions, but also on the presumption that the Legislature (whose members have sworn to uphold the Constitution) did not 'intend[ ] to infringe constitutionally protected liberties

2025“When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.” ’ ” (People v. Gutie

2014This canon of interpretation applies to ambiguous statutes: “When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the oth

2024Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 .) The court should avoid a construction that renders a provision “surplusage” (People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 253 ) and “may reject a 3 literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results.” (Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 (Simpson).) Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other construction is viable.

2021(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 8, fn. 2, citing People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [relying on prudential doctrine of constitutional avoidance]; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 872, 881 [refusing to provide guidance interpreting a new statute after remand].) There are no such difficult constitutional or statutory issues here, just common contractual issues the trial court determined independently warranted denying the petition to compel arbitration.

2021(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 8, fn. 2, citing People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [relying on prudential doctrine of constitutional avoidance]; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 872, 881 [refusing to provide guidance interpreting a new statute after remand].) There are no such difficult constitutional or statutory issues here, just common contractual issues the trial court determined independently warranted denying the petition to compel arbitration.

2021(See generally, California Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Bd. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 604, 631, fn. 19 [under the constitutional avoidance doctrine, it is prudent to address a statutory ground to avoid reaching a constitutional ground].) Despite these distinctions, we conclude the elements that must be alleged to state a federal civil rights claim provide guidance for defining the appropriate test for whether a denial of the statutory right of access occurred in this case. 16.

2017Under the doctrine, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution " ' "if any other possible construction remains available." ' " ( People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227 , 256, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 349 P.3d 103 ; accord, DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568 , 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 , 99 L.Ed.2d 645 ["where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"].) The theory unde

2017Under the doctrine, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution " ' "if any other possible construction remains available." ' " ( People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227 , 256, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 349 P.3d 103 ; accord, DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568 , 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 , 99 L.Ed.2d 645 ["where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"].) The theory unde

2017(See, e.g., People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 608, fn. 3 .) 26 relevant intent of the Legislature that enacted the law”].) It instead treats later acts as curative of purported defects in prior acts.20 Thus, even were we to find that the Act did not authorize the regulations adopted by the Board, the Legislature surely ratified them in 2012 by directing how the money is spent.

2017(See Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 52 [“The declaration of a later Legislature is of little weight in determining the 19 Contrary to the Board’s evident view, the constitutional doubt canon is distinct from the constitutional avoidance doctrine, whereby it is often deemed prudent to address a statutory or other ground to avoid reaching a constitutional ground.

2017Under the doctrine, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution " ' "if any other possible construction remains available." ' " ( People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227 , 256, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 349 P.3d 103 ; accord, DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568 , 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 , 99 L.Ed.2d 645 ["where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"].) The theory unde

2017Under the doctrine, a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution " ' "if any other possible construction remains available." ' " ( People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227 , 256, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 349 P.3d 103 ; accord, DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568 , 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 , 99 L.Ed.2d 645 ["where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"].) The theory unde

2016A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is ‘ “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” ’ ” (People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 683 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ].) In construing section 31, we may rely on principles of “constitutional avoidance”: “The doctrine of constitutional avoidance ‘command[s] courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.’ ” (Voisine v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. _ [ 195 L.Ed.2d 736 , 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2290 ]; see United State

2016A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is ‘ “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” ’ ” (People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 683 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ].) In construing section 31, we may rely on principles of “constitutional avoidance”: “The doctrine of constitutional avoidance ‘command[s] courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.’ ” (Voisine v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. _ [ 195 L.Ed.2d 736 , 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2290 ]; see United State

2016A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is ‘ “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” ’ ” (People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 683 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ].) In construing section 31, we may rely on principles of “constitutional avoidance”: “The doctrine of constitutional avoidance ‘command[s] courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.’ ” (Voisine v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. _ [ 195 L.Ed.2d 736 , 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2290 ]; see United State

2016A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is ‘ “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” ’ ” (People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 683 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ].) In construing section 31, we may rely on principles of “constitutional avoidance”: “The doctrine of constitutional avoidance ‘command[s] courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.’ ” (Voisine v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. _ [ 195 L.Ed.2d 736 , 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2290 ]; see United State

2016In People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548 , 332 P.3d 538 ], the court construed the statute for the crime of attempted criminal threat to require proof that the defendant had a subjective intent to threaten and that the intended threat under the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear, even though the statute on its face would not require the latter element.

2016In People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548 , 332 P.3d 538 ], the court construed the statute for the crime of attempted criminal threat to require proof that the defendant had a subjective intent to threaten and that the intended threat under the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear, even though the statute on its face would not require the latter element.

2014This canon of interpretation applies to ambiguous statutes: “When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the oth

2014This canon of interpretation applies to ambiguous statutes: “When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the oth

2014This canon of interpretation applies to ambiguous statutes: “When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the oth

2014This canon of interpretation applies to ambiguous statutes: “When a question of statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the oth