postconviction relief claim in Delaware

2024Mariney’s claim that Trial Counsel “did court’s denial of a motion to suppress in a violation of probation proceeding where “there was no attempt to comply with basic aspects of the probation procedures”); McAllister v. State, 3 A.3d 1098, 1098 (Del. 2010) (TABLE) (denying a postconviction relief claim where the administrative search procedures were followed) 54 2019 WL 245292 , at *3 (Del.

2024Rule 61(i)(1) requires a postconviction motion to be filed no later than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.27 Rule 61(i)(2) provides that any second or subsequent postconviction motion must be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after trial and he pleads with particularity that new evidence exists demonstrating his actual innocence or a new, retroactive rule of Constitutional law applies to his case such that it would render his conviction invalid.28 Rule 61(i)(3) bars any ground for relief that was not asserted by the movant in the proceedings leading to the c

2024In Urquhart, the defendant was represented by multiple attorneys who never met with the defendant until the morning of trial.36 Counsel was ineffective because he failed to engage in a meaningful review of exculpatory evidence with the defendant before 34 203 A.3d 719 (Del. 2019) (reversing Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction relief claim). 35 See D.I. 32. 36 203 A.3d at 725, 731–32. 9 trial37 and the defendant was prejudiced because he did not have the opportunity to appreciate that evidence in evaluating whether to plead guilty.38 Not so here.

2024In Urquhart, the defendant was represented by multiple attorneys who never met with the defendant until the morning of trial.36 Counsel was ineffective because he failed to engage in a meaningful review of exculpatory evidence with the defendant before 34 203 A.3d 719 (Del. 2019) (reversing Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction relief claim). 35 See D.I. 32. 36 203 A.3d at 725, 731–32. 9 trial37 and the defendant was prejudiced because he did not have the opportunity to appreciate that evidence in evaluating whether to plead guilty.38 Not so here.

2023Servs. 401 A.2d 88, 90 (Del.1979). 4 7.

2022That said, “the mere fact that a postconviction relief claim might bear some resemblance to a formerly 34 Riley, 585 A.2d at 721. 35 See Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992). 36 Id.; See State v. Smith, 1994 WL 713969 , at *2 (Del.

2009R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to postconviction relief). [4] See Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) (providing that "[t]he first inquiry in any analysis of a postconviction relief claim is whether the petition meets the procedural requirements of Rule 61"). [5] See Del.