postconviction relief hearing in Rhode Island

2012See Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 857 (R.I.2007) (noting “the required degree of deference * * * [that must be accorded] to the hearing justice’s findings of fact at the postconviction-relief hearing”).

2010However, the postconviction relief hearing justice declined to pass upon this contention, stating that the Superior Court was not the proper forum for the consideration of claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. *942 II Standard of Review and Controlling Legal Principles By virtue of the provisions of § 10-9.1-1, "the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacat

2016To the contrary, as the majority points out, the hearing justice “even noted the former prosecutor’s purported reason for not offering the information to the de-fénse: because he felt ‘it would lead to a continuance and to headaches.’” Lacking credibility determinations, therefore, the hearing justice’s decision does not adequately support the proposition that the former prosecutor’s failure to disclose the Carrier statements was “a considered decision to suppress, taken for the very purpose of obstructing,” or that the high value of the statements to the defense “could not have escaped the [s

2012Nevertheless, we review in a de novo manner any post-conviction relief determination “involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights.” Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473 (R.I. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DeCiantis, 24 A.3d at 569 .

2012See Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1017 (R.I.2008); see also Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 671 (R.I.2010) (denying a contention that there was a procedural defect in a postconviction-relief hearing during which the hearing justice asked the applicant whether he had any questions about what was said at the hearing and then gave the applicant an opportunity to be heard on the claims thereafter dismissed).

2011Ill Standard of Review “[P]ost-conviction relief is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction or sentence violated rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him.” Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.2010) (quoting Ballard v. State, 983 A.2d 264, 266 (R.I.2009)); see also § 10-9.1-l(a)(l) (establishing a statutory right for postconviction relief). “[T]he burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted” is upon the applicant.

2010We have previously stated that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not open the door for this Court to second-guess every decision made by defense counsel at trial.” Chalk, 949 A.2d at 399 ; see also Vorgvongsa v. State, 785 A.2d 542, 549 (R.I.2001).

2006At the postconviction relief hearing, trial counsel testified that he could not imagine how Evans’s hospital records “could support any position that I was pursuing in the case.” The significant question, he testified, was whether, on the day of the robbery, defendant’s arm could have supported his weight sufficiently to jump over the counter, and “his treating physician [Dr. Bliss] was the only person that could have answered that.” Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that trial counsel’s decisions in this regard were tactical in nature and “do not by themselves constitute ineffective

2024We further note that this Court will not disturb credibility determinations “by a postconviction-relief hearing justice unless the defendant ‘demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearing justice was clearly wrong.’” Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9 , 17 n.11 (R.I. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 526 (R.I. 1992)).

2018It is fundamental that "[t]his Court will not disturb credibility determinations by a postconviction-relief hearing justice unless the [applicant] demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearing justice was clearly wrong." Rice v. State , 38 A.3d 9 , 17 n.11 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024During the postconviction-relief hearing, Hazard “explained that his trial counsel had requested his authorization to release his mental-health treatment records” and that trial counsel “never informed him that this material would be provided to the prosecutor.” Id. at 755 .

2013II Standard of Review Postconviction relief is available pursuant to G.L.1956 § 10 — 9.1—1(a)(1), which provides a remedy to a person who has been convicted of a crime and who demonstrates “[tjhat the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state[.]” See also Hazard v. State, 64 A.3d 749, 756 (R.I.2013).

2006Indeed, the hearing justice said that, “if she was the only witness, the outcome for Mr. Evans at this hearing may [have been] favorable.” However, as the hearing justice noted, “she wasn’t the only witness.” This Court has held that under the Strickland standard, even if an applicant demonstrates that his trial counsel’s efforts were so utterly lacking as to deny him the effective assistance of counsel, the applicant still must prove that “ ‘absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Bryant v. Wall, 896 A.2d 704, 708 (R.I.2006) (quoting

2006Doctor, 865 A.2d at 1068 .

2025Under these circumstances, the “defendant bears the burden of establishing that it was prejudicial * * * by showing that the nondisclosed evidence was material because ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). - 15 - As noted, at the conclusion of the postconviction-relief hearing, petitioner alerted the trial justice that the bench decision did not address the issue of expenditures.

2024We further note that this Court will not disturb credibility determinations “by a postconviction-relief hearing justice unless the defendant ‘demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearing justice was clearly wrong.’” Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9 , 17 n.11 (R.I. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 526 (R.I. 1992)).

2024See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 528 . case-in-chief but made clear to the defense counsel that the state reserved the right to use the medical records in rebuttal if LeFebvre testified in a manner inconsistent with the records. 3 We note that LeFebvre did not testify at the postconviction-relief hearing.

2019In that case, the defendant had claimed indigency on multiple occasions, the state had stipulated to the defendant's indigent status at a postconviction-relief hearing, and one of the judges presiding over the defendant's proceedings had "specifically stated that [the defendant] could not afford an attorney." Id. at 312, 315.

2018See Dominick , 139 A.3d at 433 n.9 ("It is well established that this Court generally 'consider[s] an issue to be waived when a party [s]imply stat[es] an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues * * *.' ") (quoting Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC , 85 A.3d 1160 , 1170 (R.I. 2014) ).

2018See Dominick , 139 A.3d at 433 n.9 ("It is well established that this Court generally 'consider[s] an issue to be waived when a party [s]imply stat[es] an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues * * *.' ") (quoting Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC , 85 A.3d 1160 , 1170 (R.I. 2014) ).

2012Nevertheless, we review in a de novo manner any post-conviction relief determination “involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights.” Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473 (R.I. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DeCiantis, 24 A.3d at 569 .

2012See Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1017 (R.I.2008); see also Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 671 (R.I.2010) (denying a contention that there was a procedural defect in a postconviction-relief hearing during which the hearing justice asked the applicant whether he had any questions about what was said at the hearing and then gave the applicant an opportunity to be heard on the claims thereafter dismissed).

2012See, e.g., State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I.2011); State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828-29 (R.I.2008).

2012See, e.g., State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I.2011); State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828-29 (R.I.2008).

2012See Spratt II, 926 A.2d at 1016 .

2011Ill Standard of Review “[P]ost-conviction relief is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction or sentence violated rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him.” Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.2010) (quoting Ballard v. State, 983 A.2d 264, 266 (R.I.2009)); see also § 10-9.1-l(a)(l) (establishing a statutory right for postconviction relief). “[T]he burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted” is upon the applicant.

2010However, the postconviction relief hearing justice declined to pass upon this contention, stating that the Superior Court was not the proper forum for the consideration of claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. *942 II Standard of Review and Controlling Legal Principles By virtue of the provisions of § 10-9.1-1, "the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacat

2010In other words, the postconviction relief hearing justice had actually heard viva voce the arguments made by counsel and the testimony of the witnesses at the sentencing hearing. [16] The tragic situations which trial counsel and defendant's stepfather described to the trial justice at the time of sentencing are briefly described in the Analysis portion of this opinion, infra. [17] On his direct appeal to this Court, Mr. Page was represented by an attorney other than his trial counsel. [18] It should also be recalled that, even when we are conducting a de novo review with respect to issues of

2010However, the postconviction relief hearing justice declined to pass upon this contention, stating that the Superior Court was not the proper forum for the consideration of claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. *942 II Standard of Review and Controlling Legal Principles By virtue of the provisions of § 10-9.1-1, "the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacat

2009It is well settled in this state that, “[a] plea of nolo contendere is the substantive equivalent of a guilty plea * * LaChappelle v. State, 686 A.2d 924, 927 (R.I.1996) (quoting Figueroa, 639 A.2d at 498 ); see also Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 246 (R.I.2003) (noting that the Court’s concern lies not with the categorization of the plea, but rather with its consequences, and that the consequences of a plea of guilty and nolo contendere are the same).