Massiah rule in Florida

6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
Lightbourne v. Stategreen fla · 1983 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 386 (Fla.1983) (holding that a Massiah claim requires proof of an "overt scheme" in which the State takes part to obtain incriminating statements). 2005See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 386 (Fla.1983) (holding that a Massiah claim requires proof of an "overt scheme" in which the State takes part to obtain incriminating statements).	1	1
Miller v. Stategreen fla · 1982 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)). 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)).	1	1
Sikes v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997For instance, in Sikes v. State, 313 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), the district court held that voluntary statements made to prison authorities by an incarcerated defendant are not subject to the Massiah rule, concluding, "We cannot expect prison guards to wear earplugs at all times while in the performance of their duties." Id. at 437. 1997For instance, in Sikes v. State, 313 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), the district court held that voluntary statements made to prison authorities by an incarcerated defendant are not subject to the Massiah rule, concluding, "We cannot expect prison guards to wear earplugs at all times while in the performance of their duties." Id. at 437.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

Case	Cited	Years
Kuhlmann v. Wilson green scotus · 1986 2 sentences 2014Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 . 2014Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 .	2	2014–2014
Massiah v. United States green scotus · 1964 2 sentences 2026Id. (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 941 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 2019)). 2026Id. (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 941 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 2019)).	1	2026–2026
Muehleman v. State green fla · 1987 2 sentences 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)). 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)).	1	1997–1997
Muehleman v. Florida green scotus · 1987 2 sentences 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)). 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)).	1	1997–1997
Patterson v. Illinois green scotus · 1988 2 sentences 1997Thus, this claim was properly preserved for our review. [7] Respectively: prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of a representation with a person known to be represented by counsel unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer; holding a lawyer responsible for conduct of other persons that would be a violation of professional obligations if the other person was a lawyer where the lawyer orders or otherwise ratifies the conduct involved. [8] The United States Supreme Court has since clarified the Massiah rule in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 , 108 S.Ct. 1997Thus, this claim was properly preserved for our review. [7] Respectively: prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of a representation with a person known to be represented by counsel unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer; holding a lawyer responsible for conduct of other persons that would be a violation of professional obligations if the other person was a lawyer where the lawyer orders or otherwise ratifies the conduct involved. [8] The United States Supreme Court has since clarified the Massiah rule in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 , 108 S.Ct.	1	1997–1997
In Re Percival's Estate green · 1917 2 sentences 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)). 1997Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 , 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987), we interpreted the "deliberately elicited" standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a "stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." Id. at 314 (quoting Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982)).	1	1997–1997
United States v. Henry green scotus · 1980 2 sentences 1991The Massiah principle was again applied in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), in which post-indictment incriminating statements were made by the defendant to a cellmate who was also a paid informant. 1991The Massiah principle was again applied in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), in which post-indictment incriminating statements were made by the defendant to a cellmate who was also a paid informant.	1	1991–1991

Where else courts name it

CA 43 (1977–2023) NY 9 (1966–2010) ID 9 (1981–2024) IL 8 (1967–2023) TX 6 (1969–2021) TN 6 (1980–2015) FL 6 (1991–2026) MA 4 (1971–2007) CT 4 (1972–2025) MD 4 (1966–1978) IA 3 (2015–2016) WI 2 (2010–2022) MI 2 (1983–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check