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6 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). 1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Willis Randolph v. People of the State of California Attorney General of the State of California James Hamlet, Wardengreen2 sentences2015The Sixth Circuit reasoned: As Henry illustrates, a Massiah violation can occur even where the State specifically instructs its informant “not to initiate any conversation with or question [a defendant] regarding the [offense for which he had been indicted].” Henry, 447 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). “[I]t is not the government’s intent or overt acts that are important; rather, it is the ‘likely . . . result’ of the government’s acts.” Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ). 2015The Sixth Circuit reasoned: As Henry illustrates, a Massiah violation can occur even where the State specifically instructs its informant “not to initiate any conversation with or question [a defendant] regarding the [offense for which he had been indicted].” Henry, 447 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). “[I]t is not the government’s intent or overt acts that are important; rather, it is the ‘likely . . . result’ of the government’s acts.” Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Henrygreen2 sentences2015The Sixth Circuit reasoned: As Henry illustrates, a Massiah violation can occur even where the State specifically instructs its informant “not to initiate any conversation with or question [a defendant] regarding the [offense for which he had been indicted].” Henry, 447 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). “[I]t is not the government’s intent or overt acts that are important; rather, it is the ‘likely . . . result’ of the government’s acts.” Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ). 2015The Sixth Circuit reasoned: As Henry illustrates, a Massiah violation can occur even where the State specifically instructs its informant “not to initiate any conversation with or question [a defendant] regarding the [offense for which he had been indicted].” Henry, 447 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). “[I]t is not the government’s intent or overt acts that are important; rather, it is the ‘likely . . . result’ of the government’s acts.” Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sawyergreen2 sentences2011Interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 2011Interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen2 sentences2011Interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 2011Interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bushgreen2 sentences2007State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 513 (Tenn. 1997). 2007State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 513 (Tenn. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hudson v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). 1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Brown v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). 1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Annicaro v. Florida
green
2 sentences1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). 1997The initiation of adversary proceedings is “marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment.” State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 , 101 S.Ct. 128 , 66 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Miller v. California
green
2 sentences1980The case of Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 , 88 S.Ct. 2258 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1968), was decided per curiam. 1980The case of Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 , 88 S.Ct. 2258 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1968), was decided per curiam. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Parker L. Hancock, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison v. Charles White
green
2 sentences1980The Court applied the Massiah rule, holding that: [T]he Massiah rule is not limited to Massi-ah “circumstances” but applies to exclude post-indictment incriminating statements of an accused to government agents in the absence of counsel even when not deliberately elicited by interrogation or induced by misapprehension engendered by trickery or deception. 378 F.2d at 482 . 1980The Court applied the Massiah rule, holding that: [T]he Massiah rule is not limited to Massi-ah “circumstances” but applies to exclude post-indictment incriminating statements of an accused to government agents in the absence of counsel even when not deliberately elicited by interrogation or induced by misapprehension engendered by trickery or deception. 378 F.2d at 482 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.