low end standard in Washington

2026As our Supreme Court explained in Moretti, “‘age is not a per se mitigating factor automatically entitling every [young adult] to an exceptional sentence.’” 193 Wn.2d at 824 (quoting O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695 ).

2020Madden filed this timely personal restraint petition asserting that the trial court failed to meaningfully consider his youth as a mitigating factor and consequently violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution, and our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

2025In Xaviar, as part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the standard sentencing range. 117 Wn.

2015In State v. Xavier, the prosecutor and the defendant agreed to a recommendation for the low end of the standard range.20 But at sentencing, the prosecutor emphasized the graveness of the crime, reiterated charges that the State did not bring, noted that the State could have sought a 60-year exceptional sentence, and 19 CP at 69-70. 20 117 Wn.

2023The sentencing court found that there were not “substantial and compelling reasons that would justify an exceptional sentence in this particular case” and imposed a sentence of 280 months of total confinement, determining that “the sentence at the high end of the standard range is the appropriate sentence.” Tyson appealed the sentencing court’s ruling to this court and, after his appeal was denied, our mandate issued in October 2008. 2 No. 78007-7-I/3 More than nine years later, in November 2017, Tyson filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment and sentence, relying on the decision in Hou

2020Madden filed this timely personal restraint petition asserting that the trial court failed to meaningfully consider his youth as a mitigating factor and consequently violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution, and our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

2019Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn.

2015As the court explained, because the State agreed to recommend a low end sentence, "there was no need for the State to recite potentially aggravating facts."27 And while the court acknowledged that the State had more leeway on the mid-range recommendation to do 21 ]d, at 198-201 (prosecutor stated that defendant was "one of the most prolific child molesters that this office has ever seen," that he groomed young children "in the worst manner possible," that "molesting children permeated every aspect of [his] life and was his reason for being," and that his conduct was a "monumental violation of

2024App. 2d 238 , 241, 532 P.3d 652 (2023) (acknowledging that Dunbar may seek a sentence at the low end of the standard range based on evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation).

2023Id. at 654-55 .

2024Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 260-62 , 474 P.3d 524 (2020) (same); In re Pers.

2021Certainly, when a court imposes the low end of the standard range after the State recommended the high end, and the court did not comply with Houston- Sconiers, it suggests that more likely than not the defendant “would have received a lesser sentence had the court complied with the dual mandates of Houston-Sconiers.” Id. at 268 .

2020App. 936, 958 , 309 P.3d 776 (2013) (where there is no indication the trial court would have considered or imposed even a low end standard sentence, let alone an exceptional sentence downward, the defendant fails to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to inform the court of the possibility of an exceptional sentence downward); see generally Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 317 (although in a different setting, there was no showing of prejudice for ineffective assistance where court was aware of its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence downward based on youthfulness at sentencing of j

2020App. 936, 958 , 309 P.3d 776 (2013) (where there is no indication the trial court would have considered or imposed even a low end standard sentence, let alone an exceptional sentence downward, the defendant fails to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to inform the court of the possibility of an exceptional sentence downward). 26 RP (Mar. 18, 2015) at 3108. 27 Id. 10 No. 80370-1-I/11 Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Abdi argues that the recent decisions In re Personal Restraint of Domingo- Cornelio,28 and In re Personal Restraint of Ali29 reveal that prejudice for purposes

2018In limited factual situations such as this, a harmless error test will be employed to determine if the error resulted in any prejudice to the defendant."13 Here, the trial court both denied Kim's request for a SSOSA and sentenced him to 90 months on count I, which was "above the very minimum." Kim's case is not factually comparable to Gonzales, so we do not employ a harmless error test here. 10 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11. 11 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11 (citing Crider, 78 Wn.

1998NOTES [1] State v. Aguilar-Rivera, 83 Wash.App. 199, 202 , 920 P.2d 623 (1996); State v. Crider, 78 Wash. App. 849 , 899 P.2d 24 (1995). [2] Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (purpose of the harmless error rule is to prevent setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial). [3] See State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977). [1] State v. Aguilar-Rivera, 83 Wash.App. 199 , 920 P.2d 623 (1996).

2013Id. at 561 .

2009Johnson, 131 Wn.2d at 569 . ¶19 Miscalculating an offender score has obvious significance in the ordinary case where such an error will elevate the standard range within which the term of confinement will be set.

2009Crawford, 159 Wn.2d at 91 .

2009Crawford, 159 Wash.2d at 91 , 147 P.3d 1288 .

2006The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no SRA violation because the trial court considered Osman’s possible deportation only in relation to whether it would “render a SSOSA sentence unworkable.” State v. Osman, 126 Wn.

2006The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no SRA violation because the trial court considered Osman's possible deportation only in relation to whether it would "render a SSOSA sentence unworkable." State v. Osman, 126 Wash.App. 575, 581 , 108 P.3d 1287 (2005).

2002In In re Personal Restraint of Call, 144 Wash.2d 315 , 28 P.3d 709 (2001), the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to first and second degree robbery and first degree theft in exchange for the prosecutor's dismissal of four counts of forgery and a deadly weapon enhancement, and a recommendation that the sentence be imposed at the low end of the standard range for the robbery.

2002In In re Personal Restraint of Call, 144 Wn.2d 315 , 28 P.3d 709 (2001), the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to first and second degree robbery and first degree theft in exchange for the prosecutor’s dismissal of four counts of forgery and a deadly weapon enhancement, and a recommendation that the sentence be imposed at the low end of the standard range for the robbery.

2002In In re Personal Restraint of Call, 144 Wash.2d 315 , 28 P.3d 709 (2001), the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to first and second degree robbery and first degree theft in exchange for the prosecutor's dismissal of four counts of forgery and a deadly weapon enhancement, and a recommendation that the sentence be imposed at the low end of the standard range for the robbery.

2002In In re Personal Restraint of Call, 144 Wn.2d 315 , 28 P.3d 709 (2001), the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to first and second degree robbery and first degree theft in exchange for the prosecutor’s dismissal of four counts of forgery and a deadly weapon enhancement, and a recommendation that the sentence be imposed at the low end of the standard range for the robbery.

2001In fact, Holgren has arguably received specific performance of the plea agreement here, where the State recommended the low end of the standard range. [3] "An additional two years shall be added to the standard sentence range for vehicular homicide committed while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug as defined in RCW 46.61.502 for each prior offense as defined in RCW 46.61.5055." [4] RCW 46.62.5055(1). [5] 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [6] Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 . [7] Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 .

2001In fact, Holgren has arguably received specific performance of the plea agreement here, where the State recommended the low end of the standard range. [3] "An additional two years shall be added to the standard sentence range for vehicular homicide committed while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug as defined in RCW 46.61.502 for each prior offense as defined in RCW 46.61.5055." [4] RCW 46.62.5055(1). [5] 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [6] Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 . [7] Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 .

2025DISCUSSION Whitaker argues that the criminal harassment statute, RCW 9A.46.020, is facially unconstitutional because it employs a negligence standard, rather than the recklessness standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).

2025Berhe, 193 Wn.2d at 663 .

2023State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 41 , 216 P.3d 393 (2009).

2023State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 41 , 216 P.3d 393 (2009).

2022Id. slip op. at 2.

2021Hernandez-Hernandez, 104 Wn.

2020In the plea bargaining context, 2 Notably, Mr. Dalager does not claim the existence of a mitigating factor that counsel failed to raise, but instead claims counsel erred by failing to request an exceptional sentence based on the same mitigating factors used to argue for a low-end standard range sentence. 6 No. 36664-2-III State v. Dalager effective assistance requires that counsel “‘actually and substantially assist his or her client in deciding whether to plead guilty.’” State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wn.

2020App. 229, 232 , 633 P.2d 901 (1981)).

2020App. 263 , 15 P.3d 719 (2001) (defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance for failing to request exceptional sentence where defense counsel argued for a low-end standard range sentence based on mitigating factors and court imposed standard range sentence).

2020In the plea bargaining context, 2 Notably, Mr. Dalager does not claim the existence of a mitigating factor that counsel failed to raise, but instead claims counsel erred by failing to request an exceptional sentence based on the same mitigating factors used to argue for a low-end standard range sentence. 6 No. 36664-2-III State v. Dalager effective assistance requires that counsel “‘actually and substantially assist his or her client in deciding whether to plead guilty.’” State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wn.

2020In the plea bargaining context, 2 Notably, Mr. Dalager does not claim the existence of a mitigating factor that counsel failed to raise, but instead claims counsel erred by failing to request an exceptional sentence based on the same mitigating factors used to argue for a low-end standard range sentence. 6 No. 36664-2-III State v. Dalager effective assistance requires that counsel “‘actually and substantially assist his or her client in deciding whether to plead guilty.’” State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wn.

2018In limited factual situations such as this, a harmless error test will be employed to determine if the error resulted in any prejudice to the defendant."13 Here, the trial court both denied Kim's request for a SSOSA and sentenced him to 90 months on count I, which was "above the very minimum." Kim's case is not factually comparable to Gonzales, so we do not employ a harmless error test here. 10 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11. 11 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11 (citing Crider, 78 Wn.

2018In limited factual situations such as this, a harmless error test will be employed to determine if the error resulted in any prejudice to the defendant."13 Here, the trial court both denied Kim's request for a SSOSA and sentenced him to 90 months on count I, which was "above the very minimum." Kim's case is not factually comparable to Gonzales, so we do not employ a harmless error test here. 10 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11. 11 Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 406 n.11 (citing Crider, 78 Wn.