low end standard in Pennsylvania

2020See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (declining to find waiver of sentencing claim due to lack of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement where Commonwealth did not object). -7- J-S33034-20 invalidated mandatory minimum sentencing statute, the terms of the original sentence fell within the low-end of the standard guideline range.

2020See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (declining to find waiver of sentencing claim due to lack of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement where Commonwealth did not object). -7- J-S33035-20 invalidated mandatory minimum sentencing statute, the terms of the original sentence fell within the low-end of the standard guideline range.

2024See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that the appellant’s claim of failure to consider aggravated mitigating circumstance did not present substantial question because, in part, the sentence fell within the low end of the standard range).

2022Additionally, the court imposed sentences at the low end of the standard guideline range; consequently, “Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. (citation omitted). -5- J-S35006-22 Moreover, our review of the sentencing hearing reveals that the court did not premise its imposition of consecutive sentences solely on the basis that Appellant was not entitled to a “volume discount” for his offenses.

2024Therefore, because Appellant has failed raise a substantial - 10 - J-A27028-23 question for review, we conclude that his sentencing claim is frivolous.8 See id.; see also Kalichak, 943 A.2d at 291 .

2024However, Appellant did not specify why his sentence was inconsistent with the sentencing guidelines or what underlying circumstances rendered the sentence “excessive.” See Commonwealth v. Hornaman, 920 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2007) (general assertions that a sentence is “manifestly excessive” or “clearly unreasonable” do not establish a substantial question, especially where the sentence in question is at the low end of the standard range).

2023Second, it is well-settled that “[w]here[, as here,] the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation (‘PSI’), we can assume the sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s ____________________________________________ 4 “[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 5 When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s discretion, our standard of review is as follows:

2023See id.

2022See id. at 10-11 .

2022See Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 743 (Pa.Super. 2008) (explaining that protection from cruel and unusual punishment “prohibits sentences which are wholly and irrationally disproportionate to the crime”).

2021See id.

2021See Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419-20 (Pa. Super. 2015)[.]” Order, 11/25/20, at 1. -3- J-S15008-21 our review: “Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced [Johnson] to a low end of the standard range sentence with a fully executed notice of [his] duty of lifetime registration or sexual offenders?” Anders brief, 3/9/21, at 7.

2019Moreover, to the extent that Carrillo challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, “[o]ne who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.” Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2018See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 828 A.2d 1126, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating that “[i]n setting sentence, a court has discretion … to run the sentence concurrently with or consecutively to other sentences being imposed.”).

2015Cf. Caldwell, 2015 WL 3444594 at *2-*3 (holding challenge to imposition of consecutive sentences, together with claim that court failed to consider rehabilitative needs, presented substantial question where aggregate sentence for aggravated assault, robbery, and related offenses was thirty-one to sixty-two years); Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1273 (holding defendant set forth substantial question with respect to consecutive nature of his sentence, which aggregated forty years and seven months to eighty- one years and two months, but upholding sentence on merits).

2010See Sierra, supra, ¶ 23 Finally, as presented, the court’s alleged failure to consider mitigating factors in its decision to impose consecutive sentences does not raise a substantial question.