49 California opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fellner v. Steinbaumgreen2 sentences2023Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397 , 402 ; Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511 .) “The discretion granted to the court must necessarily be broad and will not be interfered with on appeal, except for an abuse thereof.” (National Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. 1982Whether separate actions shall be consolidated for trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. ( Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal. App.2d 509, 511 [ 282 P.2d 584 ].) That consolidation in the present case was not an abuse of discretion is shown by Estate of Bliss (1962) 199 Cal. App.2d 630 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 821 ], wherein it was held that a will contest and an action to set aside an inter vivos gift made by the testator to the proponent of the will were properly consolidated for purp | 2 | 3 |
Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'ngreen2 sentences2016Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 562 .) Unity of Interest API contends the three defendants had a "unity of interest" in a joint defense and they "filed joint answers, motions and responses." It suggests the trial court erred by not denying their defense costs and litigation expenses for counsels' joint representation of the prevailing and losing defendants under the unity of interest doctrine. 2015Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 695 ] [“Respondents supported their fee requests with declarations describing the joint defense and the division of labor, with billing records to establish the hours of work. | 2 | 3 |
Board of Trustees of California State University v. Superior Court of San Diego Countygreen2 sentences2021This suggestion is reinforced by Moebius’s statement that the County and Hefner maintained a joint defense and common interest while “working toward a resolution” of the petition, indicating the suit was resolved without extensive litigation. 19 Further, Moebius carefully referred to “any correspondence” (italics added) shared by the Hefner firm and the County as covered by 19 This circumstance may explain why the County did not assert the exemption under section 6254, subdivision (b), for “[r]ecords pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party . . . until the pending 2021This suggestion is reinforced by Moebius’s statement that the County and Hefner maintained a joint defense and common interest while “working toward a resolution” of the petition, indicating the suit was resolved without extensive litigation. 19 Further, Moebius carefully referred to “any correspondence” (italics added) shared by the Hefner firm and the County as covered by 19 This circumstance may explain why the County did not assert the exemption under section 6254, subdivision (b), for “[r]ecords pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party . . . until the pending | 2 | 2 |
Akins v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CO.green2 sentences2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees 2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees | 2 | 2 |
Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd.green2 sentences2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c 2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c | 1 | 4 |
Oxy Resources California LLC v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Id. at p. 914.) This common-interest doctrine "does not mean there is 'an expanded attorney-client relationship encompassing all parties and counsel who share a common interest.'" (Ibid.) In the trial court, Overland's attorney cited United States v. Henke (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 633 , 637 for the proposition that "entering into a joint defense agreement establishes an implied in fact attorney-client relationship between all defendants and attorneys who are parties to the agreement . . . ." However, in Oxy Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874 , the appellate 2010Thus, all . . . communications among the joint defense group members and/or their clients in connection with the joint defense group members’ representation of their respective clients are conducted and protected pursuant to California Evidence Code section 912(d) . . . .” “Typically, a joint defense agreement protects information shared by defendants after a lawsuit has been filed, and it serves the purpose of protecting from disclosure the joint defendants’ trial strategies and preparation.” (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 893 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 ] | 1 | 4 |
Sanchez v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c 2000Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), authorizes the trial court, when appropriate, to "order a joint hearing or trial" or to "order all the actions consolidated." Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. ( Sanchez, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at | 1 | 2 |
cluster 769903green2 sentences2015(Id. at p. 914.) This common-interest doctrine "does not mean there is 'an expanded attorney-client relationship encompassing all parties and counsel who share a common interest.'" (Ibid.) In the trial court, Overland's attorney cited United States v. Henke (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 633 , 637 for the proposition that "entering into a joint defense agreement establishes an implied in fact attorney-client relationship between all defendants and attorneys who are parties to the agreement . . . ." However, in Oxy Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874 , the appellate 2003An attorney represents a client for purposes of a conflict of interest analysiswhen the attorney knowingly obtains material confidential information from the client and renders legal advice" ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1148 , 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 816 , 980 P.2d 371 ; see also U.S. v. Henke (9th Cir.2000) 222 F.3d 633 , 637 [a joint defense agreement establishes an implied attorney client relationship with the co-defendant, and the extension of the attorney-client privilege therein may create a conflict where information obtained in confidence is related to subsequent litigation].) Unde | 1 | 2 |
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.green2 sentences2007(See MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 755 , 115 P.3d 41 ] [discussing judicial estoppel].) However, plaintiff’s argument did not alter the foundation of the case as framed by plaintiff, namely, that the illegal conspiracy and acts denied it the ability to sell mobilehomes. 2007(See MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 755 , 115 P.3d 41 ] [discussing judicial estoppel].) However, plaintiff’s argument did not alter the foundation of the case as framed by plaintiff, namely, that the illegal conspiracy and acts denied it the ability to sell mobilehomes. | 1 | 2 |
MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santeegreen2 sentences2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees 2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees | 1 | 2 |
Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp.green2 sentences2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees 2006Joint defendants and Parklane do not contend they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the three stated causes of action, unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.), [6] interference with prospective economic advantage, [7] and unfair competition in violation of the UCL. [8] Rather, they argue *358 that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85 (hereinafter, Section 798.85), the attorney fees and costs provision of the MRL. "`An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees | 1 | 2 |
McClure v. Donovangreen1 sentence2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c | 1 | 1 |
Day v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c | 1 | 1 |
Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence2024(See Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1200 (Villano) [in appeal of stipulated judgment, “the appellant has ‘“the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” [Citation.] One aspect of that burden requires that the appellant develop the fullest possible evidentiary record before seeking review’”].) 21 To the extent the Trustee contends the trial court erred by finding it would “bear the burden to demonstrate that it has paid indemnification for the relevant Directors, including demonstrating it complied with all statutory requirements or | 1 | 1 |
State v. Altus Finance, S.A.green1 sentence2023The statute provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See, e.g., State of California v. Altus Finance (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1284, 1293 [cases consolidated for discovery and pretrial matters]; Austin B. v. Escondido Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 870 [cases Plaintiff’s detriment or otherw | 1 | 1 |
Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Districtgreen1 sentence2023The statute provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See, e.g., State of California v. Altus Finance (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1284, 1293 [cases consolidated for discovery and pretrial matters]; Austin B. v. Escondido Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 870 [cases Plaintiff’s detriment or otherw | 1 | 1 |
Habash v. L.A Pacific Center, Inc.green1 sentence2023(See In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613 , 622 [“Under well- established rules of appellate procedure, . . . the appellant . . . has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal and to affirmatively show error”]; see also Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. 13 Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the] appellant”].) We do not know, for example, that Moi’s counsel made only a special as opposed to general appearance at the June 2, 2022 hearing to contest the Firm’s petitio | 1 | 1 |
| Ri-Joyce, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Shriergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Laws v. County of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Fabiangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of McNeillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maine v. Moultongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Insurance Co. of North America v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama Ex Rel. Flowersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| General Motors Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wheelergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Comunale v. Traders & General Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanguinetti v. City Councilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama
green
2 sentences2021(California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1222-1223 ; OXY Resources, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 890 .) 20 attorney-client documents were shared, we intended they would remain privileged and confidential.” Thus, the County asserts a basis for the common interest doctrine limited to e- mails (1) with the Hefner law firm, which owns one of the four domains defining the scope of Getz’s request, (2) regarding the suit involving Friends of El Dorado County and the Serrano Village J Lot H Project. 2021(California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1222-1223 ; OXY Resources, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 890 .) 20 attorney-client documents were shared, we intended they would remain privileged and confidential.” Thus, the County asserts a basis for the common interest doctrine limited to e- mails (1) with the Hefner law firm, which owns one of the four domains defining the scope of Getz’s request, (2) regarding the suit involving Friends of El Dorado County and the Serrano Village J Lot H Project. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gionis
green
2 sentences2020Code, § 952; Los Angeles County, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 294-295; Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) Federal opinions that rely on the joint defense privilege or common interest privilege, whether expressly or impliedly, are therefore unpersuasive. 4 Other federal opinions cited by Wood and DFEH recognize that no genuine attorney-client relationship exists between the EEOC and individual complainants, but 4 California recognizes a common interest doctrine, but it is not at issue here. 2020Code, § 952; Los Angeles County, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 294-295; Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) Federal opinions that rely on the joint defense privilege or common interest privilege, whether expressly or impliedly, are therefore unpersuasive. 4 Other federal opinions cited by Wood and DFEH recognize that no genuine attorney-client relationship exists between the EEOC and individual complainants, but 4 California recognizes a common interest doctrine, but it is not at issue here. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
cluster 768122
green
2 sentences2014The liability of public entities is entirely statutory. (§ 815, subd. (a).) Although public entities are statutorily obligated to defend their employees (§ 995), even if a potential conflict of interest exists (§ 995.2), no statute specifies that a public entity is liable for the cost of providing an entirely separate defense for an employee instead of a joint defense of the public entity and the employee (see DeGrassi v. City of Glendora (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 636 , 643). 2002The liability of public entities is entirely statutory. (§ 815, *568 subd. (a).) Although public entities are statutorily obligated to defend their employees (§ 995), even if a potential conflict of interest exists (§ 995.2), no statute specifies that a public entity is liable for the cost of providing an entirely separate defense for an employee instead of a joint defense of the public entity and the employee (see DeGrassi v. City of Glendora (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 636, 643 ). 2 Nor does decisional law support liability to provide a separate defense. | 2 | 2002–2014 |
People v. Mel MacK Co.
green
2 sentences2007(Cf. People v. Mel Mack Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 621 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 505 ] [park management charged mobilehome brokers a fee before permitting buyers to move into the mobilehome parks; such fees constitute illegal entry fees under MRL as they increased price paid by prospective tenants].) Joint defendants and Parklane assert that plaintiff is estopped to argue otherwise as plaintiff argued in the trial court that the case was about illegal fees imposed upon park tenants as a result of the kickbacks and illegal evictions. 2007(Cf. People v. Mel Mack Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 621 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 505 ] [park management charged mobilehome brokers a fee before permitting buyers to move into the mobilehome parks; such fees constitute illegal entry fees under MRL as they increased price paid by prospective tenants].) Joint defendants and Parklane assert that plaintiff is estopped to argue otherwise as plaintiff argued in the trial court that the case was about illegal fees imposed upon park tenants as a result of the kickbacks and illegal evictions. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer
green
2 sentences2007Joint defendants and Parklane point to Palmer v. Agee, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 377 and Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 943 , to argue that they were entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 798.85 because they raised the MRL in defense. 2006Joint defendants and Parklane point to Palmer v. Agee, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 377 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 841 and Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 943 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 , to argue that they were entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 798.85 because they raised the MRL in defense. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Palmer v. Agee
green
2 sentences2007Joint defendants and Parklane point to Palmer v. Agee, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 377 and Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 943 , to argue that they were entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 798.85 because they raised the MRL in defense. 2006Joint defendants and Parklane point to Palmer v. Agee, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 377 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 841 and Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 943 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 , to argue that they were entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 798.85 because they raised the MRL in defense. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
City of Oxnord v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2000Unlike City of Oxnard, supra, 37 Cal. App.4th at page 1078 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , where the city's joint defense agreement provided clear and uncontradicted evidence that the city was legally obligated to pay less than its full SIR in settling, the *606 McKernan settlement called for payment of the settlement proceeds by the defendants as a group, without allocation or severance of their liabilities. 2000Unlike City of Oxnard, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at page 1078 , where the city’s joint defense agreement provided clear and uncontradicted evidence that the city was legally obligated to pay less than its full SIR in settling, the McKernan settlement called for payment of the settlement proceeds by the defendants as a group, without allocation or severance of their liabilities. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
RICKLEY v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2025(See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412 ; Rickley v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 950 .) 10 contract that has a fee-shifting provision. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Committee for Responsible Planning v. City of Indian Wells
green
1 sentence2025The Effect of Consolidation on an Action If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 .) When two actions are c | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Carlton v. Quint
green
1 sentence2023(Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697-698 .) Here, because the joint hearing on the Firm’s petition to confirm the award and Moi’s motion to quash was not transcribed, and no settled statement was requested, Moi provides no adequate record to affirmatively show error. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Fisher v. Nash Building Co.
green
1 sentence2023Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397 , 402 ; Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511 .) “The discretion granted to the court must necessarily be broad and will not be interfered with on appeal, except for an abuse thereof.” (National Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Walker v. Walker
green
1 sentence2023Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a) provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” “Consolidation of cases under Code of Civil 18 Procedure, section 1048, rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Walker v. Walker (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 89, 91-92 , citing Fisher v. Nash Bldg. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Prouty v. Gores Technology Group
green
2 sentences2022LaBarbera relies on Prouty, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1225 , in which the appellate court concluded the plaintiffs were intended third party beneficiaries rather than merely incidental beneficiaries, but that case is distinguishable. 2022LaBarbera relies on Prouty, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1225 , in which the appellate court concluded the plaintiffs were intended third party beneficiaries rather than merely incidental beneficiaries, but that case is distinguishable. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Dhillon v. John Muir Health green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Anderson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Mazda Motor of America, Inc. v. California New Motor Vehicle Board green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hardin Oldsmobile v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Tovas v. American Honda Motor Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Buss v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Estate of Baker green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Trust green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Misik v. D'Arco green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corporation v. Armco Steel Corporation, the Ceco Corporation, and Laclede Steel Company green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 16, 1974 green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| First Pacific Networks, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People Ex Rel. Deparment of Corporations. v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Flatt v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Taylor v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Estate of Bliss green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Chetwood v. California National Bank green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.