Mapp hearing in New York

2024In the absence of a showing by the district attorney that the Mapp motion is not grounded in the same facts and witnesses as the Dunaway motion, judicial economy favors granting the Mapp hearing ( see id. at 429—430).

2024This Mapp motion appears to be "grounded in the same facts involving the same police witnesses" as the Dunaway hearing previously consented to by the district attorney ( People v Mendoza , 82 NY2d 415, 429 [1993]).

2024Turning to the issue of suppression, the Presentment Agency has the initial burden at a Mapp hearing of showing, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct ( People v Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d 99 [1996]; People v Berrios , 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Hernandez , 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept. 2007]).

2024Turning to the issue of suppression, the Presentment Agency has the initial burden at a Mapp hearing of showing, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct ( People v Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d 99 [1996]; People v Berrios , 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Hernandez , 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept. 2007]).

2024Turning to the issue of suppression, the Presentment Agency has the initial burden at a Mapp hearing of showing, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct ( People v Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d 99 [1996]; People v Berrios , 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Hernandez , 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept. 2007]).

2024Turning to the issue of suppression, the Presentment Agency has the initial burden at a Mapp hearing of showing, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct ( People v Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d 99 [1996]; People v Berrios , 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Hernandez , 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept. 2007]).

2024See Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643 (1961); Huntley , 259 AD2d at 845 (defining a Mapp hearing as a hearing on "a motion to suppress tangible evidence").

2024See Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643 (1961); Huntley , 259 AD2d at 845 (defining a Mapp hearing as a hearing on "a motion to suppress tangible evidence").

2006As there were no colorable grounds to challenge the propriety of the defendant’s arrest or seizure of tangible evidence, the defendant failed to establish that defense counsel’s initial failure to obtain a pretrial Mapp hearing (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]) demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Montana, 71 NY2d 705, 708-709 [1988]; People v Wells, 187 AD2d 745 [1992]).

1991The failure to request a Mapp hearing in itself, does not constitute ineffectiveness (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 ), and given defendant’s trial testimony that he had not been in the premises from which the weapons were recovered, we can only conclude that defendant lacked the requisite standing to move for suppression.

2024See Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643 (1961); Huntley , 259 AD2d at 845 (defining a Mapp hearing as a hearing on "a motion to suppress tangible evidence").

2024See Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643 (1961); Huntley , 259 AD2d at 845 (defining a Mapp hearing as a hearing on "a motion to suppress tangible evidence").

2008Suppression of Tangible Property A Dunaway/Mapp hearing will be held at a time appointed by the court (see People v Bryant, 8 NY3d 530 [2007]).

2007The denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the prerecorded $20 found on defendant without conducting a Mapp hearing was not, under the facts of this case, error since the application did not set forth sufficient sworn factual allegations to mandate a hearing (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 430 [1993]; People v Richardson, 28 AD3d 1002, 1005 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 817 [2006]; cf. People v Bryant, 8 NY3d 530, 533-534 [2007]).

2017Insofar as the claim of ineffective assistance is based on the failure to request a Mapp hearing, we note that, in light of the facts and legal conclusions stated by Judge Horowitz with respect to the probable cause dimension of the Dunaway hearing (from which defendant raises no issue on appeal), a proceeding formally denominated a Mapp hearing would have had little or no chance of success ( see People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143 , 152 [2005]; People v Gerald , 153 AD3d 1029 , 1031 [2017]).

2017Insofar as the claim of ineffective assistance is based on the failure to request a Mapp hearing, we note that, in light of the facts and legal conclusions stated by Judge Horowitz with respect to the probable cause dimension of the Dunaway hearing (from which defendant raises no issue on appeal), a proceeding formally denominated a Mapp hearing would have had little or no chance of success ( see People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143 , 152 [2005]; People v Gerald , 153 AD3d 1029 , 1031 [2017]).

2025Similarly, to the extent that defendant challenges the sentence imposed as unduly harsh and severe, such claim is also foreclosed by his unchallenged appeal waiver ( see People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Brabant , 229 AD3d 892 , 897 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Cochrane , 228 AD3d 1082 , 1082 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1019 [2024]).

2008Accordingly, defendant’s challenges to County Court’s suppression rulings are precluded (see People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]; People v Hunt, 29 AD3d 1081, 1083 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 813 [2006]), and his challenge to the admission of evidence at the Huntley/Mapp hearing and to the severity of the sentence imposed are foreclosed (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255 [2006]; People v Romano, 45 AD3d 910, 912 [2007]).

2019Moreover, defendant's contention that counsel failed to obtain a Mapp hearing is unpersuasive given that defendant invited Krawczyk into the barn and defendant's father signed a consent to search, rendering a Mapp hearing unnecessary ( see People v Hogan , 26 NY3d 779, 787 [2016]; see generally People v Worthington , 150 AD3d 1399, 1403 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1095 [*5][2017]).

2019Moreover, defendant's contention that counsel failed to obtain a Mapp hearing is unpersuasive given that defendant invited Krawczyk into the barn and defendant's father signed a consent to search, rendering a Mapp hearing unnecessary ( see People v Hogan , 26 NY3d 779, 787 [2016]; see generally People v Worthington , 150 AD3d 1399, 1403 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1095 [*5][2017]).

2008(People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979].) A Dunaway/Mapp hearing was held on April 2, 2008.

1999The evidence presented at the Mapp hearing demonstrated that the police officers’ request for information from the defendant was supported by an objective, credible reason (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 ; People v Harris, 151 AD2d 777 ).

1994ROSARIO AND PRETRIAL HEARINGS Soon after the Rosario decision (supra), People v Malinsky ( 15 NY2d 86 ) extended the cross-examination doctrine to pretrial hearings by pointing out (at 90) that "a right sense of justice” allows the defense to ascertain what a witness previously said and "it matters not whether the witness is testifying upon a trial or at a hearing.” The hearing in Malinsky concerned probable cause at a Mapp hearing.

1994ROSARIO AND PRETRIAL HEARINGS Soon after the Rosario decision (supra), People v Malinsky ( 15 NY2d 86 ) extended the cross-examination doctrine to pretrial hearings by pointing out (at 90) that "a right sense of justice” allows the defense to ascertain what a witness previously said and "it matters not whether the witness is testifying upon a trial or at a hearing.” The hearing in Malinsky concerned probable cause at a Mapp hearing.

1992(People v Chandler, 121 AD2d 644 [2d Dept], lv denied 68 NY2d 913 [1986]; compare, CPL 265.15 [1] [presuming persons occupying room or dwelling possess machine gun present therein]; 265.15 [2] [presuming persons occupying stolen vehicle possess weapon present therein]; 265.15 [3] [presuming persons occupying vehicle possess firearm present therein].) Since standing no longer arises automatically from a charge of possession (see, People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160 [1981]), and since the defendant has not alleged facts in support of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, a Mapp hearing

1992(People v Chandler, 121 AD2d 644 [2d Dept], lv denied 68 NY2d 913 [1986]; compare, CPL 265.15 [1] [presuming persons occupying room or dwelling possess machine gun present therein]; 265.15 [2] [presuming persons occupying stolen vehicle possess weapon present therein]; 265.15 [3] [presuming persons occupying vehicle possess firearm present therein].) Since standing no longer arises automatically from a charge of possession (see, People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160 [1981]), and since the defendant has not alleged facts in support of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, a Mapp hearing

1991In such instances, the arrest will be upheld if it is shown at a subsequent Mapp hearing that the information underlying the report was sufficient to constitute probable cause (Whiteley v Warden, supra; People v Havelka, 45 NY2d 636 ; People v Lypka, supra).

1991In such instances, the arrest will be upheld if it is shown at a subsequent Mapp hearing that the information underlying the report was sufficient to constitute probable cause (Whiteley v Warden, supra; People v Havelka, 45 NY2d 636 ; People v Lypka, supra).

1990Appeal from a judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Sklar, J.), rendered January 10, 1986, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and sentencing him, as a predicate violent felon, to concurrent terms of from ZVi to 7 years’ imprisonment and one year, respectively, which was held in abeyance and remanded for a Mapp hearing upon remittitur ( 73 NY2d 666 frevg 137 AD2d 1 ]), is unanimously dismissed on the ground that defendant has absconded an

1990Appeal from a judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Sklar, J.), rendered January 10, 1986, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and sentencing him, as a predicate violent felon, to concurrent terms of from ZVi to 7 years’ imprisonment and one year, respectively, which was held in abeyance and remanded for a Mapp hearing upon remittitur ( 73 NY2d 666 frevg 137 AD2d 1 ]), is unanimously dismissed on the ground that defendant has absconded an