6 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2024See Jefferson, 2019 IL App (5th) 170221-U , ¶¶ 15-17 (noting the State’s identical concession in that appeal). -6- consistently refused “ ‘to consider the answer to the “special interrogatory” beyond the purpose for which it was asked—whether there could be a sentence enhancement.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Jackson, 372 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of polygraph evidence of a State witness); People v. Binion, 358 Ill. 2012See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of polygraph evidence of a State witness); People v. Binion, 358 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rosemond
green
2 sentences2011If the actions attributed to Detective Bernatek were the worst-case scenario experienced by [the] defendant during the interrogation, we do not believe that these actions amounted to coercion that could be characterized as sufficient to open the door to admission of the polygraph evidence under the narrow Jefferson exception." Rosemond, 339 Ill. 2011If the actions attributed to Detective Bernatek were the worst-case scenario experienced by [the] defendant during the interrogation, we do not believe that these actions amounted to coercion that could be characterized as sufficient to open the door to admission of the polygraph evidence under the narrow Jefferson exception." Rosemond, 339 Ill. | 4 | 2005–2011 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2005App. 3d 51, 61 , 790 N.E.2d 416 (2003) (the " Jefferson exception" allows the limited admission of polygraph evidence but requires the trial court to exercise "enhanced scrutiny" when the State introduces it); People v. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d 53, 105 , 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003) (polygraph evidence becomes proper where questions have been raised as to the reliability and timing of a statement). 2005App. 3d 51, 61 , 790 N.E.2d 416 (2003) (the " Jefferson exception" allows the limited admission of polygraph evidence but requires the trial court to exercise "enhanced scrutiny" when the State introduces it); People v. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d 53, 105 , 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003) (polygraph evidence becomes proper where questions have been raised as to the reliability and timing of a statement). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Binion
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of polygraph evidence of a State witness); People v. Binion, 358 Ill. 2012See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of polygraph evidence of a State witness); People v. Binion, 358 Ill. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.