6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valinet v. Eskewgreen2 sentences2009Both parties analyze the question under subsection 363(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), [2] adopted in Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind.1991). 2009Both parties analyze the question under subsection 363(2) of the Restatement (See-ond) of Torts (1965), 2 adopted in Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Cary
green
2 sentences1968The court in the Rentschler case stated as follows: “ (2) The courts of many states have said that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ . . . and our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Cary, supra. [Jones v. Cary (1941), 219 Ind. 268 , 37 N. E. 2d 944 ] said that for a driver to drive to the left of the center of the highway in violation of a statute, without any excuse or reason, constituted negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ Thus, the expressions ‘per se’ and ‘as a matter of law’ have been regarded as substantially interchangeable. 1968The court in the Rentschler case stated as follows: “ (2) The courts of many states have said that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ . . . and our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Cary, supra. [Jones v. Cary (1941), 219 Ind. 268 , 37 N. E. 2d 944 ] said that for a driver to drive to the left of the center of the highway in violation of a statute, without any excuse or reason, constituted negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ Thus, the expressions ‘per se’ and ‘as a matter of law’ have been regarded as substantially interchangeable. | 2 | 1946–1968 |
Repczynski v. Mikulak
neutral
2 sentences1967In Repczynski v. Mikulak (1927), (Transfer Den. 1931), 93 Ind. App. 491 , 157 N. E. 464 , our Appellate Court stated in the case where a parent knowingly permitted his under-aged son to drive an automobile on the highway in violation of the statute: “ . 1967In Repczynski v. Mikulak (1927), (Transfer Den. 1931), 93 Ind. App. 491 , 157 N. E. 464 , our Appellate Court stated in the case where a parent knowingly permitted his under-aged son to drive an automobile on the highway in violation of the statute: “ . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Evansville & Ohio Valley Railway Co. v. Woosley
neutral
2 sentences1961D.) 120 Ind. App. 570 , 93 N. E. 2d 355 . *532 By reason of the fact there is evidence in the record, although conflicting, as to whether or not the view of the highway was obstructed by the dust raised by the appellant’s car, it was a fact question for the court; therefore, the court was justified in concluding the proximate cause of the accident was the fact that the appellant had stopped his car on a highway in violation of the statute, §47-2120, supra. Evansville, etc. Ry. 1961D.) 120 Ind. App. 570 , 93 N. E. 2d 355 . *532 By reason of the fact there is evidence in the record, although conflicting, as to whether or not the view of the highway was obstructed by the dust raised by the appellant’s car, it was a fact question for the court; therefore, the court was justified in concluding the proximate cause of the accident was the fact that the appellant had stopped his car on a highway in violation of the statute, §47-2120, supra. Evansville, etc. Ry. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Huss
green
2 sentences1946The' courts of many states have said that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence “as a matter of law.” This court, in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Huss (1933), 96 Ind. App. 71 , 180 N. E. 919 , said the violation of a statute governing the operation of motor vehicles was negligence “as a matter of law,” and our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Cary, supra, said that for a driver to drive to the left of the center of the highway in violation of a statute without any excuse or reason, constituted negligence “as a matter of law.” Thus, the expressions “per se” and “as a matter of law” 1946The' courts of many states have said that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence “as a matter of law.” This court, in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Huss (1933), 96 Ind. App. 71 , 180 N. E. 919 , said the violation of a statute governing the operation of motor vehicles was negligence “as a matter of law,” and our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Cary, supra, said that for a driver to drive to the left of the center of the highway in violation of a statute without any excuse or reason, constituted negligence “as a matter of law.” Thus, the expressions “per se” and “as a matter of law” | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Town of Crown Point
neutral
1 sentence1902Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 150 Ind. 536 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.