49 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1983–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Luperongreen2 sentences2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d&mdash, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954, *2 [2d Dept 2025]). 2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954 , *2 [2d Dept 2025]). | 6 | 6 |
People v. Goodegreen2 sentences2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d&mdash, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954, *2 [2d Dept 2025]). 2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954 , *2 [2d Dept 2025]). | 6 | 6 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2025The burden then shifts to the district attorney to prove "that certain periods within that time should be excluded" ( People v Berkowitz , 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]; see People v Brown , 28 NY3d 392, 403 [2016]). 2025The burden then shifts to the district attorney to prove "that certain periods within that time should be excluded" ( People v Berkowitz , 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]; see People v Brown , 28 NY3d 392, 403 [2016]). | 6 | 6 |
People v. Berkowitzgreen2 sentences2025The burden then shifts to the district attorney to prove "that certain periods within that time should be excluded" ( People v Berkowitz , 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]; see People v Brown , 28 NY3d 392, 403 [2016]). 2025The burden then shifts to the district attorney to prove "that certain periods within that time should be excluded" ( People v Berkowitz , 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]; see People v Brown , 28 NY3d 392, 403 [2016]). | 6 | 6 |
People v. Devinogreen2 sentences2021As the People exceeded the 90-day statutory limit, defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss the information based upon the People's noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement was sufficiently egregious to constitute the denial of meaningful representation ( see People v Devino , 110 AD3d 1146 , 1149 [2013]; People v Jackson , 172 AD2d 874 , 875 [1991]; People v Jenkins , 58 Misc 3d 150[A] , 2018 NY Slip Op 50088[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). 2021As such, defendant's appeal waiver was valid ( see People v Burnett , 186 AD3d 1837, 1837-1838 [2020]). "[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to the very heart of the process" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d at 255 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) and, consequently, we have held that a statutory speedy trial claim is precluded by a valid appeal waiver ( see People v Harrison , 176 AD3d 1262 , 1264 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1016 [2019]; People v Gardiner , 159 AD3d 1233 , 1234 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1 | 4 | 4 |
People v. Persongreen2 sentences2026Defendant's appeal waiver included a valid waiver of his right to raise a claim for a statutory speedy trial violation, which forecloses review of defendant's claim under CPL 30.30 ( see People v Person , 184 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1069 [2020]; People v Merchant , 209 AD3d 453 , 453 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 987 [2022]). 2024Contrary to the defendant's contention, "the enactment of CPL 30.30(6) does not alter that analysis" ( People v Votaw , 190 AD3d at 1164 ; see People v Person , 184 AD3d at 448). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2025Generally, "an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to the very heart of the process, including a defendant's statutory speedy trial claim" ( People v Gore , 224 AD3d 848 , 848 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 255 ). 2025Generally, "an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to the very heart of the process, including a defendant's statutory speedy trial claim" ( People v Gore , 224 AD3d 848, 848 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 255). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Votawgreen2 sentences2025Footnotes Footnote 1: To the extent defendant asserts a statutory speedy trial violation, such a claim is precluded by his valid appeal waiver ( see People v Wint , 222 AD3d 1050 , 1051 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 945 [2024]; People v Votaw , 190 AD3d 1162, 1164 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1101 [2021]). 2024Although the written waiver of the right to appeal included incorrect statements of the applicable law, the record demonstrates that, under the totality of the circumstances, including the Supreme Court's oral colloquy, the defendant's consultation with counsel, and the defendant's age and experience, the defendant had a full appreciation of the terms and consequences of the appeal waiver ( see People v Reyes-Guzman , 222 AD3d 887 , 887; People v Stacker , 206 AD3d 766 , 766; People v Yakubov , 204 AD3d 1043, 1044 ; People v Lawrence , 184 AD3d 587, 587 ). "'[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will | 2 | 3 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2023The recent amendments to CPL 30.30, which, inter alia, permit a defendant who pleaded guilty to raise a statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see CPL 30.30[6]), and extended statutory speedy trial limitations to traffic infractions charged in the same accusatory instrument with certain other offenses ( see CPL 30.30[1][e]), are not retroactive, and do not apply to criminal actions commenced prior to the January 1, 2020 effective date of the legislation ( see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK, § 1), such as this 2016 action ( see People v Galindo , 38 NY3d 199 [2022]; People v Hall , 210 AD3d 482, 483 2023The recent amendments to CPL 30.30, which, inter alia, permit a defendant who pleaded guilty to raise a statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see CPL 30.30[6]), and extended statutory speedy trial limitations to traffic infractions charged in the same accusatory instrument with certain other offenses ( see CPL 30.30[1][e]), are not retroactive, and do not apply to criminal actions commenced prior to the January 1, 2020 effective date of the legislation ( see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK, § 1), such as this 2016 action ( see People v Galindo , 38 NY3d 199 [2022]; People v Hall , 210 AD3d 482, 483 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2013While the record contains a “Demand” document from the People dated October 20, 2011 (the date the indictment was filed) stating their readiness for trial, and under certain circumstances “a prearraignment statement of readiness can be valid” (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 798 [1998]), the People do not argue that this constituted a valid statement of readiness. 2013While the record contains a “Demand” document from the People dated October 20, 2011 (the date the indictment was filed) stating their readiness for trial, and under certain circumstances “a prearraignment statement of readiness can be valid” (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 798 [1998]), the People do not argue that this constituted a valid statement of readiness. | 2 | 2 |
People v. O'Briengreen2 sentences2015Moreover, while any present challenge to the court's determination of the statutory speedy trial issue in the amended decision and order was forfeited by the defendant's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty ( see People v O'Brien, 56 NY2d 1009 ; People v Briggs, 123 AD3d 1051 ; People v Bediako, 119 AD3d 598 ; People v Sze, 113 AD3d 795 ), we note, in any event, that the error in initially dismissing counts seven, eight, and nine based on an alleged statutory speedy trial violation was clearly apparent from the documents in the court file. 2015Moreover, while any present challenge to the court’s determination of the statutory speedy trial issue in the amended decision and order was forfeited by the defendant’s knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty (see People v O’Brien, 56 NY2d 1009 [1982]; People v Briggs, 123 AD3d 1051 [2014]; People v Bediako, 119 AD3d 598 [2014]; People v Sze, 113 AD3d 795 [2014]), we note, in any event, that the error in initially dismissing counts seven, eight, and nine based on an alleged statutory speedy trial violation was clearly apparent from the documents in the court file. | 1 | 7 |
People v. Lara-Medinagreen2 sentences2023The recent amendments to CPL 30.30, which, inter alia, permit a defendant who pleaded guilty to raise a statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see CPL 30.30[6]), and extended statutory speedy trial limitations to traffic infractions charged in the same accusatory instrument with certain other offenses ( see CPL 30.30[1][e]), are not retroactive, and do not apply to criminal actions commenced prior to the January 1, 2020 effective date of the legislation ( see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK, § 1), such as this 2016 action ( see People v Galindo , 38 NY3d 199 [2022]; People v Hall , 210 AD3d 482, 483 2023The recent amendments to CPL 30.30, which, inter alia, permit a defendant who pleaded guilty to raise a statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see CPL 30.30[6]), and extended statutory speedy trial limitations to traffic infractions charged in the same accusatory instrument with certain other offenses ( see CPL 30.30[1][e]), are not retroactive, and do not apply to criminal actions commenced prior to the January 1, 2020 effective date of the legislation ( see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK, § 1), such as this 2016 action ( see People v Galindo , 38 NY3d 199 [2022]; People v Hall , 210 AD3d 482, 483 | 1 | 6 |
People v. Georgegreen2 sentences2023Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v Gardner , 204 AD3d 1039, 1040 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542, 542 ). 2022Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v George , 199 AD3d 831 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542 ; People v Duggins , 192 AD3d 191 ). | 1 | 4 |
People v. Ryangreen2 sentences2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d&mdash, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954, *2 [2d Dept 2025]). 2025When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant must initially allege that the district attorney was not ready within the applicable period ( see People v Goode , 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon , 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Ryan , —AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 01954 , *2 [2d Dept 2025]). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Dugginsgreen2 sentences2022Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v Forbes , 203 AD3d at 949 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542 ; People v Duggins , 192 AD3d 191 ). 2022Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v George , 199 AD3d 831 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542 ; People v Duggins , 192 AD3d 191 ). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Wileygreen2 sentences1988The failure of defendant’s court-assigned counsel to make a motion to dismiss the indictment for noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement resulted in the waiver of a meritorious and dispositive objection that was sufficiently egregious, without more, to constitute a denial of defendant’s right to meaningful representation (see, People v O’Connell, 133 AD2d 970 ; see also, US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; People v Wiley, 120 AD2d 66 ). 1987We consider such an omission, which cannot be explained away as attributable to trial strategy, sufficiently egregious, without more, to constitute denial of meaningful representation by counsel (see, US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; see also, People v Wiley, 120 AD2d 66, 68 ), and to warrant our intervention in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Englandgreen2 sentences2025It is well settled that time elapsing because of court unavailability is not charged to the People when determining trial readiness ( see People v England , 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994]). 2025It is well settled that time elapsing because of court unavailability is not charged to the People when determining trial readiness ( see People v England , 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Burnettgreen | 1 | 1 |
Duell v. Condongreen1 sentence2021Furthermore, the Legislature did not clearly express — in either the statutory language or legislative history — an intention for the newly-enacted provision to be applied retroactively ( compare Matter of Duell v Condon , 84 NY2d 773, 784 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rosengreen1 sentence2021Subdivision (6) does not address how an appeal may be taken or perfected; it addresses the potential substance of a defendant's appellate arguments, i.e., whether he or she may raise a statutory speedy trial claim ( but see People v Rosen , 24 AD2d 1009, 1009 [1965]; People v Sullivan , 18 AD2d 1066, 1066 [1963]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Acostagreen1 sentence2021We agree with the First Department that the enactment of CPL 30.30 (6) does not alter that analysis ( see People v Person , 184 AD3d 447, 447 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1069 [2020]; see also People v Acosta , ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 07466, *1 [2020]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sweetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Anthony v. Pavonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cabangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Reidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Francogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Worthygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Joseph CC.green | 1 | 1 |
| 10 East Realty, LLC v. Incorporated Village of Valley Streamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Suttongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. O'Connell
green
2 sentences1992Relying upon People v O’Connell ( 133 AD2d 970 ), defendant contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failure to move to dismiss the indictment for noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement. 1991This court has indicated that counsel’s failure to move to dismiss charges based on the People’s noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement, without more, is sufficiently egregious to constitute the denial of meaningful representation (People v O’Connell, 133 AD2d 970, 971 ; see also, People v Miller, 142 AD2d 970 ). | 3 | 1988–1992 |
People v. Gardner
neutral
2 sentences2023Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v Gardner , 204 AD3d 1039, 1040 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542, 542 ). 2023That provision, which did [*2]not go into effect until after the defendant entered his plea of guilty and the judgment of conviction was rendered, does not apply retroactively ( see People v Gardner , 204 AD3d at 1040 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d at 542 ). | 2 | 2022–2023 |
People v. Forbes
green
2 sentences2022Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPL 30.30(6), which provides that a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty," does not apply to this case so as to permit the defendant to raise his statutory speedy trial claim on appeal ( see People v Forbes , 203 AD3d at 949 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d 542 ; People v Duggins , 192 AD3d 191 ). 2022The cited provision did not become effective until January 1, 2020, i.e., after defendant was sentenced in September 2019, and courts have consistently held that the statutory amendment does not apply retroactively ( see People v Forbes , 203 AD3d at 949 ; People v George , 199 AD3d at 832 ; People v Lara-Medina , 195 AD3d at 542; People v Duggins , 192 AD3d 191, 195 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1096 [2021]). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cortes
green
2 sentences2014Thus, to avoid a statutory speedy trial violation, the People would have been required to demonstrate that sufficient periods of the delay were not chargeable to the People (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at 210 ; People v Devino, 110 AD3d at 1148). 2014Thus, to avoid a statutory speedy trial violation, the People would have been required to demonstrate that sufficient periods of the delay were not chargeable to the People (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at 210 ; People v Devino, 110 AD3d at 1148). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Taranovich
green
2 sentences1996A balancing of the factors set forth in People v Taranovich ( 37 NY2d 442, 445 ) indicates that defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. 1990Further, as noted by the Supreme Court, given the serious nature of the offense and the lack of prejudice, dismissal was not required on constitutional speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL 30.20 (see, People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 ). | 2 | 1990–1996 |
People v. Friscia
green
2 sentences1991(People v Friscia, 51 NY2d 845 .) Defendant was arrested on separate murder charges in the Virgin Islands, pleaded guilty, and was eventually lodged in a Federal detention facility in Terre Haute, Indiana, from which he was eventually returned to New York. 1989We reject the People’s contention that defendant was seeking to reserve his constitutional, rather than statutory, speedy trial challenge, which is not automatically waived by a guilty plea (see, People v Friscia, 51 NY2d 845, 847 ). | 2 | 1989–1991 |
People v. Lawrence
green
2 sentences1987The failure of defendant’s assigned trial counsel to make a written motion, upon reasonable notice, before trial to dismiss the indictment for noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement resulted in the waiver of a meritorious and dispositive objection (see, People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203 ). 1986As the defendant failed to raise either the constitutional claim (CPL 30.20) or the statutory speedy trial claim (CPL 30.30) in the court of first instance, the issues have been waived (see, People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200 ; People v Jordan, 62 NY2d 825 ; People v Adams, 38 NY2d 605 ; People v White, 32 NY2d 393 ; People v Ruiz, 107 AD2d 770 ). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
People v. Yakubov
green
1 sentence2024Although the written waiver of the right to appeal included incorrect statements of the applicable law, the record demonstrates that, under the totality of the circumstances, including the Supreme Court's oral colloquy, the defendant's consultation with counsel, and the defendant's age and experience, the defendant had a full appreciation of the terms and consequences of the appeal waiver ( see People v Reyes-Guzman , 222 AD3d 887 , 887; People v Stacker , 206 AD3d 766 , 766; People v Yakubov , 204 AD3d 1043, 1044 ; People v Lawrence , 184 AD3d 587, 587 ). "'[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Romero
green
1 sentence2024Although the written waiver of the right to appeal included incorrect statements of the applicable law, the record demonstrates that, under the totality of the circumstances, including the Supreme Court's oral colloquy, the defendant's consultation with counsel, and the defendant's age and experience, the defendant had a full appreciation of the terms and consequences of the appeal waiver ( see People v Reyes-Guzman , 222 AD3d 887 , 887; People v Stacker , 206 AD3d 766 , 766; People v Yakubov , 204 AD3d 1043, 1044 ; People v Lawrence , 184 AD3d 587, 587 ). "'[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Peopl v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2021As the People exceeded the 90-day statutory limit, defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss the information based upon the People's noncompliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement was sufficiently egregious to constitute the denial of meaningful representation ( see People v Devino , 110 AD3d 1146 , 1149 [2013]; People v Jackson , 172 AD2d 874 , 875 [1991]; People v Jenkins , 58 Misc 3d 150[A] , 2018 NY Slip Op 50088[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| The People v. Dru Allard green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Kidd green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Holland green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Zeigler green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re Dashawn R. neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Sze green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Bediako green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Briggs green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Mitchell neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Charles C. Dean v. Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, and Department of Correctional Services green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. McMillan green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Lavalle green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Petrovich green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Trepasso green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Colon green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. McMillan green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Taylor green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Smiley-Walsh v. New York City Housing Authority green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Parker green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Ferguson green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Di Donato green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Deutchman neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Lomax green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Callahan green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Frederick green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Allen green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Greenwaldt green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Adams green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.