6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crain v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In D.M., the Indiana Supreme Court discussed voluntariness in the related context of knowingly and voluntarily waiving one’s Miranda rights: In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 2014In D.M., the Indiana Supreme Court discussed voluntariness in the related context of knowingly and voluntarily waiving one’s Miranda rights: In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S | 4 | 4 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen2 sentences2025Voluntariness of the Waiver [33] “In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice ‘was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception’ and whether the waiver was ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].’” Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). [34] Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-4 provides the following factors to cons 2014In D.M., the Indiana Supreme Court discussed voluntariness in the related context of knowingly and voluntarily waiving one’s Miranda rights: In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S | 1 | 5 |
DM v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Voluntariness of the Waiver [33] “In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice ‘was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception’ and whether the waiver was ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].’” Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). [34] Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-4 provides the following factors to cons 2016D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 339-340 (Ind. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). [11] The special status accorded juveniles in other areas of the law is fully applicable in the area of criminal procedure. | 1 | 2 |
Pruitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2016However, “to the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.” Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 104 (Ind. 2005). [10] Our supreme court has clearly identified how we are to determine the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fare v. Michael C.
green
2 sentences2014In D.M., the Indiana Supreme Court discussed voluntariness in the related context of knowingly and voluntarily waiving one’s Miranda rights: In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 2014In D.M., the Indiana Supreme Court discussed voluntariness in the related context of knowingly and voluntarily waiving one’s Miranda rights: In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S | 4 | 2011–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.