commonality requirement in Texas

2005Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607 , 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2242-44 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689, 704 (1997).

2005Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607 , 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2242-44 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689, 704 (1997).

2012The class certification order states, “Whether the offer was made by [Glencrest] uniformly to all class members; the class members’ acceptance by signing identical leases as called for in the offer as consideration; consideration; and the alleged lack of payment are common to all of the class members.” When a class action is based on an oral contract, the terms of the oral contract must be proven to be substantially similar by proving that the defendant engaged in a “common course of conduct.” See Nissan Motor Co. v. Fry , 27 S.W.3d 573, 588 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied) (“The c

2012The class certification order states, “Whether the offer was made by [Glencrest] uniformly to all class members; the class members’ acceptance by signing identical leases as called for in the offer as consideration; consideration; and the alleged lack of payment are common to all of the class members.” When a class action is based on an oral contract, the terms of the oral contract must be proven to be substantially similar by proving that the defendant engaged in a “common course of conduct.” See Nissan Motor Co. v. Fry, 27 S.W.3d 573, 588 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied) (“The co

2008Microsoft Corp., 914 S.W.2d at 611; Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d 631, 641 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) Plaintiff alleges that Hertz engaged in the same uniform policy and practice in regard to its FSC, and the documents produced by Hertz prove that to be the case.

2002Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d 631, 643 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

2018Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433–34 (noting that predominance requirement is “one of the most stringent prerequisites to certification” and is “far more demanding than the commonality requirement” (internal quotes omitted)); see also Stonebridge Life Ins., 236 S.W.3d at 205 (“Because predominance is one of the most stringent prerequisites to class-action certification, it is considered first in our review and must be rigorously applied.”).

2018Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433–34 (noting that predominance requirement is “one of the most stringent prerequisites to certification” and is “far more demanding than the commonality requirement”) (internal quotes omitted); see also Stonebridge Life Ins., 236 S.W.3d at 205 (“Because predominance is one of the most stringent prerequisites to class-action certification, it is considered first in our review and must be rigorously applied.”).

2000Entex, 990 S.W.2d at 919 ; Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602 611 (Tex.App.— Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

1999“The commonality requirement does not mean that all questions of law and fact must be identical, but that an issue of law or fact exists that inheres in the complaints of all the class members.” Id.; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 611 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d) (noting a single common question could provide grounds for a class action).

2000Beresky, 986 S.W.2d at 387 ; Dresser, 847 S.W.2d at 372 .

1999Dresser, 847 S.W.2d at 372 .

2002Entex v. City of Pearland, 990 S.W.2d 904, 919 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2002Entex v. City of Pearland, 990 S.W.2d 904, 919 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2008Sun Coast Resources, Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet dism’d w.o.j.) (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986)); see, also, Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir.1999) (the commonality requirement “is not demanding”).

2003Yet it does require at least one issue of law or fact “that inheres in the complaints of all class members.” Id.; see also Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986); Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain, 26 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

2018“The test for predominance is not whether common issues outnumber uncommon issues but . . . whether common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the court.” Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting Central Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)).

2018“The test for predominance is not whether common 7 issues outnumber uncommon issues but . . . whether common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the court.” Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting Central Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)).

2009Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain , 26 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).

2009Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain, 26 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

2002National challenges the trial court=s findings as being Atoo general to satisfy the commonality requirement because each simply restates the causes of action.@ In support of this proposition, National cites Kelley v. Galveston Autoplex, 196 F.R.D. 471, 475 (S.D.

2002National challenges the trial court’s findings as being “too general to satisfy the commonality requirement because each simply restates the causes of action.” In support of this proposition, National cites Kelley v. Galveston Autoplex, 196 F.R.D. 471, 475 (S.D.Tex.2000). 4 However, in Kelley , the federal district court did not find commonality because the alleged violations took many different forms.

2024The predominance requirement is “one of the most stringent prerequisites to class certification” and is “far more demanding than the commonality requirement.” Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433–34; see also Stonebridge Life Ins.

2021“Courts determine whether common issues predominate by identifying the substantive issues of the case that will control the outcome of the litigation, assessing which issues will predominate, and determining if the predominating issues are, in fact, those common to the class.” Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433–34; see id. (noting that predominance requirement is “one of the most stringent prerequisites to certification” and is “far more demanding than the commonality requirement” (citations omitted)).

2000Rio Grande Valley Gas , 962 S.W.2d at 643 ; Weatherly , 905 S.W.2d at 651 ( citing Adams v. Reagan , 791 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990, no writ)).

2000Rio Grande Valley Gas, 962 S.W.2d at 643 ; Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 651 (citing Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1990, no writ)).

2012The class certification order states, “Whether the offer was made by [Glencrest] uniformly to all class members; the class members’ acceptance by signing identical leases as called for in the offer as consideration; consideration; and the alleged lack of payment are common to all of the class members.” When a class action is based on an oral contract, the terms of the oral contract must be proven to be substantially similar by proving that the defendant engaged in a “common course of conduct.” See Nissan Motor Co. v. Fry , 27 S.W.3d 573, 588 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied) (“The c

2012The class certification order states, “Whether the offer was made by [Glencrest] uniformly to all class members; the class members’ acceptance by signing identical leases as called for in the offer as consideration; consideration; and the alleged lack of payment are common to all of the class members.” When a class action is based on an oral contract, the terms of the oral contract must be proven to be substantially similar by proving that the defendant engaged in a “common course of conduct.” See Nissan Motor Co. v. Fry, 27 S.W.3d 573, 588 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied) (“The co

2004Id. at 435 ; see also Tana Oil, 978 S.W.2d at 742 .

2004Id. at 435 ; see also Tana Oil , 978 S.W.2d at 742 .

1996Cooper v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F.Supp. 187, 191 (N.D.Tex.1979); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ).

1993Cooper v. University of Texas at Dallas, 482 F.Supp. 187, 191 (N.D.Tex.1979).

2015“A common'question exists when the answer as to one class member is the same as to all.” Peltier Enters., Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (citing Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 4 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

2015“A common'question exists when the answer as to one class member is the same as to all.” Peltier Enters., Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (citing Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 4 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

2008Sun Coast Resources, Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet dism’d w.o.j.) (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986)); see, also, Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir.1999) (the commonality requirement “is not demanding”).

2008See Hankins, 111 S.W.3d at 74-75 (holding that even under the commonality requirement’s low threshold, a class with both proceeds leases and market value leases would fail).

2008See Hankins, 111 S.W.3d at 74-75 (holding that even under the commonality requirement’s low threshold, a class with both proceeds leases and market value leases would fail).

2008Snyder Communications v. Magana, 94 S.W.3d 213, 231 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002), rev’d on other grounds (“commonality is satisfied if the Class members were subject to the same misrepresentations and omissions”); FirstCollect, Inc. v. Armstrong, 976 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (all customers paid a collection fee that was alleged to be unlawful); Alford Chevrolet-Geo v. Jones, 91 S.W.3d 396 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (every Class member subject to same sales contract terms); National Western Life Ins.

2008Sun Coast Resources, Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet dism’d w.o.j.) (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986)); see, also, Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir.1999) (the commonality requirement “is not demanding”).

2008Snyder Communications v. Magana, 94 S.W.3d 213, 231 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002), rev’d on other grounds (“commonality is satisfied if the Class members were subject to the same misrepresentations and omissions”); FirstCollect, Inc. v. Armstrong, 976 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (all customers paid a collection fee that was alleged to be unlawful); Alford Chevrolet-Geo v. Jones, 91 S.W.3d 396 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (every Class member subject to same sales contract terms); National Western Life Ins.

2002The court indicated that in order *300 for certification to be proper, the contracts in issue would have had to be “a single type of contract that is virtually, if not completely, identical in each transaction.” Id. (quoting Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D.Tex.1993)).