official records exception in California

2024(See People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 134 [concluding that a trial court may admit and consider a CLETS printout under the official records exception to the hearsay rule].) Not only is the consideration of the certified records specifically contemplated by statute to establish proof of a prior prison term, we conclude this does not offend constitutional law.

2018A willful and knowing violation of a restraining order issued under section 213.5 is a misdemeanor punishable under Penal Code section 273.65, and, as a matter of evidence in any such proceeding, the entry of a CLETS report may be admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Martinez , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 134 , 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 687 , 990 P.2d 563 .) As counsel noted, issuance of the restraining order requires entry of the order into the CLETS system, which is available to all public law enforcement agencies, and may, as defense counsel argued, negatively

2019(See Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189 [In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony for sentencing purposes, “the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction ‘but no further’”].) Moreover, here the weight of the marijuana does “‘reflect[ ] the facts of the offense for which [appellant] was convicted.’” (Trujillo, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 179 .) Finally, unlike the defendant in Trujillo, appellant was not on trial for “an allegation that [he] had suffered a prior conviction for a violent felony within the meaning of the ‘Three Strikes’ law . . . .” (Id.

2019(See Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189 [In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony for sentencing purposes, “the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction ‘but no further’”].) Moreover, here the weight of the marijuana does “‘reflect[ ] the facts of the offense for which [appellant] was convicted.’” (Trujillo, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 179 .) Finally, unlike the defendant in Trujillo, appellant was not on trial for “an allegation that [he] had suffered a prior conviction for a violent felony within the meaning of the ‘Three Strikes’ law . . . .” (Id.

2021The object of the official records exception to the hearsay rule “ ‘is to eliminate the calling of each witness involved in the preparation of the record and substitute the record of the transaction instead. [Citations.] Accordingly, for the exception to apply, it is not necessary that the person making the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction. [Citations.] Assuming satisfaction of the exception’s other requirements, the trustworthiness requirement . . . is established by a showing that the written report is based upon the observations of public employees who had a duty to observe

2020Code, § 664; see also Coe v. City of San Diego (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 772 , 786–788 [police reports are admissible under the official records exception].) 13 Reynoso’s confession itself is admissible as a party admission.

2019Code, § 1271), our Supreme Court stated: “The psychiatrist’s opinion that the victim suffered from a sexual psychopathology was merely an opinion, not an act, condition or event within the meaning of the statute.” (People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486 , 19 503; see also Hutton v. Brookside Hospital (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 350, 355 .) Although the deputies’ conclusion concerning the significance of the scale and baggies is not admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the conclusion based on its reliability.

2019Code, § 1271), our Supreme Court stated: “The psychiatrist’s opinion that the victim suffered from a sexual psychopathology was merely an opinion, not an act, condition or event within the meaning of the statute.” (People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486 , 19 503; see also Hutton v. Brookside Hospital (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 350, 355 .) Although the deputies’ conclusion concerning the significance of the scale and baggies is not admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the conclusion based on its reliability.

2019(See Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [“limited use of hearsay such as that found in probation reports is permitted, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the hearsay information is reliable”]; Banda, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 357 [“the petition in a Proposition 64 case . . . bears the hallmarks of a resentencing proceeding.

2019(See Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [“limited use of hearsay such as that found in probation reports is permitted, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the hearsay information is reliable”]; Banda, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 357 [“the petition in a Proposition 64 case . . . bears the hallmarks of a resentencing proceeding.

2019(See Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [“limited use of hearsay such as that found in probation reports is permitted, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the hearsay information is reliable”]; Banda, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 357 [“the petition in a Proposition 64 case . . . bears the hallmarks of a resentencing proceeding.

2019(See Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [“limited use of hearsay such as that found in probation reports is permitted, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the hearsay information is reliable”]; Banda, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 357 [“the petition in a Proposition 64 case . . . bears the hallmarks of a resentencing proceeding.

1995(See, e.g., Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1369-1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]; Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 72, 76-79 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 31 A.L.R.4th 905 ].) However, he contends that “such a report is not admissible under the official records exception ... as to any assertions not based on the personal knowledge of the officer who prepared it. [Citations.]” (Original italics.) Accordingly, Cobb’s sworn report does not qualify under the exception insofar as it relates Grochowski’s observation of the driving.

1995(See, e.g., Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1369-1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]; Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 72, 76-79 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 31 A.L.R.4th 905 ].) However, he contends that “such a report is not admissible under the official records exception ... as to any assertions not based on the personal knowledge of the officer who prepared it. [Citations.]” (Original italics.) Accordingly, Cobb’s sworn report does not qualify under the exception insofar as it relates Grochowski’s observation of the driving.

2021If defendant had raised a hearsay objection, the prosecution would have likely asserted the evidence was admissible under the official records exception pursuant to section 1280: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if all of the following applies: [¶] (a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a 58. public employee. [¶] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. [¶] (c) The sour

2013(Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 317-319 .) In People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1477 , the court explained: “Although similar to the business records exception . . . , the official records exception differs in one important respect. ‘[The former] requires a witness to testify as to the identity of the 4 record and its mode of preparation in every instance.

2023Code, s]ection 1280 to prove the commission, attempted commission, or solicitation of a criminal offense, prior conviction, service of a prison term, or other act, condition, or event recorded by the record.” Evidence Code section 452.5 “creates a hearsay exception allowing admission of qualifying court records to prove not only the fact of conviction, but also that the offense reflected in the record occurred,” and the language of the provision “is clear and unambiguous.” (People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1460-1461 (Duran).) Exhibits 1 through 7 and 21 were admissible under Evidenc

2006In Duran , the court interpreted section 452.5, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a]n official record of conviction ... is admissible pursuant to Section 1280 [the official records exception to the hearsay rule] to prove the commission ... of a criminal offense . . . .” ( 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460 , italics omitted.) Finding that this statutory language was unambiguous, the Duran court held that “section 452.5 states a new hearsay exception for certified official records of conviction, which may be offered to prove not only the fact of a conviction, but the commission of the underlying of

2023Code, § 1280, subd. (c); Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 461 ; People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 843 [“‘Assuming satisfaction of the exception’s other requirements, “[t]he trustworthiness requirement . . . is established by a showing that the written [arrest] report is based upon the observations of public employees who have a duty [as the arresting deputies had] to observe the facts and report and record them correctly.”’”].) However, no hearsay exception applies to the out-of-court statements made by the eight witnesses in the police reports, nor do the People point to an applica

2022Code, § 1280; Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 461–462; People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831 , 843–845 (Hall); Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 .) The official records exception to the hearsay rule is based on the presumption that public officers properly perform their official duties.

2022(Rupf, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 431 .) The court first observed that the deputy “testified as to his observations and as to appellant’s admissions to him,” and “no objection was made to introduction of the sheriff’s report itself.” (Id. at p. 430.) The court held that “[c]learly any firsthand observations by [the deputy], either were not hearsay or, if contained in the sheriff’s report prepared by him, were admissible under the official records exception.” (Id. at p. 431, italics added.) The observations contained in the sheriff’s report that were admissible under Evidence Code section 1280

2016(Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 430 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 157 ]; McNary v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 688, 695 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 55 ]; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ].) Although Coe contends the method of preparation was suspect to the extent the officers and detectives used past reports as templates, she identifies only a few reports containing errors attributable to this method and only one error she characterizes as critical, which the City noted and corrected on its own.

2021Code, § 1280, subd. (b)), the Martinez court relied on statutes requiring law enforcement agencies to report criminal proceedings to the Department of Justice (Department) and requiring the Department to provide information on request within certain time limits. ( Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 121-125 [collecting statutes]; see also People v. Morris (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363 , 371- 372.) To satisfy the requirement that the writing was made by and within the scope of duty by a public employee (Evid.

2013(People v. Morris (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363, 367 .) Although assault with a deadly weapon is not among the crimes expressly enumerated under the MDO law, the crime is, by definition, one involving the use of force or violence.

2021The object of the official records exception to the hearsay rule “ ‘is to eliminate the calling of each witness involved in the preparation of the record and substitute the record of the transaction instead. [Citations.] Accordingly, for the exception to apply, it is not necessary that the person making the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction. [Citations.] Assuming satisfaction of the exception’s other requirements, the trustworthiness requirement . . . is established by a showing that the written report is based upon the observations of public employees who had a duty to observe

2016(Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 430 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 157 ]; McNary v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 688, 695 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 55 ]; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ].) Although Coe contends the method of preparation was suspect to the extent the officers and detectives used past reports as templates, she identifies only a few reports containing errors attributable to this method and only one error she characterizes as critical, which the City noted and corrected on its own.

2009Under these circumstances, the Department’s statutory recording duties are sufficiently specific to support the trial court’s discretionary determination that the CLETS printout met the timeliness requirement of the official records exception. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 128.) More recently, the court in Miyamoto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ] (Miyamoto), addressed the same issue.

2009Under these circumstances, the Department’s statutory recording duties are sufficiently specific to support the trial court’s discretionary determination that the CLETS printout met the timeliness requirement of the official records exception. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 128.) More recently, the court in Miyamoto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ] (Miyamoto), addressed the same issue.

2014(Id. at p. 131.) Under Martinez, the trial court here did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting the disposition.7 (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 120 , citing People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 978 [trial court has broad discretion to determine whether foundational requirements have been met].) First, Helbling, the paralegal from the district attorney’s 7 Because defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the disposition as hearsay, the trial court did not expressly consider the official records exception to the hearsay rule. 6 office,8 testified that the DOJ generated the dispos

2000At the time of defendant's trial, Evidence Code section 1280 provided: "Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if: [¶] (a) [t]he writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee; [¶] (b) [t]he writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; and [¶] (c) [t]he sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness." (Stats.1965, ch. 299, § 2, p. 1343.) A trial court has broad discr

2006In Duran , the court interpreted section 452.5, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a]n official record of conviction ... is admissible pursuant to Section 1280 [the official records exception to the hearsay rule] to prove the commission ... of a criminal offense . . . .” ( 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460 , italics omitted.) Finding that this statutory language was unambiguous, the Duran court held that “section 452.5 states a new hearsay exception for certified official records of conviction, which may be offered to prove not only the fact of a conviction, but the commission of the underlying of

2006In Duran , the court interpreted section 452.5, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a]n official record of conviction ... is admissible pursuant to Section 1280 [the official records exception to the hearsay rule] to prove the commission ... of a criminal offense . . . .” ( 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460 , italics omitted.) Finding that this statutory language was unambiguous, the Duran court held that “section 452.5 states a new hearsay exception for certified official records of conviction, which may be offered to prove not only the fact of a conviction, but the commission of the underlying of

1995(See, e.g., Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1369-1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]; Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 72, 76-79 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 31 A.L.R.4th 905 ].) However, he contends that “such a report is not admissible under the official records exception ... as to any assertions not based on the personal knowledge of the officer who prepared it. [Citations.]” (Original italics.) Accordingly, Cobb’s sworn report does not qualify under the exception insofar as it relates Grochowski’s observation of the driving.

1995(See, e.g., Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1369-1375 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]; Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 72, 76-79 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 31 A.L.R.4th 905 ].) However, he contends that “such a report is not admissible under the official records exception ... as to any assertions not based on the personal knowledge of the officer who prepared it. [Citations.]” (Original italics.) Accordingly, Cobb’s sworn report does not qualify under the exception insofar as it relates Grochowski’s observation of the driving.

2026(See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676 [“Case-specific facts are those relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried”].) We have previously upheld the admission of “uncertified computer printouts reporting criminal history information” or rap sheets under the official records exception to the hearsay rule.

2015(Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 232, fn. 6 .) 9 the official records exception to the hearsay rule, “the statements of those who prepare an official record concerning their personal observations as well as the observations of others who were acting pursuant to their official duty to observe and accurately report facts are admissible. . . .