intent-effects test in Maryland

2013We pointed out in Young that, although the intent-effects test was gleaned from United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (a double jeopardy case) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d501 (1997) (involving both ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges), the test is applicable in the due process context to determine whether a law constitutes "punishment.” Young, 370 Md. at 711 -12 n. 11, 806 A.2d 233 .

2013We pointed out in Young that, although the intent-effects test was gleaned from United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (a double jeopardy case) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d501 (1997) (involving both ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges), the test is applicable in the due process context to determine whether a law constitutes "punishment.” Young, 370 Md. at 711 -12 n. 11, 806 A.2d 233 .

2016Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as read in pari materia with the less expansive federal ex post facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” See Wilkerson, 420 Md. at 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the narrowest opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)). *19 We recognize, however, that in reachin

2016Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as read in pari materia with the less expansive federal ex post facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” See Wilkerson, 420 Md. at 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the narrowest opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)). *19 We recognize, however, that in reachin

2016Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as read in pari materia with the less expansive federal ex post facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” See Wilkerson, 420 Md. at 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the narrowest opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)). *19 We recognize, however, that in reachin

2016Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as read in pari materia with the less expansive federal ex post facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” See Wilkerson, 420 Md. at 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the narrowest opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)). *19 We recognize, however, that in reachin

2016Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,” [Kansas v. ]Hendricks, [ 521 U.S. 346 ] , at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 [ (1997) ], “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636 )[.] Smith, 538 U.S. at 90 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (some citations omitted).

2016Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,” [Kansas v. ]Hendricks, [ 521 U.S. 346 ] , at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 [ (1997) ], “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636 )[.] Smith, 538 U.S. at 90 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (some citations omitted).

2016In Re: Nick H., 224 Md.App. at 691 , 123 A.3d 229 (quoting from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)).

2016In Re: Nick H., 224 Md.App. at 691 , 123 A.3d 229 (quoting from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)).

2016In Re: Nick H., we said: *18 Because Doe I is a plurality decision, we employ the Marks Rule to determine the Court's holding: “ ‘[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [four judges], the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (2011) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)).

2016In Re: Nick H., we said: *18 Because Doe I is a plurality decision, we employ the Marks Rule to determine the Court's holding: “ ‘[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [four judges], the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (2011) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)).

2016In applying the intent-effects test, the Supreme Court said: If the intention of the legislature ... was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

2016In applying the intent-effects test, the Supreme Court said: If the intention of the legislature ... was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

2013We pointed out in Young that, although the intent-effects test was gleaned from United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (a double jeopardy case) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d501 (1997) (involving both ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges), the test is applicable in the due process context to determine whether a law constitutes "punishment.” Young, 370 Md. at 711 -12 n. 11, 806 A.2d 233 .

2013We pointed out in Young that, although the intent-effects test was gleaned from United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (a double jeopardy case) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d501 (1997) (involving both ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges), the test is applicable in the due process context to determine whether a law constitutes "punishment.” Young, 370 Md. at 711 -12 n. 11, 806 A.2d 233 .