intent-effects test in Indiana

2019See id. at 810 ; see also Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 , 390-91 (Ind. 2009) (noting that "every statute [is] clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until that presumption is clearly overcome by a contrary showing").

2015See also Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. 2009) (concluding that the effects of the act were non-punitive when applied to Jensen because the “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea in 2000; therefore, requiring him to register under the 2006 Amendment to the Act does not violate Indiana’s constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws). [13] Here, several of the intent-effects test factors weigh in favor of treating INSORA as non-punitive when applied to Slone.

2016See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 (observing that the United States Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test in discussing whether a statute violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 55A01-1604-CR-953 | November 22, 2016 Page 12 of 13 and that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Trisler’s motion to dismiss.

2015Id. [11] When we apply the intent-effects test here, we look to Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 2011), for guidance.

2026Although our analysis under the intent-effects test is “independent from that of the federal standard,” Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 316 n.3, the analytical framework itself is the “same,” Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2010).

2013State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind.2010); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009), the defendant is correct in his assertion that "Indiana does not use the heightened standard of clearest proof ... as used by the United States Supreme Court....” Appellant’s Br. at 7; Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 n. 7 (“The heightened standard of clearest proof is not consistent with this State's decisional law.”).

2026Although our analysis under the intent-effects test is “independent from that of the federal standard,” Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 316 n.3, the analytical framework itself is the “same,” Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2010).

2016Constitution and holding that the intent-effects is the “appropriate analytical framework for analyzing ex post facto claims under the Indiana Constitution”); Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 316, n.3 (Ind. 2013) (observing that “Indiana courts have adopted an approach consistent with the federal standard through use of the intent-effects test”).

2019Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810 (citations omitted). [15] In applying the intent-effects test in Harris , our supreme court initially presumed the 2007 amendment was civil and regulatory.

2015Id. [11] When we apply the intent-effects test here, we look to Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 2011), for guidance.

2016Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ); see also Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 390 ; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810 .

2016Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ); see also Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 390 ; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810 .

2016On grounds other than the intent-effects test at least one federal circuit characterized the firearms possession ban under the federal GCA as imposing a “civil disability.” See United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1008-1009 (9th Cir.2013).

2016On grounds other than the intent-effects test at least one federal circuit characterized the firearms possession ban under the federal GCA as imposing a “civil disability.” See United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1008-1009 (9th Cir. 2013).

2014Healey v. State, 986 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).