private claim in New York

1969In sustaining the counterclaim, the court found a distinction between a judgment involving ‘1 marital status, ’ ’ and one concerned with a ‘ ‘ private claim or demand arising out of the marriage.” The rule was carefully defined in the later case of Querze v. Querze ( 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ) where the court said: ‘ ‘ This court has held that a void foreign divorce decree will preclude the spouse who obtains it from asserting in our courts a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Star buck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ).

1969A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ). 2 The defendant’s premise in point of law is strictly confined to the impotence of the decree to affect the marital status itself (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ; cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 200-203 ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N Y 2d 342, 351).

1980A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N.Y. 612 ).

1969A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ). 2 The defendant’s premise in point of law is strictly confined to the impotence of the decree to affect the marital status itself (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ; cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 200-203 ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N Y 2d 342, 351).

1980A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N.Y. 612 ).

1969A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ). 2 The defendant’s premise in point of law is strictly confined to the impotence of the decree to affect the marital status itself (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ; cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 200-203 ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N Y 2d 342, 351).

1963The distinction between suits to establish the marital status and those which merely are brought to assert a private claim for pecuniary gain has been clearly stated and recognized in cases involving an invalid divorce in a sister State (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 358-359 ).

1963(Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146 , supra; Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13 ; Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779 .) However, an invalid foreign divorce, whether obtained in a sister State (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ) or in a foreign country (Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ) ‘ will preclude the spouse who obtains it from asserting in our courts a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 , supra.) (See, also, Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 158-159 .) * * * “ The support for which plaintiff here sues is not sought as an incid

1969But we have consistently held that such a decree will have no effect upon the right of either spouse to a full adjudication in our courts upon the question of the existing marital status (Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657 ; Vose v. Vose, [ 289 N. Y. 779 ] supra; Maloney v. Maloney, 288 N. Y. 532 ).” (Emphasis supplied.) (See, also, Shannon v. Shannon, 247 App. Div. 790 ; Considine v. Bawl, 39 Misc 2d 1021 ; McDermott v. McDermott, 252 App. Div. 875 .) The fine line thus drawn in the cases between adjudications of “marital status ” and those affecting “private ri

1947But we have consistently held that such a decree will have no effect upon the right of either spouse to a full adjudication in our courts upon the question of the existing marital status (Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657 ; Vose v. Vose [ 280 N. Y. 779 ], supra; Maloney v. Maloney, 288 N. Y. 532 ). * * * “ The rule against collateral attack has no application here.

1969But we have consistently held that such a decree will have no effect upon the right of either spouse to a full adjudication in our courts upon the question of the existing marital status (Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657 ; Vose v. Vose, [ 289 N. Y. 779 ] supra; Maloney v. Maloney, 288 N. Y. 532 ).” (Emphasis supplied.) (See, also, Shannon v. Shannon, 247 App. Div. 790 ; Considine v. Bawl, 39 Misc 2d 1021 ; McDermott v. McDermott, 252 App. Div. 875 .) The fine line thus drawn in the cases between adjudications of “marital status ” and those affecting “private ri

1947But we have consistently held that such a decree will have no effect upon the right of either spouse to a full adjudication in our courts upon the question of the existing marital status (Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657 ; Vose v. Vose [ 280 N. Y. 779 ], supra; Maloney v. Maloney, 288 N. Y. 532 ). * * * “ The rule against collateral attack has no application here.

1952That right comes from the statute and not from the common law (Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 571 ).

1951That right comes from the statute and not from the common law (Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 571 ).

2002Bank of Brooklyn v State of New York, 243 NY 231, 241 ).

1938(Farrington v. State, 248 N. Y. 112 .) It may, however, “ reject the calls of justice, equity and fair dealing, stand upon its legal rights and leave the claimant without remedy, and the State alone, through its Legislature, can decide which course it will pursue.” (Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State, 243 N. Y. 231, at p. 240 .) In the latter case, regarding the duties of the Legislature and this court, it was said: “ In the first place, of course, it is necessary to ascertain the facts which are thought to give rise to this kind of an obligation and while undoubtedly the duty rests. upon the

2002For example, in Babcock v State of New York ( 190 App Div 147, 156 ), cited by the defendant, the Court said: “The Legislature, although it may not make a gift of the moneys of the State, nor itself audit or allow a private claim against the State, may yet recognize and legalize private claims, which, though unenforcible through the application of legal principles, are yet founded upon equity and justice, and it may empower the Court of Claims to audit and allow them” (id. at 156-157; Carr v State of New York, 231 NY 164 [leaving determination of merits of underlying claim to court is not an a

1938It is well and simply expressed in Babcock v. State ( 190 App. Div. 147, at p. 156 ), where the court says: “ The Legislature, although it may not make a gift of the moneys of the State, nor itself audit or allow a private claim against the State, may yet recognize and legalize private claims, which, though unenforcible through the application of legal principles, are yet founded upon equity and justice, and it may empower the Court of Claims to audit and allow them.” The extent of the power of the Legislature is very clearly stated in Ausable Chasm Co. v. State ( 266 N. Y. 326 ), and the cour

1980The defendant’s premise in point of law is strictly confined to the impotence of the decree to affect the marital status itself (Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 17 ; cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 200-203 ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N Y 2d 342, 351).” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) The prior divorce decree in this case is not upon its face an unenforceable decree.

1969A foreign decree, though void for lack of jurisdiction, may still form the body of an estoppel against the party who caused it to be issued as to a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ). 2 The defendant’s premise in point of law is strictly confined to the impotence of the decree to affect the marital status itself (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ; cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 200-203 ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N Y 2d 342, 351).

1963(Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146 , supra; Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13 ; Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779 .) However, an invalid foreign divorce, whether obtained in a sister State (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ) or in a foreign country (Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ) ‘ will preclude the spouse who obtains it from asserting in our courts a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 , supra.) (See, also, Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 158-159 .) * * * “ The support for which plaintiff here sues is not sought as an incid

1952In short, while a void Mexican decree “ may not be the foundation for the creation of any rights ” (Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146, 150 , supra), it may well be the foundation for the termination of rights (Matter of Rathscheck, 300 N. Y. 346 , supra).

1963(Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146 , supra; Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13 ; Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779 .) However, an invalid foreign divorce, whether obtained in a sister State (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ) or in a foreign country (Hynes v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612 ) ‘ will preclude the spouse who obtains it from asserting in our courts a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 , supra.) (See, also, Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 158-159 .) * * * “ The support for which plaintiff here sues is not sought as an incid

1947But we have consistently held that such a decree will have no effect upon the right of either spouse to a full adjudication in our courts upon the question of the existing marital status (Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657 ; Vose v. Vose [ 280 N. Y. 779 ], supra; Maloney v. Maloney, 288 N. Y. 532 ). * * * “ The rule against collateral attack has no application here.

1963The distinction between suits to establish the marital status and those which merely are brought to assert a private claim for pecuniary gain has been clearly stated and recognized in cases involving an invalid divorce in a sister State (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 ; Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157 ; Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 358-359 ).

1958With respect to such divorces the courts have made it clear that they do not have even sufficient vitality to create an estoppel against the spouse who obtains it in an action to establish marital status, although it may suffice to preclude the spouse from asserting a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage (Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17-18 ; cf., Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 , involving a Massachusetts divorce but cited by the court in the Querze case for the proposition last discussed). * On the preceding analysis the case of Krause v. Krause ( 282 N. Y. 355 ) offers

2014In this regard, freedom of contract is also respected since, in the event that the statutory award is less than the contingency fee, deducting the court-awarded fees from the sum owed under the contract ensures that the attorney receives, and the client pays, no more or less than they bargained for (see Venegas, 495 US at 90 ).

2014In addition, permitting counsel to collect a statutory award that exceeds the amount due under a contingency fee agreement advances the “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” of the NYCHRL (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-130) by incentivizing the private bar to represent civil rights plaintiffs even where any damage award is likely to be insubstantial (see McGrath, 3 NY3d at 428 ; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502, as amended by Local Law No. 85 [2005] of City of NY).

2010In the Moreland Commission’s Summary Report contained in the legislative history, chapter 658 of the Laws of 1975, the Commission stated that section 2801-d provided a “supplemental mechanism for the enforcement of existing standards of care” and included incentives for the private bar to pursue meritorious lawsuits (Morisett v Terence Cardinal Cooke Health Care Ctr., 8 Misc 3d at 512-513 ).

2007(People v King, 137 Misc 2d 1087 [Crim Ct, NY County 1988].) A court’s discretion to designate its own preferred method of verification, as defendant concedes, is limited only by the statute and by the need to safeguard the defendant’s procedural rights.

2007(People v Pierre, 140 Misc 2d 623 [Crim Ct, NY County 1988].) Other courts have allowed the prosecutor to conduct a private hearing, and ruled on the witness’ swearability based on a recording of this hearing, filed and served with the court.

2006That dismissal was affirmed in Chapman v State of New York ( 261 AD2d 814 [1999]).

2002For example, in Babcock v State of New York ( 190 App Div 147, 156 ), cited by the defendant, the Court said: “The Legislature, although it may not make a gift of the moneys of the State, nor itself audit or allow a private claim against the State, may yet recognize and legalize private claims, which, though unenforcible through the application of legal principles, are yet founded upon equity and justice, and it may empower the Court of Claims to audit and allow them” (id. at 156-157; Carr v State of New York, 231 NY 164 [leaving determination of merits of underlying claim to court is not an a

1997In the case of State v Magnuson ( 210 Mont 401 , 682 P2d 1365 ), Mr. Magnuson argued before the Supreme Court of Montana that a medical facility receiving Federal assistance violated the confidentiality provision regarding patient records maintained in connection with alcohol abuse treatment programs by providing information concerning his intoxication to the Musselshell County Sheriff’s Department.

1997In the case of State v Magnuson ( 210 Mont 401 , 682 P2d 1365 ), Mr. Magnuson argued before the Supreme Court of Montana that a medical facility receiving Federal assistance violated the confidentiality provision regarding patient records maintained in connection with alcohol abuse treatment programs by providing information concerning his intoxication to the Musselshell County Sheriff’s Department.

1997(Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474 .) A qualified attorney must be given a hearing before he is deprived of the right to practice law on the ground that he lacks character and fitness.

1997(Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 573-574 .) The Supreme Court found a protected liberty interest in a government security clearance, without which an aeronautic engineer employed by a private defense contractor could not find work at a comparable salary.

1995Matter of Smiley , 36 N.Y.2d 433 (1975).