48 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Borjan v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 673-74 ; see also Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (an improper argument constitutes reversible error when, in light of the record as a whole, it is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings). 2016Id. at 673-74 ; see also Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (an improper argument constitutes reversible error when, in light of the record as a whole, it is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings). | 13 | 14 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences1982In holding the comment improper, the Court of Criminal Appeals set out the standard found in Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), as follows: The test as to whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error is whether, (1) the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, or (2) it is violative of a statute or, (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case. 1980In Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this Court stated the following rule: The test as to whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error is whether, (1) the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, or (2) it is violative of a statute or, (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case. | 6 | 9 |
Spaulding v. Stategreen2 sentences1988Spaulding v. State, 505 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). 1985The court in Spaulding v. State, 505 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), stated the pertinent standard of review: The test as to whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error is whether, (1) the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, or (2) it is violative of a statute or, (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case. | 3 | 3 |
Guidry v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See, Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. Crim. 2015See, Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Ponce v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Id.; Ponce v. State, 299 S.W.3d 167, 174-75 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.). 2012Id.; Ponce v. State, 299 S.W.3d 167, 174-75 (Tex.App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Poole v. Stategreen2 sentences2000App. 1990); see Poole v. State , 974 S.W.2d 892, 904 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.). 2000However, this conclusion does not end our analysis. *598 “An improper argument constitutes reversible error when in light of the record as a whole it was extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute, or injected new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings.” Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see Poole v. State, 974 S.W.2d 892, 904 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Todd v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 389-390 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (quoting Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1980)). 1996Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 389-390 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (quoting Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1980)). | 2 | 2 |
Ramos v. Stategreen2 sentences1976One is articulated in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 368 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967): "`If the prosecutor's remark can be interpreted as an expression of his personal opinion of the guilt of the appellant, then such argument would be improper. 1976One is articulated in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1967): “ ‘If the prosecutor’s remark can be interpreted as an expression of his personal opinion of the guilt of the appellant, then such argument would be improper. | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2006A different question would be presented if the prosecutor had, for example, named the former teacher and asked the jury members to recall their trust and respect for him. (6) Secondly, as noted in Wilson , our determination of whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error depends on whether it "injects a new and harmful fact into the case." 938 S.W.2d at 59 . 2004A different question would be presented if the prosecutor had, for example, named the former teacher and asked the jury members to recall their trust and respect for him. (6) Secondly, as noted in Wilson , our determination of whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error depends on whether it "injects a new and harmful fact into the case." 938 S.W.2d at 59 . | 1 | 5 |
Briddle v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 389-390 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (quoting Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1980)). 1996Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 389-390 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (quoting Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1980)). | 1 | 2 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Hernandez v. State , 819 S.W.2d 806, 820 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Colley v. Stategreen1 sentence1996McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); Colley v. State, 893 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. refd). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1996In support of this claim appellant relies on Johnson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Tex.Crim. 1996In support of this claim appellant relies on Johnson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and Thomas v. State, 519 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In support of this claim appellant relies on Johnson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and Thomas v. State, 519 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). | 1 | 1 |
McKay v. Stategreen1 sentence1996McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); Colley v. State, 893 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. refd). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen1 sentence1992Phillips v. State, 701 S.W.2d 875, 892 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Brandley v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 713 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 1986Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 713 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vineyard v. State
green
2 sentences1982Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548 (Tex.Cr.App.1922). 1982Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548 (Tex.Cr.App.1922). | 3 | 1972–1982 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2018Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 673-74 ; see also Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (an improper argument constitutes reversible error when, in light of the record as a whole, it is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings). 2016Id. at 673-74 ; see also Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (an improper argument constitutes reversible error when, in light of the record as a whole, it is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings). | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Wesbrook v. State
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hawkins v. State
green
2 sentences2008App. 1998), YORK DISSENT – 2 three-factor test for determining whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes reversible error.3 We consider: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction).4 In the motion for mistrial context, the ultimate question is “whether the refusal to grant the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.”5 The a 2008App. 1998), YORK DISSENT – 2 three-factor test for determining whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes reversible error.3 We consider: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction).4 In the motion for mistrial context, the ultimate question is “whether the refusal to grant the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.”5 The a | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cannon v. State
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Mosley v. State
green
1 sentence2008App. 1998), YORK DISSENT – 2 three-factor test for determining whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes reversible error.3 We consider: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction).4 In the motion for mistrial context, the ultimate question is “whether the refusal to grant the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.”5 The a | 1 | 2008–2008 |
David W. McKay v. Texas
green
2 sentences1996McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); Colley v. State, 893 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. refd). 1996McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); Colley v. State, 893 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. refd). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1984In Smith v. State, 653 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ), we find: “The test as to whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error is whether (1) it is manifestly improper, harmful or prejudicial, or (2) it is viola-tive of a statute, or (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case.... | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence1981In determining whether or not improper jury argument constitutes reversible error, the court in Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) recently stated: The test as to whether an improper argument constitutes reversible error is whether, (1) the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, or (2) it is violative of a statute or, (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Smerke v. Office Equipment Company
green
1 sentence1949And for the further reason that appellee’s counsel was the offender: Smerke v. Office Equipment Co., supra [ 138 Tex. 236 , 158 S.W.2d 304 ], This case quotes .the rule adopted by our Supreme Court for determining whether or not the argument constitutes reversible error. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Robbins v. Wynne
green
1 sentence1937In Robbins v. Wynne, 44 S.W.(2d) 946, 947 , opinion by Judge Critz, it was said: “When, as in a case like this, the improper argument and circumstances surrounding it are undisputed, we think the issue of injury is purely a law question. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.